

JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

VOL. 5

JULY, 1912

NO. 3

THE ELEMENT OF FEAR IN RELIGION.

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In how far may religion be considered a mere manifestation of social phenomena and in how far is it rooted in individual psychology? Is there any common trait which cannot be explained by a reference beyond the social *milieu*? Is it true that, "*Unter der Hülle aller Religionen liegt die Religion selbst?*" And what is this *Religion selbst*, if there be such? While not attempting to define *Religion selbst*, an effort will be made here to point out one element believed to be common to every religion, simple and crude, or complex and advanced. If this be established, then it follows that religion is necessarily rooted in individual as well as in social psychology, since no social complex presents any one common feature—unless it be such fundamental underlying features as find their ultimate support in the individual psychic needs. Chance could not explain an element so general and invariable.

It will be well to keep in mind a distinction not observed in the treatment of this topic by a large class of writers, viz., the distinction between religion and religious emotion itself and the manifestation of religion and religious emotions themselves. The former may appear in manifold garb and guise, without losing its distinctive character. To confuse or to identify the two is like identifying the meal-hour with hunger. There is a certain chain of connection and of influence between the two, the meal-hour determining the time and place and diet, and, to some extent, regulating the appetite itself. The meal-hour is social, but no one would contend that it was hunger itself, or that the latter was not the more fundamental, and the one thing responsible for the meal-hour, rather than *vice versa*.

And this remains true, although, in some socially well regulated lives, we may find, through a period of many years, a thorough correspondence between the individual need and the social arrangement. If we take mankind over a larger range and in its less advanced, as well as in its more advanced standings, we shall the more easily see the fundamental difference between the social arrangement and the individual needs.

A confusion no less fundamental than this suggested confusion between the meal-hour and hunger seems to have been made by a certain class of the social psychologists, of whom Durkheim may be taken as one of the most brilliant, though, the writer is convinced, sometimes an erring representative. While agreeing with him as to the method by which these facts must be approached, namely, through a study of the whole social complex in which they find manifestation, we are forced to differ from him as regards the interpretation of those phenomena; as, for example, when he says,¹ after pointing out the obligatory character of religion, "*La religion obligatoire ne saurait avoir des origines individuelles.*" Granted the compulsory character of religious manifestations, does he not make the same fundamental error of inference in forthwith denying its origin in the individual, that one would make in concluding from the fact that every undergraduate at Oxford had to dine in hall at seven, that, therefore, eating being a social compulsion, appetite had no "*origine individuelle?*" The greater fallacy in Durkheim's presentation lies in the regrettable fact—and it is a fallacy as general as it is deplorable—that he confuses under one word two things as distinct, yet as intimately related, as eating and appetite. Social compulsion, as pointed out, does, to some extent, regulate and determine the appetite; but no theory of feasts and dinner-hours would be complete without something of gastronomics; and appetite is recurrent in the individual as such, nor waits necessarily until two or three are gathered together. Just so, if the writer's interpretation is correct, there is a common fundamental element in religion, as distinguished from its various manifestations, that is rooted in individual psychology and manifests itself quite independently of the activity of the group. From the fact that religious forms are presented as compulsory, it is illogical to conclude, with Durkheim, that, on the theory of its varying directly as the collective religion varies, its origin is not in the individual soul,

but in the collective soul. Or, that, to use his own words: "*La religion a pour origine, non des sentiments individuels, mais des états de l'âme collective, et elle varie comme ces états. Si elle était fondée dans la constitution de l'individu, elle ne se présenterait pas à lui sous cet aspect coercitif.*" So far as the interpretation we are about to attempt may be said to imply a theory of historical or evolutionary development, we believe that religious manifestations are, in a sense, specializations from a primitive and relatively undifferentiated consciousness, at once intellectual, emotional, spontaneous and teleological. Almost necessarily, it tends to take on, at a certain stage, more and more the appearance of a social phenomenon. Such tendencies toward religious forms and practices that are social no longer permit individuals to remain in egoistic isolation, but bring them into a unity of purpose, and thereby strengthen the group and tribal bonds. Perhaps religious values and "all that goes to make up the distinguishing features of the religious consciousness have evolved most fully in the atmosphere of the social group." The same may be said of any form of social activity, of science, or of the higher learning; but the social atmosphere may or may not be responsible for the origin of the interest or activity to which it gives trend and shape. In a word, the sociological school does not distinguish between the forms and practices called religious, and religion itself. They deal, as Schiller would say, with "*die Hülle aller Religionen*" and not with "*Religion selbst.*" The food which we prefer may, to a great extent, be determined by that with which we have been provided. But it is quite false to conclude from this, that eating is solely a matter of meals. The same distinction holds with regard to religion and the forms of religious activity exhibited by the group to which one belongs. Conformity to established forms of the group does not so much create as it is created by an individual need common to the many units which go to make up the community. Indeed, arguments of this kind could as easily prove that knowledge is a social phenomenon as that religion is such. Our schools are established by the state, and the courses given are prescribed by it; this circumscribes the individual, determines the trend of his interests, and so knowledge becomes wholly social, some would say, and nothing is really left to individual initiative. The social side of such forms is one that we should emphasize, but not to the extent

of distorting it beyond due proportions. It is a most important, and, until recently, an unemphasized and almost unrecognized aspect, but it is not the only aspect. In the matter of education, for example, knowledge is tremendously dependent upon the personal factor, both in instructor and in instructed. The fact that a thing must take a certain course, that it is to some extent circumscribed, does not strip it of all dependence on the individual. Religious forms may be largely social; religion itself may still remain, fundamentally individual. If we interpret the phenomena correctly, religion is psychological and individual, not social and general, as Durkheim would have us believe. The particular practice and form of it may be social; but the religious consciousness itself is not a hole that can be filled with anything, and the social aspect is as much conditioned by the psychology of the individual as the content of his consciousness is conditioned by the social environment.

In the following discussion we shall take as the common psychic element in every true religious consciousness the emotions of awe and reverence.³ In accordance with this definition it will not be possible to separate magic entirely from religion, and we shall treat of them as the magico-religious,⁴ a term suggestive of an intimate relationship between the two, or a condition which is both magic and religion, and neither of these to the exclusion of the other.

In the following pages, we shall attempt an analysis of a body of phenomena recognized as the magical or the sacred, with a view toward determining any common quality in the mass. We shall adduce representative data fairly complete from Australia and Melanesia, and, by way of illustrating the prevalence of similar attitudes in the presence of similar phenomena, will adduce material from widely separated ethnographic areas. Lastly, we shall point out the existence of the same attitude in ourselves, as well as in the higher animals, and shall attempt an explanation of the same. But the attempt throughout will be to illustrate and interpret, not to exhaust the examples, nor suppose that mere mention of them proves the point the writer is trying to make.

If we examine the phenomena that give rise to this attitude toward the magico-religious, we shall find it to be the unusual, that is, the unfamiliar and the apparently uncaused—all of which belong in the same logical, if not in the same working,

psychological category; the attitude taken is one of awe, of fear or of reverence—all belonging to the same fundamental category. The outer or objective element in the sacro-sanct, then, is the unusual or apparently uncaused, the inner or psychological element is the emotion of fear or of awe shading off into respect and reverence.⁵

A proper test of the correctness of our view-point will be to take the sum-total of the magico-religious phenomena in one or more definite ethnographic areas, and then find how far these results are applicable to other removed areas. Believing that the best test is one which applies to all this group of phenomena among a given people, we shall first describe, in a purely factual way, and then attempt to analyse, the magico-religious in Melanesia and in Australia.⁶

Codrington gives the following facts with regard to Melanesia:

Whenever the native is deeply impressed by some natural phenomenon, he apprehends the presence of some haunting *mana* and is moved to acts of worship or propitiation. A deep hole in a stream or in a pool among the rocks upon the beach is such a natural object, and into these he scatters money as a sacrificial offering. In Banks Island deep pools in streams are sacred, and there is at Valmoa a deep hole into which no one dares to look. Here we have lurking possibilities whose limits are not determinable. What power, what danger, what mystery may lurk in these hidden depths—places which have always impressed mankind!

A very common source of *mana* are stones which bear a striking likeness to fruit or tubers, such as, for example, the banana or the yam. If practically all stones bore this striking resemblance, it is not possible to believe that they would be looked upon as bearers of *mana*. But this resemblance is not usual; it is noticeable,⁷ therefore, when it occurs and necessarily has some particular significance.

In the New Hebrides, large stones are sacred, and in Banks Island stones of a remarkably long shape are so powerful that, if a man's shadow falls on one, it will draw out his soul from him, so that he will die. The natural ring of stones at Loalav in Saddle Island is, and has been from time immemorial, a sacred place. Those who do not know how to sacrifice to the sacred stones pass them by with awe, and will not tread the sacred ground about them. It is safe to say that both the peculiarity

of this arrangement and the difficulty of accounting for the agency which effected it have forced themselves upon the attention of the native; and to the writer, it seems clear that the unusualness of the phenomenon and the element of the apparently uncaused (that is by any known means) has been directly responsible for the emotional attitude taken by him toward the place. Nor is it surprising, in view of the prevalence of such an attitude in similar situations, that if a native finds a boulder of volcanic or coral rock of peculiar conformation, he is at once struck with a belief that a spirit is connected with it. For a spirit does not select an ordinary place for abode; which is in accordance with the rule that the unusual tends to attract the sacred and soon to surround itself with occult and mystic influence. Accordingly, in Florida Island, the presence of an extraordinary thing or the occurrence of an extraordinary event may cause a place to become *vumba*, that is, *sacred*, this wonderful thing or event being taken as evidence of the presence of a ghost. Again, this interpretation of the unusual as the sacred.⁸

Two trees have an inherent sacredness: the cycas and the casuarina. Dr. W. H. R. Rivers informs the writer that the cycas tree is a very common one in the Banks Island, and is used in every part of the island in all the sacred rites. He could not suggest, however, why it is sacred or why it should play such an important part in all their sacred ceremonies. Codrington tells us that, at Saa, a leaf of the cycas is put on the breast of a deceased great man, and in Lepers' Island it is used for keeping count of the one hundred days during which the death-meal is eaten. But here again there is intimation of nothing that offers a clue to the source of its sacredness.

Is it not possible that the sacredness of the casuarina may be explained by the qualities exhibited in the following description of it by Codrington? He says:

"Nothing can be more weird and ghostly than an aged casuarina standing alone on a wind-beaten beach, or rising on a lofty cliff, with bare grey stem and shadowless foliage, never without a voice, whispering in a calm or shrieking in a breeze. The presence of one of these trees gives a certain sanctity and awfulness to a place."

Lest it be supposed that Codrington has drawn too freely on his imagination, let me quote, to the same effect, from Carl Lumholtz:¹⁰

"After journeying two or three days through this gray wilderness, we

crossed the Comet river. Along its banks my attention was drawn to a number of *Casuarinas*—those leafless, dark trees, which always make a sad impression on the traveller; even a casual observer will notice the dull, depressing sigh which comes from a grove of these trees when there is the least breeze.”

Perhaps it is, after all, matter of little surprise if the native has attached some sacredness to these trees.¹¹⁻¹³

A white *kandara* or cuscus of unusual size, or an unusually large eel in a stream which is full of eels, is looked upon as representing some *tindalo* and the place around becomes sacred. Ordinarily snakes are killed. Dr. Rivers informs the writer that the natives of Banks Island have an intense fear of them, although they know that the land snakes, unlike the sea-serpents, are quite harmless. Snakes become sacred, however, when they are found in sacred places, or when there is something startlingly unusual about them, as, for example, when they appear to men in unexpected ways and places. Snakes of enormous size are said to live in banyan trees and are invested with considerable sacredness.

Two birds are sacred; the frigate-bird and the king-fisher.

The frigate-bird has great swiftness of flight and a habit of cruising about among birds of other species and of boldly pursuing them. The following description, taken from Newton's *Dictionary of Birds*, is impartial evidence, and may throw some light upon the source of the bird's sacred character. It soars “for a considerable distance in the air with scarcely a perceptible movement of the wings. . . . The buoyancy of this bird is very great,” as it floats overhead against the deep blue sky, “the long tail alternately opening and shutting like a pair of scissors, the head inclined from side to side, and the wings, to all appearance, fixedly extended.” The writer, without intimating the object of his interest, asked an observer if there was anything peculiar about the flight of the frigate-bird, and received the answer: “Oh, it is a most impressive sight!”¹⁴ So, Flinders Petrie, writing of the vulture, as the emblem of protection, figured in Egyptian royal tombs, says:

“There is perhaps no sight in the animal world more imposing than one of these birds stretched out with a span of some nine or ten feet, hanging in the air overhead; it is natural that it should have excited the admiration of man.”¹⁵

Are we right in inferring that these impressive because un-

usual features are, at least in part, responsible for the sacred character of the frigate-bird?¹⁶

The other sacred bird of Melanesia, the king-fisher, is—and this is apropos of our discussion—the subject of a variety of legends and superstitions, both classical and mediaeval. One curious old superstition, to which we are indebted for our modern weathercock, is that if a dead king-fisher be suspended from the roof, it will always turn its breast in the direction from which the wind blows. Sir Thomas Browne was the first to suspect the truth of this alleged characteristic, and experiment convinced him that it must be ranked among other *vulgar errors*.

“It was formerly held that if the dead bodies of these birds were put away in chests they protected garments from the ravages of moths, and it was believed that the feathers of a dead king-fisher were renewed in all their splendor every year. It was an article of faith, too, that the plumage of the king-fisher was injurious to the eyes of those who gazed too long and too intently upon it, while the possession of even a feather was a protection against lightning.”¹⁷

The following descriptions are given of this bird:

It has “a very loud, harsh, rattling scream,” a “loud piercing cry, resembling a cry of distress * * * its curious loud barking was sometimes mistaken for that of a dog.” “Its voice is so extraordinary as to be unlike that of any other living creature.” “Its cry, which resembles a chorus of wild spirits, is apt to startle the traveller who may be in jeopardy, as if laughing and mocking at his misfortune.”¹⁸

Here, again, the unusual seems allied with the sacred.¹⁹

Sharks, alligators, and bonitos were, according to Codrington, sacred animals in the Solomon Islands. At Ulawa offerings of porpoise teeth are made to dreaded maneaters, and here, as well as at Saa, if a sacred shark attempts to seize a man and he escapes, the people are so much afraid of the shark's anger that they throw the man back into the sea to be drowned. Men, who believe they are about to die, frequently announce that their 'ghost will reside in a shark, and the *tindalo* of this class of men seem to form a class of “powerful supernatural beings.”

Professor Goode says that a single sweep of the tail of the bonito doubtless suffices to propel the fish one hundred yards, since the polished surfaces of its body can offer little resistance to the water.²⁰ Although the native must have observed this peculiar power of the bonito, it were useless to speculate whether or not he has been impressed by it. Moreover, since these are dangerous animals, I think we need look no

farther for an adequate explanation of their sacred character. As a matter of fact, they were propitiated, and fear may have been indirectly responsible for all the reverence and respect paid them. Dr. Rivers informs me that practically all of their sacred animals are dangerous.²¹

Here, then, we have other sources for the sacred not related, at least not directly related to the unusual. Of different import, however, seems the following:

"If a flying-fish or gar-fish springs from the waves and strikes a man, they say in San Cristoval, that an *adaro* or ghost sent it; it is no common fish, the man will die."

Thus may unhappy combination of accident and incident betoken the dire and the marvellous—the usual reaction upon the unusual.

Turning now to our second ethnographic territory, we find in Australia, as we found in Melanesia, a peopling of deep water-holes with indescribable spirits. The Kabi says that the rainbow which imparts vitality in the form of a rope (*yurru*), and for which they have great respect, lives in unfathomable water-holes on the mountains and when visible is in the act of passing from one haunt to another.²² According to Taplin,²³ the Narrinyeri live in dread of a spirit called *Mulgewauke*.

"The booming sound which is heard frequently in Lake Alexandrina is ascribed to him, and they think it causes rheumatism to those who hear it. He is represented as a curious being, half man, half fish, and has, instead of hair, a matted crop of reeds. I have often wondered myself what the noise is really caused by which they ascribe to *Mulgewauke*. I have heard it dozens of times, and so have other persons. It resembles the boom of a distant cannon, or the explosion of a blast. Sometimes, however, it is more like the sound made by the fall of a huge body into deep water. It cannot be the peculiar sound made by the Murray bittern, as I have often heard that too, and it is not at all like the noise in the Lake. At first I ascribed it to people blasting wood on the opposite side, but since then I have been convinced that this cannot be the case. One peculiarity of the sound ascribed to the *Mulgewauke* is, that although it is sometimes louder than at others, yet it is never near, always distant. I have no doubt but that some time or other the natural cause of it will be discovered, but I have never heard the phenomenon explained. A legend of this tribe states that, once upon a time, a child, who was playing on the shore, was seized and carried to the bottom of the lake by a *Mulgewauke*, one of these spirits of the deep, and it was with great difficulty that the child was rescued from him. The Moorundi, near the great north-west bend of the Murray, live in dread of a water-spirit which has the form of an enormous star-fish, and lives in this river. The Wailwun tribes say

that *wawi* is a snake or a monster, as large as a gum-tree with a small head and neck like a snake."

It lives in a water-hole thirty miles from the Barwan; and used to eat black fellows.²⁴ Among the Central tribes the only being to whom the natives offered propitiation, and the one of whom they stood most in dread, was *Wullunqua*, a powerful water-spirit which lived in a very deep water-hole. They never approached his abode without giving him due warning of their coming and never failed to apologise for trespassing on his property. When they made the mound representing *Wullunqua* in the Intichiuma ceremonies, he was represented as very long and large.²⁵ No slender weakling of a serpent could be the proprietor of such an awe-inspiring place. Beneath that quiet surface, in the abysmal depth unfathomable, beyond the power of the eye to discern, must lurk some powerful creature whose ability to do one injury could not be doubted. What might one *not* expect from this unknown region? Is it not because hidden and concealed, untraversed and unknown, these water-holes and lakes are invested with danger, peopled with sprites and spirits and monsters not to be approached save humbly and with awe-stricken souls? The phenomena are so almost universal wherever such lakes and water-holes occur that we must suppose some common appeal made by them to men who react thus in their presence.²⁶

In Australia, too, particular respect is paid to rocks, because of unusual resemblances. The Narrinyeri have a sacred rock called *Luive* upon which women and children are not allowed to tread. They say he is a transformed ancestor, and, owing to the conformation of the stone, are able to point out his head, feet, hands, and also his hut and fire.²⁷

Mention is nowhere made,—so far as we are informed,—of sacred trees in Australia. There is, however, some evidence that the wood of the casuarina, of the existence of which in Australia and Melanesia we have already spoken, is instinct with magic powers. A death caused by a combination of sorcery and violence is called *baru* by the Kurnai, while they use the name *Baru* for the species of casuarina known locally as the "He-oak." Moreover, when they wished to kill a man by evil magic they threw its malign influence at him by means of a piece of "He-oak" (*Casuarina suberosa*). The *Gulivil*, used by the Wotjobaluk for killing by magic, was made of *Casuarina glauca*

("Bull-oak"). The Wudthaurung put the rough cones of *Casuarina quadrivalvis* ("She-oak") into a man's fire, so that the smoke might blow into his eyes and blind him. Here, however, "the idea seems to be that the idolon of the rough seed cones would magically produce injury, as the object might do;" and Howitt finds in this belief an attempted explanation of ophthalmia.²⁸

Although there are no sacred birds in Australia similar to those of Melanesia, peculiar beliefs are entertained about some of the feathered tribe. The North Central tribes, for example, believe that the spirit of a man killed by an avenging party takes the form of a little bird and waits for an opportunity to kill men by evil magic. They say that this bird when heard sounds like a child crying in the distance.²⁹

Lumholtz gives this account of a bird, which the natives on the Upper Herbert River, Queensland, look upon as an evil spirit:

"It was *Kvigan*, their evil spirit, who chiefly haunted this spot. His voice was often heard in the evening at night from the abyss or from the scrubs. I made the discovery that the strange melancholy voice which they attributed to the spirit belonged to a bird which could be heard at a great distance. But I must admit that it is the most mysterious bird's voice that I have ever heard, and it is not strange that a people so savage as the Australian natives should have formed superstitious notions in regard to it. *Kvigan* is found in the inaccessible mountain regions."

Moreover, the evil spirit is sometimes resident in the cicada and the explanation of its sacredness as given by Lumholtz³⁰ is most suggestive:

"This insect, the cicada, produces in summer a very shrill sound in the tree-top, but it is impossible to discover it by the sound. It is this loud shrill sound which comes from every direction, and which is not to be traced to any particular place, that has evidently given rise to superstitious ideas concerning it."

Indeed, Lumholtz seems to sum up the situation admirably in the observation that the natives have a superstitious fear of these evil spirits, "*and of the unknown generally.*"³¹

A few examples will illustrate the attention given the strange or the unusual and the attitude taken by the native toward such phenomena which are at once feared and respected by him. An incident mentioned by Taplin³² illustrates this admirably.

"The first time some of the women heard our clocks strike, they listened with astonishment, then inquired hurriedly in a whisper, 'What him say?' and rushed out of the house in terror without waiting for an answer."³²

As in Melanesia, an eclipse or a falling star is a wonder and a portent which brings an appalling sense of danger, so, in Australia, women as well as men are much frightened at eclipses of the moon, although it is only by the latter that evil is foreboded. Similarly, the fact that the ghost of the dead is considered quite harmless does not detract from their regarding it with fear.^{33a}

The Kurnai believe that the wild dog sometimes speaks, and that "to hear this is fatal, the listener being turned into stone." The narrator refers to a belief that a camp of Kurnai were literally petrified by hearing one of their dogs say, "You are eating fish, and have given me none." A Kurnai told Fison that, when a boy, he once heard a dog commence to howl something; he caught only one word, "bring" (bone), whereupon he made off as fast as he could run and so saved his life.^{33b}

The natives of Western Victoria believe that if a corpse opens its eyes and stares at any one, the unfortunate person at whom it looks will not live long. When the star-gazer sees the planet Venus set twice in one night, he knows that death awaits him 'ere the dawn. The cause of an echo is not understood and the echo is supposed to be a mysterious something mocking the speaker.

Strange spears and weapons are reluctantly touched, for it is believed they communicate sickness and might cause death; and it was with difficulty that some of the West Victoria natives could be prevailed upon to take hold of spears, arrows, and clubs from the Society Islands. However much the natives may be in want of a fire-stick when travelling through the bush, they will not take a light from a strange fire, unless they observe the footprints of human beings near it, indicating that it has been kindled by man. Fire caused by lightning is shunned, "because there is a belief that the lightning hangs about the spot, and would kill anyone going near it. . . . Neither will they take a fire from a funeral pyre."³⁴

Among the Kabis of Queensland and the tribes of Gippsland, to have miraculously escaped death is a passport to the ranks of the medicine-men.³⁵

Interesting, in this connection, is the attitude taken toward the insane—an attitude that varies among different peoples as much as the attitude toward the aged. Among the Chepara, if a man became insane, or was in the habit of idiotically muttering

to himself, it was thought that *Wulle*, an evil being, was influencing him, and that disaster might happen to the camp. A fear of the insane was doubtless responsible for the custom in Western Victoria of killing them.³⁶ Spencer and Gillen say that among the North Central tribes, twins were usually destroyed at once as something uncanny.³⁷

In an interesting article on "The Bull-Roarer and the Higher Gods,"³⁸ Marett has pointed out the very intimate connection between the bull-roarer and Australian religion and the compelling nature of its weird sound, sufficing not only to awe men but even to effect such unaesthetic creatures as elephants, cattle and gorillas. No other sound in Heaven or on earth may be likened to that of a rapidly twirled bull-roarer, and none so likely to attract and hold the attention of its users and hearers. For the women and the uninitiated, the sound of the bull-roarer is the voice of *Daramulun*, and, as Marett convincingly points out, for the initiated, *Daramulun* is probably the bull-roarer itself. Indeed, Ridley says that, by the tribes living about the Namoi and the Barwan, the bull-roarer is spoken of as *Dhurumbulum*, and is said to have been given them by Baiame.³⁹ Surely, no better instance could be had of the source of the mystery and awe surrounding the bull-roarer and its ceremonial.

The following incident told the writer by a young Chilkat chief (Alaska) illustrates how savages react in the presence of the unusual.

"John Fox was a very energetic man who rose early every morning and attended to his traps before it was daylight or anyone else was astir. He told me this story to show me that I should always look into a thing carefully before I made anything [supernatural] out of it. 'I was out one afternoon in a piece of woods to get some berries, I had a big basket and a little basket. The big basket I had set down. Later I looked for it and could not find it anywhere. I hunted and hunted and could not find it anywhere. Then the thought suddenly came to me: This is strange, for I have been over this ground time and time again and know every inch of it; and nothing like this ever happened to me in my whole life. There is something very strange about it. I can't understand it.

"Just then a piece of bark fell down in front of me. I was frightened. Then a second piece came down right past my nose. I was too frightened to move. I felt a funny feeling run all over me—a kind of a chill. A third piece came this time on my hat. I thought: I can't stand this any longer. I must find out what it is. I was nearly fainting—so weak from

fright. I moved a step or two and leaned up against a tree to support myself, and looked up— There was a large wood-pecker up there which had been picking off the bark!"

Here was an unusual experience which, had impressed the Indian and had aroused an intense fear of a I-do-not-know-what. Explanation dissipated the fear.

We have seen that, in Melanesia and Australia, a study of the entire mass of the magico-religious showed a common element, which we called the unusual, or the apparently uncaused. It will not be possible to point this out in detail for any other area, but a few instances will serve to show how general it is. Indeed, to find a tribe or people among whom this would not apply, is a task the present writer cannot perform. The reactions may vary, and a given phenomenon may not always bring the same reaction, but those which do elicit it are of this kind and may be included under our general principle.

At Aneiteum, "smooth stones, apparently picked up out of the bed of the river were regarded as representatives of certain gods, and wherever the stone was, there the god was supposed to be. One resembling a fish would be prayed to as the fisherman's god. Another, resembling a yam, would be the yam god. A third, round like a bread-fruit, the bread-fruit god—and so on."⁴⁰

The principal sacred place at Salengo, on Savaii, was a rock which gave an unusually hollow sound at the change of wind and current. This was a call for offerings; for a time the fish about this rock were untouched as sacred to this "Neptune."⁴¹

As in Melanesia, and Polynesia, so in Indonesia generally, and especially in Borneo, particular virtues are attached to peculiarly shaped stones; Sir A. Lyall's explanation of the primitive worship of stones in India as, "that single awe of the unusual which belongs to no particular religion," is doubtless applicable to nearly the whole of these phenomena.⁴² Such, too, may be the explanation of the respect which the peasants have, generally, for the cromlechs, alignments, dolmens, etc., of Europe, to which frequently offerings are made.⁴³

With respect to the pictographs on the rocks of British Guiana, Brown writes:

"The Indians of Guiana know nothing about the picture writing by traditions. They scout the idea of their having been made by the hand of man, and ascribe them to the handiwork of the *Makunamia*, their great spirit. Nevertheless, they do not regard them with any superstitious feel-

ings, looking upon them merely as curiosities, which is the more extraordinary as there are numbers of large rocks without any markings on some rivers, which they will not even look at in passing, lest some calamity should overtake them. Their Peaimen or sorcerers always squeeze tobacco juice into their eyes on approaching these, but pay no regard to the sculptured rocks.’⁷⁴⁴

Sir John Evans remarks that, “stones remarkable for their colour or shape appear at all times to have attracted the attention of mankind, and frequently to have served as personal ornaments or charms;” (*Ancient Stone Implements of G. Br. and Ireland*, p. 470) and this holds particularly of prehistoric implements of a type not used by the people in whose locality they are occasionally found. Ellis (*The Yoruba* pp. 46-51) says that among the Yorubas of West Africa, stone implements which have long ceased to be used, are believed to be the thunderbolts of the god Shango; and whenever a house is struck by lightning his priests rush in a body to pillage it and to find the stone, which, as they take it with them secretly they always succeed in doing. Bowen (*Op. cit.*, p. xvi), says of this same region that the prehistoric stones which are picked up are thought to have been cast down by Sango or Dzakuta and are preserved as sacred relics. The stone implements which are found scattered broadcast over the Malay Peninsula are believed by the Malays to be thunderbolts,⁴⁵ and thunderbolt, fairy dart, elfstone or thunderstone is a name given them all over Europe by the peasants who generally save and use them as amulets, for person or property.⁴⁶

The unusual is particularly fitted for magic. We have already seen that among certain Australian tribes to have miraculously escaped death is to have prepared oneself for the fold of medicine-men. The Yoruba proverb that, “A rat which has a navel is a witch,”⁴⁷ is one that is applicable in almost any land. So, too, an unusual thing will be especially adapted to the performance of witchcraft; as witness the following example:

In hunting material for a new fetich, a Batanga fetich doctor “searched among the trees until they found two growing near together, but bent in such a way toward each other that their trunks crossed in contact, and were rubbed smooth by abrasion; and when violently rubbing, in a storm, gave out a creaking sound. In that mysterious sound inhered the fetich power. He chose the trees, not for any value in their kind, but because of their singular juxtaposition and their weird sounds.”⁴⁸

Likewise an unusual event will herald the approach or signify

the presence of witches. "When a fire is seen on a distant hill, where no fire can be accounted for"—this is an indication that the witches are assembling for their orgies.⁴⁹ In British Guiana, fragments of rock crystal brought from the mountains of the interior are supposed to possess some hidden virtue.⁵⁰

It is essential that magic should involve the use of means which we do not understand. Practically all magical formulae involve this element. See, for example, how the addition of apparently useless and unessential things and the insistence upon them, enhance the sense of mystery surrounding one of these formulae:

We are told to "spin a variegated and a scarlet thread together, and tie seven knots in it; thou shalt mix together oil of cedar, spittle of the man, the leavened dough, earth from an old grave, a tortoise's mouth, a thorn, earth from the roots of the caper, earth of ants; thou shalt sprinkle the knots with this. While thou tiest them, thou shalt repeat this incantation and bind it on the temples of the man. Thus shalt thou tighten it, until the darkening of the white part of the face and the whitening of the dark-colored part of the face takes place."⁵¹

How much more attractive and awe-inspiring is the prescription which tells us to crush dried toads in a mortar, compounding a salve out of mashed worms, and make pills from the dried livers of rats which are mixed with saliva emitted during a blasphemous incantation, than the matter of fact scientific one which prescribes two ounces of quinine and a good night's sleep, or certain nitrates plus certain carbon compounds, at which no man marvels, nor finds in it cause for respect. After all, Naaman was only human when he objected to the simplicity of the cure which was to take away his leprosy.

In the Arab Museum at Cairo is preserved a "cup of terror," which was used in the middle ages for treating persons who were "ill from the effects of violent emotion." For this purpose "the vessel is filled with water in which is soaked a bunch of old rusty keys; the vessel and its contents are then exposed all night to the cool air, and the patient drinks the water in the morning." The cure might or might not be equally sure if it were realised by the patients "that the oxide derived from the keys may in certain cases be of benefit to the patient;" but there can be no doubt that, with this knowledge, the cup that cures would no longer be a "cup of terror."⁵² Explanation of the cure destroys the peculiar respect and reverence once attaching to the medicine.

“ Long was making a powerful series of cures of chronic rheumatism and pains and aches of many kinds by means of this wonderful liniment. This remedy was thought to be so efficacious that the British Government finally bought the secret of it from him, paying many thousands of dollars for it, in order that it might be given to the public and enable them to free themselves from most of the chronic ills to which flesh is heir. The mysterious remedy proved to be only a combination of turpentine and white of egg with some other equally familiar substances, and, of course, just as soon as it lost the power that its mystery had commanded for it, it ceased to be effective.”⁵³

Moreover, the practicing of a craft or trade or the performing of a feat which others do not understand will often merit one the name of witch or wizard and imbue respect or fear, not infrequently a combination of the two. To tamper with new things was to play with danger, and to invent was to invite disaster. In 1278, ‘*propter quasdam novitates*,’ Roger Bacon, the foremost scientist of his day, was condemned for his innovations and sent to prison for fourteen years.⁵⁴ Silvester II., Pope of Rome, 1002-3, was

“ both intelligent and learned, qualities, which, at that age, were regarded as derivable only from the devil. He was spoken of with bated breath as a necromancer. Men crossed themselves when they mentioned his name, being convinced that he had in his possession a magical brazen head, which had foretold his death in Jerusalem. . . . And it seems to be a fact that *he used steam power* for blowing the church organ.”

Little wonder he excited awe and fear! St. Gregory, too, seems to have owed his success in attaching to himself demoniacal attributes to the fact that he was so far in advance of the times as to be for most men beyond comprehension, the natural inference being that he, his popedom notwithstanding, must have obtained these faculties from his Satanic Majesty. Whether such powers be looked upon as providential or as coming from the devil, seems often to hang in the balance, but in the Middle Ages the devil seems to have been the more popular and preferred.⁵⁵ Perhaps this use of means not generally comprehended by the masses may account for the peculiar fear or respect commonly attaching to blacksmiths among savage or semi-civilized peoples. In Abyssinia all artisans are *Budah*, i.e., sorcerers, and especially is this true of the blacksmith. Here, as among the Somali, he is a social outcast, though throughout El-Islam, the blacksmith is respected as one treading in the path of David, whom they look upon as the father of the craft.

But whatever his social position, few people will venture to molest or offend a blacksmith, since they fear the effects of his resentment.

"The power of possessing persons with the devil is attributed mostly to Jewish blacksmiths; and women and children are terrified when they meet, in a solitary place, a blacksmith who is a Jew. These sorcerers are also said to be endued with the power of changing the shape of the object of their incantations."⁵⁶

Other attempts have been made to explain the low status of the blacksmith, as, for example, that he was retained by the invading conquerors who had no knowledge of iron-working but appreciated its value.

Marett⁵⁷ speaks of the horror of a human corpse as a something instilled in man's heart by his instinct of self-preservation; and this, he says, is at the back of his horror of a ghost. In similar manner Shaler⁵⁸ refers to "the primitive fear of death," and "the instinctive fear of death," holding that, "its source is to be looked for in our animal ancestry, where this fear, blind and unconscious of its object, was absolutely demanded for the fit preservation of the individual."⁵⁹ The theory is good, but unfortunately the facts will not conform to it. As a reviewer of Marett has pointed out, the explanation will not suffice. "A dog has a strong instinct of self-preservation, but he sniffs with the mildest curiosity at the corpse of a brother. There must be something else behind the human awe of death. What is it?" we are asked.⁶⁰ It is difficult to answer Darwin's question, "Who can say what cows feel, when they surround and stare intently on a dying or dead companion?"⁶¹ and yet, to ask the question is to deny instinctive fear of a dead body. The author can vouch for the correctness of the assertions made by the writer in *The Church Times* as to the lack of this instinctive fear among the lower animals. Dogs are not frightened by the sight of the body of a dead dog, nor are cattle or horses frightened by the body of one of their dead companions. A duck will peck at the head of one of its mates still gory from recent decapitation; while chickens look upon the spasmodically gyrating headless body of one of their tribe without displaying more than the mildest curiosity.

There is, of course, abundant evidence of the fear of a corpse. Swan speaks of the great superstitious dread some of the Indians of Washington have for a dead person; "their horror of touching

a corpse oftentimes gives rise to a difficulty as to who shall perform the funeral ceremonies. In cases of small-pox, I have known them leave the corpse in the lodge, and all remove elsewhere."⁶² The Clallam and Twanas are especially afraid of having children go near the corpse, being much more fearful of the effect of the evil spirit on them than on older persons.⁶³ But this is scarcely 'instinctive fear.' Of a different sort, perhaps, is the attitude of the Eskimo, who are said to "feel the greatest awe in touching a dead body,"⁶⁴ or that of the Yerkla-mining of Australia, who are said to be much afraid of a dead body. Indeed, "they never bury their dead or dispose of them in any way. When death approaches, the person is left alone, as comfortably as possible, near a fire, and the tribe leave the neighbourhood, not to return for a considerable time." Mrs. Peggs reports that the natives at Roebuck Bay, W. Australia, have a fear of the bodies of people killed by some disaster, such as drowning or burning, though formerly they ate their dead.⁶⁵ The Stlatlunh (of British Columbia) believe that evil influences attend corpses so potent that only the funerary shaman with mystic powers could come into contact with them and remain immune to the bad medicine. And even he took precautions to wash the body, comb and tie the hair, paint the face and sprinkle the head of the corpse with the down of bulrushes, which is effective in checking the evil influences attending corpses.⁶⁶ These instances give a measure of support to Thompson's view that, "the tabu on a dead body is due to the dread of attracting the departed soul, which can return to afflict all that meddle with the corpse," but they cannot be taken to imply a "primitive" or instinctive fear of death. Moreover this fear of a corpse is by no means universal.⁶⁷ The Indians in the Ungava District, near Hudson Bay, have not that dread of a corpse which is shown so plainly among the Eskimo;⁶⁸ and Dawson says the tribes of Western Victoria never manifested any fear of their dead until after contact with the whites. Mr. R. S. Rattray, who has enjoyed a long and intimate acquaintance at first hand with Africans, tells me that, among the tribes of British Central Africa with which he is acquainted, there is no fear of the bodies of their dead; the same assurance was given me with regard to Dahomey by a native from that country. Similar testimony was given me by a Chilkat Indian of Northwest Alaska; and Dr. Rivers assured me, with regard to Melan-

esia, that the present natives of the Banks Islands have no fear of their dead.

If Lyman Abbott had been sojourning in Australia, with an eye solely to the customs and attitudes of its aborigines, he would scarcely have spoken of that "feeling of awe in the presence of the great mystery of life and death, which, at times, sobers and solemnizes the most careless of us."⁶⁹ If we are to believe Spencer and Gillen, it does neither of these for the natives of the Central tribes of Australia. Nor is it true, as Karsten would have us believe,⁷⁰ that "death always has something of mystery about it, that lies like a veil over one who has departed this life." Some kinds of death are mysterious, others are mere matter-of-fact occurrences. As Fison has expressed it, "Death by accident they can imagine—death by violence they can imagine—but I question if they can . . . imagine death by mere disease. . . . Thus the belief arises that death occurs only from accident, open violence, or secret magic."⁷¹ This is true of most tribes of Australia, and practically the same condition was said by a native informant to exist in Dahomey.⁷²

We believe, then, that Steindorff expressed quite the reverse of the truth when he said: "to the unsophisticated man there is always something incomprehensible in the sudden cessation of life."⁷³ It is only to the sophisticated man that there is anything incomprehensible in the cessation of life. For the unsophisticated, life ceases; for the sophisticated, life ceases without fully ascertainable cause. For the ordinary man, the sun rises—a sun-rise it is to him and nothing more; and it is only an intelligence more advanced that wonders at a phenomenon so common, and finds in the very rising and setting of the sun one of the great mysteries of nature. Why then should animals exhibit fear in the presence of their dead? They do not realize that the mysterious vital force called life has gone out; and there is nothing involved in the mere presence of a dead body which calls for any great fear by way of self-preservation.⁷⁴ Quite different is it when the animal sees or smells blood, an immediate reaction becoming a means of self-preservation since blood often means or meant foes and danger. Thus, perhaps, may we account for the rage of bulls—and often of cows—which smell or see the blood of a slaughtered fellow-tribesman.⁷⁴ With human beings the sight of blood seems to have quite a contrary effect. William James spoke of having fainted, while he watched

the bleeding of a horse, and the writer knows a university professor who had to give up work in the dissecting room because of dizziness and nausea brought on by the sight of blood. The operating surgeon in a Baltimore hospital told the writer some years ago that a large number of men (not practitioners) who see an operation for the first time actually faint. If this has any relation to the survival of the species *Homo* it would seem to be of the opossum type of mere passivity.

Although we have advanced somewhat beyond the "primitive" conceptions of death we have not passed altogether beyond the "primitive" attitudes toward it. In the case of many of us, we do not feel the same sense of mystery about one who has died of some disease with the course and consequences of which we are familiar, as we feel when one has died of some sudden attack where the cause of death is beyond determination.

It is easy to believe anything of a land or people remote and unknown, and anything is possible in the land of shadows and mystery. The Greenlanders' idea of the American Indian is that of a fabulous inlander with a face like a dog's, martial spirits and inhuman foes to mankind.⁷⁵

The Point Barrow Eskimo tell confused stories of the people in the far-off country unknown to them, who are without posteriors (commonly met with in Eskimo legends) and who have sledges that run of themselves, not requiring any dogs to draw them.⁷⁶ The Central Eskimo believe that living in the extreme northwest is a tribe called the Ardnainig, the men of which are no larger than children and entirely covered with hair. The women, however, are of normal size, do all the work, go out hunting in *kayaks*, and in every way provide for the men whom they carry about in their hoods, "just like children."⁷⁷

The Tornit, who are believed by the Eskimo to have shared their country in the long ago, were much taller than the Eskimo, had very long legs and arms, were almost all of them blear-eyed, and were extremely strong, being able to lift large boulders which were far too heavy for the Eskimo.

"But even the Innuits (i.e. Eskimo) of that time were much stronger than those of to-day, and some large stones are shown on the plain of Miliagdjuin, in Cumberland Sound, with which the ancient Innuits used to play, throwing them great distances. Even the strongest men of the present generations are scarcely able to lift them, much less to swing them or throw them any distance."⁷⁸

Nearly all the animals which are known to the natives only by report through foreign tribes are highly exaggerated fabulous creatures, e. g., the musk ox is believed to be a fierce animal with black and red streaks and larger than a bear, while the black bear lives inland, is of enormous size, and devours everything that comes near it.⁷⁹

The Montagnais think that the Wendigoes are giant cannibals, 20 and 30 feet high; that they live on human flesh, and that many Indians who have gone hunting, and have never afterwards been heard of, have been devoured by Wendigoes.⁸⁰

The Tenan-kut-chin is a remote Alaskan tribe that came out once a year, for the purpose of trading, and then retired to their fastnesses and were seen no more for another year.

“No white man or Indian of other tribe had penetrated the wilds in which they pursued the deer and trapped the fox and sable. Their reserve, fierce demeanor, and the mystery which surrounded their manner of life had its effect on the imagination of the adjacent tribes, who seemed to fear the strangers, and had many tales, smacking of the marvelous, to tell of them.”⁸¹

This attitude is essentially different from that taken by a weaker tribe toward an adjacent stronger one from which they had much to fear as regards physical and warlike prowess.

When the little Yoruba girl had wandered a long, long way she came to the country where the “people stand on their heads in mortars and pound yams with their heads.”⁸² “An intelligent Bornuese” (Yoruba) assured Bowen that somewhere eastward of Nufe and Yakoba there was a tribe of men, called Alabiwu who had inflexible tails about six inches long.

“Beyond this tribe was another called Alabiwo, distinguished by a small goat-like horn projecting from the top of the head just above the margin of the hair. Somewhere in the same region was a tribe called Alakere, the tallest of whom were scarcely three feet high. Being a weak people, the Alakere surrounded their towns with walls of iron.”

The Negroes beyond the Niger tell of a people who have four eyes, and point out the exact position of the different eyes.⁸³

Bowen thinks many of these stories have been told the credulous Negroes by Arab traders. But the fact that they are readily believed shows an innate willingness to give credence to the marvellous when the marvellous is located in a distant and for them impenetrable territory. The stories that were rife in

Europe about the wonders of the new land shortly after the discovery of America are instances.

The Bushongo, who found the Batwa a forest-dwelling people, in possession when they arrived, hold them in superstitious awe, regarding them as spirits born from trees. In some cases, bands of these pygmies have been induced to leave the forest, to settle in villages and to practice agriculture; and in such cases they are regarded by the Bushongo as becoming more human.⁸⁴

"In the time of Augustus, the island (of Pravaos) was literally at the end of the world, and if it was not classed among fabulous lands, it was placed at the extreme borders of the actual world, at the point where incredible marvels began. Any number of stories were told of the height of the cataract (etc.). . . . Beyond were the deserts of Africa, whence some new monster appeared, regions haunted by sphinxes and onocentaurs, overrun by tribes of Oreillards and Sciapodes."⁸⁵

It is not surprising, then, that

"The unknown stranger, like everything unknown and everything strange, arouses a feeling of mysterious awe in superstitious minds. . . . He is commonly believed to be versed in magic, and the evil curses of a stranger are greatly feared, owing partly to his quasi-supernatural character partly to the close contact in which he comes with the host and his belongings."

He is regarded, not only as a potential benefactor, but as a potential source of evil, and may bring disease or ill-luck.⁸⁶ You may be entertaining angels—or devils—unawares. So, too, the extraordinary power attaching to the blessings and curses of parents, may be due, at least in part, to the mystery of old age and the nearness of death.⁸⁷

But, as Westermarck has pointed out,

"Increasing intercourse between different communities or different countries . . . habituates the people to the sight of strangers, and, in consequence, deprives the stranger of that mystery which surrounds the lonely wanderer in an isolated district whose inhabitants have little communication with the outside world."⁸⁸

In the saying that "familiarity breeds contempt" there seems, then, to be much truth. If we look about us, I believe we shall find that those who possess a given quality or ability in an eminent degree do not have any great respect for one possessing similar eminent qualities though they may feel unbounded respect for those eminent in lines not their own. In the one case they themselves can wield the given power or influence

and thoroughly understand the means by which this has been attained and is maintained. Perhaps, as Ross would say, the father who seems to the child to be limitless in powers and wisdom will, for that reason, be readily obeyed and respected. Perhaps, too,

“The born leader is one whose superiority seems boundless. If it is only relative, if we can measure it, if we can fathom the secret of it, and can see how we can finally attain to it ourselves, he is no longer our hero.” “A sense of power in others seems to involve a sense of their inscrutability; and on the other hand, so soon as a person becomes plain, he ceases to stimulate the imagination; we have seen all around him.” “The power of mere inscrutability arises from the fact that it gives a vague stimulus to thought and then leaves it to work out the details to suit itself” [which details it is wont to work out most fantastically]. “Another instance of the prestige of the inscrutable is the fascination of silence, when power is imagined to lie behind it. The very name of William the Silent gives one a sort of thrill, whether he knows anything of that distinguished character or not; one seems to see a man darkly potent, mysteriously dispensing with the ordinary channel of self-assertion, and attaining his ends without evident means. . . . One who always appears to be his own master and does not too readily reveal his deeper feelings is so much the more likely to create an impression of power. He is formidable because incalculable.”⁸⁹

With men, with events, with natural phenomena, it is the same—a complete understanding is not consonant with awe and reverence. To all of us alike, savage or civilized, the mysterious is impressive, and both custom and religion lose half their emotional toning when their origin and historical development are laid bare.⁹⁰

We have already mentioned the reaction upon the unusual manifested by different people. The instance of the Narrinyeri woman, who fled in terror from the clock that talked, is a case in point; so too is that of the Tasmanian woman, who screamed when she saw an officer of a French ship pull off his gloves, thinking that he was removing his skin.⁹¹ Such events are often taken as magically potent—instances of which have been given. Almost as frequently however they become sacred and a religious significance attaches to them. Just as an object about which there is some unusual quality is often selected for the performance of magic, so an animal about which there is something unusual may be given a sacred character. As an instance of this, we have the respect shown to white elephants in Siam, where they are much revered and may not be killed.⁹² So,

too, the white monkey is an object of great veneration among the Siamese and is kept in the stables of the sacred white elephants to prevent the presence of evil spirits. The Eskimo believes that the albinos of seals and of deer—which are said to be very quick,—spring from an egg of about half a foot in length. This egg takes form in the earth, so the seals when hatched dig an underground passage to the sea, while the deer dig one to a distant part of the country.⁹³

When it was announced that a mule had conceived near Biskra, the Arabs, thinking the end of the world was at hand, gave themselves up to long fasts by way of conciliating the wrath of heaven. Fortunately the mule miscarried; but long afterwards the Arabs still spoke with terror of this event.⁹⁴ Not essentially different from this, if our interpretation is correct, is the case of the Chinyanja who have many superstitions with respect to men who cannot beget children—this being very unusual and therefore mysteriously strange.⁹⁵

We shall give a few only of the numberless examples that might be cited to show the efficacy of the unusual in generating religious awe and respect.

“A Kaffir broke a piece off the anchor of a stranded vessel and soon after died. Ever after the Kaffirs regarded the anchor as something mysterious, divine, and did it honour by saluting it as they passed by, with a view to propitiate its wrath.”⁹⁶

The Lacus Palicorum near Favarotta, Sicily, emits carbonic acid gas in such quantities that “small birds are suffocated in attempting to fly too near the surface across the lake and horses and oxen experience difficulty in breathing as soon as they enter the water. The ancients regarded the spot as sacred and the peculiar resort of the gods.”⁹⁷ By the Nenenot everything not understood is attributed to the working of one of the numerous spirits;⁹⁸ in Egyptian religion the gods were held responsible for such deaths as cannot be assigned to obvious physical causes.⁹⁹ This is a higher conception than that so prevalent among savages, who attribute deaths of this kind almost invariably to the working of magic; but the two explanations are not essentially different both involving a universal explanation of all that is unusual and mysterious beyond comprehension.¹⁰⁰

This is a view not altogether above or beneath us when we come face to face with “those events at which marble statues might well be believed to perspire, phantasmal fiery warriors

to fight in the air, and quadrupeds to bring forth monstrous births—that it did not belong to the usual order of Providence, but was in a peculiar sense the work of God.” For, as Spinoza wrote nearly three centuries ago,

“As men have been wont to call that science which surpasses human apprehension divine, so have they been wont to call the works whereof the cause is generally unknown, divine, or the work of God. For people in general think that the power or providence of God, then, is most clearly manifested when they perceive something to happen in nature which is most uncommon and contrary to the opinion which they have formed from custom concerning nature.”¹⁰¹

Indeed, the part played by the unusual and the prominence given it in at least two of the great world religions is considerable and worthy of notice. Both the Koran and the Bible, as well as the history of attempts to prove the authenticity and divine nature of the creeds, bear ample testimony to this. One example from the Koran will suffice: Moses and Aaron were competing with the Egyptian magicians before Pharaoh in order to show that the God of the Hebrews was the more powerful God. “And lo! by their enchantment, their cords and rods seemed to him as if they ran. And Moses conceived a secret fear within him. And, when Moses’ rod swallowed up their cheating wonders, then the magicians threw themselves down in worship:

“They said, ‘We believe on the Lord of the Worlds!’

“‘Throw down thy staff.’ And when he saw that it moved itself as though it were a serpent, he retreated backward and returned not. ‘O Moses, fear not.’”¹⁰²

The practice of magic or of sorcery as such has, however, by the Christian church generally been looked upon with disfavor as an enemy of the true religion. The Roman Church has, in the main, looked upon magical arts as the work of the devil, and as late as 1791 required penance from one Guiseppe Balsamo who was alleged to have engaged in these practices.¹⁰³

As already stated, the distinction between the divine and the profane is not always easy to draw, and the Roman Church has not always been consistent. Sometimes, a magical act is invested with sanctity, is looked upon as a proof of the presence of the Divine, and is, accordingly, respected, as a miracle. In many cases, so far as the nature of the event is concerned there is no way to distinguish between magic and miracle.

Witness the following examples: To test the sacredness of the girdle, alleged by the sacristan of the Church of S. Lorenzo to have belonged to that saint, Pope Alexander II

“laid it on the bier, and at once the dead arose and walked. Then all men knew that the sacristan had told what was true, and the Pope celebrated mass as he had been bidden, and promised an indulgence of forty years to all who should visit, on a Wednesday, any church dedicated to St. Lawrence.”¹⁰⁴

“One chain [of St. Peter] had been sent to Rome by Eudoxia the elder, and the other remained at Constantinople, but the Romans could not rest satisfied with the possession of half the relic; and within the walls of this very basilica (S. Pietro in Vincoli) Leo I. beheld in a vision the miraculous and mystic uniting of the two chains, since which they have both been exhibited here, and the day of their being soldered together by invisible power, August 1st, has been kept sacred in the Latin Church.”¹⁰⁵

Divine authority and saintliness are proved by the ability to perform some feat not possible for the ordinary layman. The principal miracle ascribed to the Beato Vicolo Albergati, and represented in an altar piece of the chapel dedicated to him in the church of *S. Maria degli Angeli* at Rome, is that he converted bread into coal in order to convince the Emperor of Germany of his divine authority—and great must have been his success, as the records bear witness.¹⁰⁶ St. Agnese,

“when she saw herself thus exposed, . . . bent down her head, . . . and prayed; and immediately her hair, which was always long and abundant, became like a veil, covering her whole person from head to foot; and those who looked upon her were filled with awe and fear, as if something sacred, and dared not lift their eyes.”¹⁰⁷

Among the wonderful actions of St. Catherine of Siena which stood as a proof of her great saintliness was the following: while she was leaning in ecstasy against a pilaster in the chapel of San Domenico, “a candle that was there alight in honour of some saints, fell upon the veils of her head and entirely burnt itself out upon them, without doing any harm or making any mark.”¹⁰⁸

According to the official provision of the Roman Church, three miracles are the minimum number that qualify one for sainthood. Nor are miracles wholly without value in the eyes of the modern church, Protestant, Greek, or Latin. The immaculate conception proves the divinity of Christ and the miracle of turning water into wine testifies to his oneness with God.¹⁰⁹ “I

should not be a Christian were it not for the miracles," said Saint Augustine,¹¹⁰ and many devout believers could echo his words. To quote Pascal:

"Miracles are more important than you think; they have served for the foundation; and will serve for the continuance of the Church till the coming of Antichrist."¹¹¹

"Miracles . . . a support of religion . . . have been the test of Jews, of Christians, of saints, of innocents, and of true believers."¹¹²

It was a daring venture when Fichte, in his *Kritik der Offenbarung*, announced that "no proof of the divinity of a revelation can be derived from an appeal to miracles occurring in connection with it; but that the question of its authenticity can be decided only by an examination of its contents;" and his book was not allowed publication by the Dean of the Theological Faculty of Halle, because of this heresy.¹¹³ Dear to the heart of the believer are these miracles and loudly do they proclaim the divinity of him who manipulates them—albeit a miracle is only an unusual phenomenon, impressive in inverse proportion to its usualness.

Something of this element of unusualness or of impenetrability is essential to religious emotion. To understand too well is to lose emotion; too much light dissipates awe and reverence. For, as Durkheim has said, the mystery is not inherent in the event itself, but in the paucity of our understanding of the same and is due entirely to our ignorance. Thus, as the illustrations adduced abundantly show, what is mysterious to one is mere matter of fact to another and what was once a mystery becomes explained fact and with this additional information the original awe is gone. For every mystery—save in so far as everything is a mystery—is, in fact, merely a provisional mystery which science as it progresses explains away step by step. Now, religion and magic pertain only to the sphere in which our science has not succeeded in giving us systematic knowledge and clear concepts, and which remains for our intellect a *terra incognita*. For him who possessed an integral science which translated the whole world of fact and fancy into clear and definite concepts—a creature no one would envy—the mysterious would no longer exist since for it explanation is suicidal. Veness expresses a fact of the imaginative faculty that is common to all of us when he speaks of the awe which we feel as a sense

of the vastness and incomprehensibility of Nature, when it floods in upon us:

"The dark night, only sufficiently lighted up to enable you to see the dark shadow of the bush thrown on the water, the overpowering sense of solitude; the still silence broken only by the sound of paddles, or of the insects in the forest, or perhaps the horrible roar of the red howling monkey . . . combine to fill the mind with awe and to carry the thoughts beyond the world to its great Artificer."¹¹⁴

Moreover, the cosmic emotion which we feel when conscious of ourselves as limited finites peering into the great boundless infinite we could not experience if our knowledge furnished us with organised logical, indisputable information as to the details of the parts and the scheme of the whole, if it explained the means used, the ends attained and the reasons for all. Perhaps no better expression of this emotional change can be given than the following words from an anonymous author who tells us:

"A great scientist has said that the more a man of science investigates the secrets of nature, the more does he marvel at them and the less is he astonished. . . . The more he ponders over her mysteries the more inexplicable does he feel to be the solution to him, with his practiced intellect and stored-up knowledge; the drop of water or the simplest moss is as wonderful in its essence and perplexes him as greatly as do the most startling phenomena, such as tempests, eclipses, etc. With the uncultured man the familiarity of sameness fills him with indifference. . . . That an apple falls to the ground or that a man is capable of standing upright causes no perplexity to the savage or the child; they evoke as little astonishment in them as in the elephant or the horse."¹¹⁵

To clarify religious concepts and the content of religious beliefs is to devitalize them and to rob religion of its real essence, the emotions of awe and reverence.

Etymology gives interesting corroboration of the historical relation between the unusual and awe and reverence, between miracles and religious emotion. For example, we find that:

In its earliest use "*marvel*" meant a "*miracle*," then "*a wonderful or astonishing thing; a cause of surprise, admiration or wonder; a wonder; the marvellous*" meant "*that which is prodigious or extravagantly improbable*," or "*of poetic material; concerned with the supernatural*;" while the verb *marvel* means, "*to be filled with wonder or astonishment; to be struck with surprise*."¹¹⁶

So *miracle* comes from Latin *mirari*, to wonder at,¹¹⁷ the same stem from which *marvel* is derived; thus showing a historical connection or unity of

these concepts. Moreover we find the same connection recorded in the history of the word "wonder:"

"*Wonder*, a strange thing, a prodigy, a portent, admiration. . . . The original sense is 'awe,' lit. that from which one turns *aside*, or 'that which is turned from,' from Teut. base *Wand*, to wind, turn." ¹¹⁸

Mystery is in general a fact, matter, or phenomenon, of which the meaning, explanation or cause is not known and which awakens curiosity or inspires awe. ¹¹⁹

Canny, comes from *can* in the sense of "to know how, be able, or the derived Sc. sb. *Can*, knowledge, skill." Hence it meant, "knowing, sagacious, judicious, prudent." ¹²⁰ In our use of the word *uncanny* we have grown accustomed to emphasize the emotional state and mental attitude with which we view the uncanny, i. e., the unknown. Hence its present meaning—due to this emphasis or interest—: "Eery, weird, mysterious; apparently not of this world; hence, noting one supposed to possess preternatural powers." ¹²¹

So, *σεβέσθαι*, which "expresses primarily, the notion of fright," ¹²² meaning, "to be afraid of anything" is cognate with "*σεβίδω*, to worship, honour." *σεβας* meaning, "reverential awe, a feeling of awe and shame; generally reverence, worship, honour, esteem; the awe one feels at any astonishing sight; astonishment, wonder; after Homer, the object of reverential awe, majesty, holiness, etc." ¹²³

In another Greek word we meet with a record of this connection of the element of surprise and reverence with the unusual—that is the thing to be marvelled at: "*θαμυάσσω*, to wonder, be astonished; to look on with wonder and amazement, to wonder, marvel at a thing: later, like Latin, *mirari*, to regard with wonder and reverence, to esteem, honour, admire, praise; to wonder, marvel at; "while *θαμνα* meant "whatever one regards with wonder or astonishment, a wonder, marvel, wondrous thing, work of wonder; wonder, surprise, astonishment. ("The money paid to see conjuror's tricks," was called *θαυμακτροι*.) A similar story is recorded in Arabic words: "the Arabic terms *ittaga*, to be pious, *taqwa* or *taqa*, piety, *taqi*, pious, properly denote the idea of 'being on one's guard against something.'" ¹²⁵

Herbert Spencer's statement that "anything which transcends the ordinary, a savage thinks of as supernatural and divine" ¹²⁶ would seem to have a wider application than he imagined.

A similar attitude toward unusual and apparently uncaused phenomena is probably to be found in every one of us. The most civilized, the most sceptical and scientific and incredulous of us are not free from these uncanny feelings in the presence of phenomena which we cannot understand. "Who of us has not been told the common tale of death by fright from imaginary ghosts?" or of "the man who dies from fright because his clothes got entangled in the coffin of a dead man?" Indeed,

if any would test this in himself, let him, as Lane suggests, take the road by night, if only to regain something of that awe of nature, that fear of the elemental, which the resources of civilization have well-nigh driven out of the townsman's life.¹²⁷ And yet it is not physical injury that one apprehends in these situations—no one fears physical injury from a ghost, however great his horror of making its acquaintance. Indeed, the ultimate explanation seems to be an innate fear and spontaneous reaction upon these unusual or apparently uncaused phenomena. So universal is this that the present writer, for one, is convinced that, apart from any fear of bodily harm—it is not physical injury that one fears before he runs away—the most imperturbable scientist or philosopher, sitting quiet and alone in his study at the ominous hour of midnight, would be moved by emotions other than those of mere curiosity or of annoyance, should his books persist in quietly rearranging themselves on the shelves, or the pens rise and dance merrily on his table. Who would not then exhibit that "fear of the unknown" which is said to be "one of the strongest characteristics of primitive man?" Like him: "He may not fear his fellowmen, nor the beasts of the forest; but he lives in perpetual awe of those unseen powers which, from time to time, seem bent on his destruction."¹²⁸

This attitude toward the unusual and the apparently uncaused is not peculiar to man but seems to be shared by many of the higher animals. The classical instance is that of the dog of Romanes, which was terrified by a bone moved across the floor by means of an invisible thread. Here is individual psychology with a vengeance; it has nothing of the social tinge about it.¹²⁹ Nor is there anything social in the action of the terrier, which was frightened terribly by notes from a piano when no player was to be seen—said terrier showing ordinarily a manifest liking for music from this instrument.¹³⁰ Horses pay no attention to a horse and carriage that they meet on a road, but will often shy at a carriage minus the horse.¹³¹ Thus Sully's observation that children are often terrified by the strange and irregular behavior of a feather as it glides along the floor or lifts itself into the air¹³² can be paralleled abundantly in the animal world.¹³³

Waterhouse¹³⁴ says he has failed to find these alleged reactions in the case of animals upon which he has made experiments; but

no one will deny that, with all of the higher animals, as with man, *the unusual and unfamiliar is interesting and claims attention*. As Poincaré says, the isolated fact strikes all eyes, those of the vulgar as well as those of the learned.¹³⁵ Moreover, this interest must have had a very vital relation to the life of the individual and the survival of the species in the struggle for existence. The inference is supported by the fact that this interest is not manifested by the lowest orders of animal life and that it is nowhere so generally observable as in those animals which have reached the highest state of development. Trust your ancestral cousin, the monkey, to notice a new fad as quickly as any member of *Homo sapiens* observes it. All know how to deal with the things of everyday experience but every new appearance is a new problem, a new possibility that may either offer material advantage or present an unsuspected danger. The unusual event is frequent with a potentiality that may take the direction of benefit or of disaster with unforeseen probability, and must be closely observed in order to snatch the benefit or flee the danger. Where existence is precarious, with deadly enemies lurking everywhere and liable to appear anywhere and anywhen, the noises and movements which are not familiar, which have not been found by experience to be consonant with safety, must receive immediate close attention. The animal which does not invariably and attentively observe such strange and unfamiliar happenings is at a great disadvantage as compared to one which is keenly alert to all such. To be keenly alive to advantage or to danger is a distinct asset and one that must, in the long run, tend to secure the survival of the individual and so of the species, which was so fortunate as to possess this quality. Thus, to pay attention to the unfamiliar is a distinct gain; inasmuch as the enemy, if lurking there, will the more easily be discovered and escape will be more probable where flight is timely. Another considerable advantage is gained when the animal not merely attends to the unusual phenomenon, but reacts spontaneously and takes to flight or to shelter before the enemy has gained even the advantage of staying its flight while holding its attention. The tendency to react spontaneously becomes another considerable asset in the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. It would indeed be matter of surprise if a tendency so universal, both geographically and culturally, in human psychology and physi-

ology, did not have its roots in the higher animals and a pre-human ancestry. If, now, this is the crude basis of religion and of magic alike, it follows that these are rooted in individual as well as in social psychology. If President Hall's generalization be true that,

"It is a commonplace of religious psychology that in every individual and race are found the elements of about every religion that ever was in the world, from fetichism up, and that the best Christian is so only by a more or less safe working majority of his faculties,"¹³⁶

it can be so only on the supposition that religion is, at basis, a matter of individual psychology.

As we have pointed out, the crust of custom or of the usual has to be broken before a sense of wonder and mystery are aroused within us; the unknown is, literally and actually, the *uncanny*, or *unkenned*; devices that seem most impressive till known, become disgustingly simple and even vulgar when they are completely understood. As W. I. Thomas has said:¹³⁷

"It is psychologically true that only the unfamiliar and not—completely—controlled is interesting. This is the secret of the interest of modern scientific pursuit and of games. States of high emotional tension are due to the presentation of the unfamiliar—that is, the unanalysed, the uncontrolled—to the attention. And although the intimate association and daily familiarity of family life produce affection, they are not favorable to the genesis of romantic love. Cognition is so complete that no place is left for emotional appreciation."

A word may be said as to our interpretation of certain things as caused or uncaused, usual or unusual. Those interested in the unusual and unfamiliar will read with pleasure the first few chapters of Poincaré's *Science et Méthode*. In this work, M. Poincaré endeavors to give us the psychology of scientific effort and advance, the basis of which he finds to be the desire to schematize every fact of the universe, and assign to each its proper relative position and value—in a word, an endeavor to bring order and harmony out of chaos and confusion. The isolated and apparently uncaused fact must be assigned its proper place in the sequence or correspondence of things, and thus be shown not to be really uncaused. Until this place in the scheme is found we feel about the isolated, unexplained fact much as we feel about a vibrating string that is neither in temporal nor in tone unison with other vibrating chords. In a word, a love for the harmony and orderliness of things is responsible

for all of our scientific interest and progress. Certainly this "harmony" is an immense gain. It brings economy of thought, as expressed in every generalization and "class" or connotative word; the categories of cause and effect assign things their proper relative positions in the order and sequence of events, enable us to grasp and make use of our knowledge with minimum effort, and must be considered one of the essentials of advance. But this is only one way of saying that the progress of knowledge has been due to continued attempts to transform the unusual and the uncaused into the usual and the caused.

Perhaps a certain amount of support is given to Poincaré's interpretation by the fundamental part rhythm and the love of rhythm plays in our whole physiological and psychological life.¹³⁸ Every people known to us have some form of music, and always *rhythm* is a predominant characteristic—sometimes, to our ears, almost the only quality it possesses. Indeed, in the case of uncivilized people, it is perhaps, an all-inclusive generalization that music is limited to airs possessing an obvious rhythm.¹³⁹ Perhaps the systematization of all experience is part of this desire for harmony in all things.

We are not contending that savages make the distinction of unusual and uncaused after the manner that we have attempted to classify these magico-religious phenomena, any more than the man who fears ghosts and monsters makes such a distinction. But, in the words of Goblet d'Alviella,¹⁴⁰

"The most benighted savages, even when they have no idea of the distinction between natural and supernatural, perceive quite clearly that certain events are due to causes whose connection is self-evident. They did not need to wait till a Newton came to reveal the law of gravitation, in order to convince themselves that, if an apple detached from a tree falls to the ground, there is nothing in this phenomenon but what is natural and capable of being foreseen. But everything that strikes them as unusual and unexpected—and this category includes the great majority of phenomena—seems to them due to the action of invisible powers acting through mysterious processes."¹⁴¹

These powers, says d'Alviella, bear amongst all non-civilized peoples, a generic name which corresponds in their respective languages to our term "spirits."

But, needless to say, we can suppose no such conscious categorizing on the part of the higher animals. Nor do the facts, admitting the correctness of our interpretation of

them, prove or tend to prove that animals are religious because they respond to the unusual and apparently uncaused in much the same way that we humans respond to these self-same phenomena. But the emotional and spontaneous reaction may be present and of such a nature as not to be essentially different from that of men. Indeed it would be matter of surprise if phenomena so universal as these attitudes toward the unusual were not rooted in our pre-human ancestors; while their existence among practically all of the higher animals over the entire globe makes it fairly certain that these spontaneous reactions have been of utility to the species and have had an intimate relation to its survival and perpetuation.¹⁴²

From this point of view there is perhaps no better statement of the implications of the question than that given us by Waterhouse, with whose view I find myself in entire accord. He says:

“The old postulate of a religious faculty existing apart from anything the brutes possess, and supposed to be divinely bestowed, is hardly capable of defence to-day; but it would be sheer perversity to treat religion as if it were not a human *differentia* on the ground that the emotions that exist as religious in man are also found in brutes. That would be to identify religion with certain emotions instead of referring it to a distinctive object of these emotions. The difference in the conception of the object distinguishes clearly the emotions as religious. A savage's awe of the supernatural is *toto coelo* different from the same emotion in a dog with regard to his master.

“If a sharp dividing-line could be drawn between man and the brute, it might be possible to point to the origin of religion. Since that is impossible, the origin of religion is buried behind the blurred haze that lies over the pathway which joins the two points, which to us are none the less distinct, between the lowest man and the highest brute. It may be assumed that there is no break, that continuity is complete, but that must not prevent the facts being handled as we have them, and they are these: that, whilst the emotions that are religious in man exist in brutes, they do not exist as religious in brutes; but their religious quality is something added to them in their passage to man, a something that belongs to man as man.”¹⁴³

Our attempt has been to point out a common objective element in these magico-religious phenomena, and not to attempt an interpretation of the various ways in which this may develop into various religious forms and practices with all their complications of tabus and sanctions.¹⁴⁴ Here is one of the ways in which the probability of that development has been outlined:

“The saying *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor* is, with some qualification,

to be accepted as true. At all events we cannot fail to notice that, even in the later times, the dread inspired by the more mysterious phenomena of nature leads man to personify the powers that produce them, and such powers he timidly endeavors to conciliate. The *fear* of God afterwards assumes a nobler character, but nevertheless retains traces of its origin.'¹¹⁴⁸

But records of historical development are few, and did we have them, we should scarcely expect to find the same story told by each and all of them alike. There is no well-defined groove along which every religious system must move in its historical unfoldment.

How we shall feel toward an event or its explanation depends largely upon the centering of our interest. The Australians speak of the remotest time in the dim mythical past when the features of the country had not yet been formed and half-men half-animal creatures walked about, as the *Alcheringa* times. The question what happened before the *Alcheringa* times is cause for merriment from its very absurdity, and does not tend to set them thinking. Now, their interest might center upon portions of the *Alcheringa* times without ever going prior to it; but if they really centered their attention upon the *Alcheringa* as a period of time then the question what was *before* the *Alcheringa* must arise and would, we are forced to believe, receive some answer, more or less satisfactory to the propounder. For it seems essential that there should be a before and an after to that on which our interest is centered, even if that before be nothing more definite than a pre-*Alcheringa* period. In that case the break may be abrupt, but no explanation on which our interest is centered will be without its own explanation. Perhaps to this shifting of interest, as much as to our Poincaréan love of harmony and order, is due the pursuit of wisdom and the advancement of science. For each explanation becomes in itself a thing to be explained when once we center our interest on the explanation; and no first or no ultimate remains such when once we have centered our interest on these aspects.

In conclusion, let it be said that this is merely an attempt to explain an essential and invariable element in all magic and all religions. Possibly in its inadequate way, it may add a chapter to the threshold of religion. Possibly we have shown the foundation of the magico-religious to rest in individual as well as in social psychology, and have demonstrated a fundamental error in viewing religion as simply a social phenomenon.

Social, in the sense that intellect itself, according to some thinkers, is social, it may be. Even so its roots reach back into the remote past when began that struggle with the unknown which baffles yet the keenest intellect. Just how this fear has become socialized giving us the various forms of religion that we have to-day is a problem that awaits the worker in social psychology and in historico-anthropology.

To sum up: From the very heterogeneous material which we have presented, a common trait of spontaneous reaction upon unusual phenomena seems to emerge. The unrelated, unclassified events are wont to be placed without the pale of the natural and well within the region of the sacro-sanct. As Dr. Lowie has admirably expressed it, "Observations contrary to the past experience disturb our mental equilibrium, which can be readjusted only by bringing both the ordinary observation and the deviations from it under a common law."¹⁴⁶ We have found that the attitude taken toward these phenomena is almost invariably one of fear—an emotion whose intellectual correlate is, as we have seen, so frequently *mystery*.

Moreover, we the super-civilized and the supercilious, have yet a great deal of the savage in us. "So superstitious is he," writes Fewkes of the Zuñi, "that he fears any trifling event of an unusual nature. . . . Any unusual occurrence in life is so mysterious as to cause fear."¹⁴⁷ And yet, it may be doubted whether civilized man is any less susceptible to these reactions than is the savage, the difference being not one of emotional toning in the presence of the unusual, but rather the greater bounds of knowledge mediate or immediate into which so much of the realm still unconquered by savage man has been placed by civilized man in a way that meets his own intellectual demands. Both alike are in fear and well on the way to the awe and sense of mystery in which religion must ever enshrine itself, when in the presence of what is for both an unusual and unknown occurrence, each interpreting it according to his bent.

In closing, let the following extract from Biard's account, written 1611-16,¹⁴⁸ of the trip of the French up the St. John river, remind us that all mankind is kin in the presence of the unusual, and each in his own way is wont to surround it with a dim halo of mystic significance.

"Now, as we were sailing up the river, being already about a league and a half from the Malouin [Malecite] settlement, towards nightfall a phe-

nomenon appeared to us, which filled us with terror. For the heavens became wonderfully red over the Malouin habitation, and then the glow, separating into long rays and flashes of light, moved on and melted away over this settlement. This appeared twice. Our Savages when they saw this wonder, cried out in their language: 'We shall have war, there will be blood.' The French also made some Prophecies thereupon, each according to his own idea."

NOTES

^{1,2} See *L'Année Sociologique*, vol. 2, pp. 4-6, 23-25.

³ This definition of religion was intimated, but not developed by Moncure D. Conway in an early number of the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*. Its best exponents are William McDougall, *Social Psychology* (1909); and R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion* (1909), *Birth of Humility* (1910). See also an article by Andrew Lang in the *Contemporary Review* for May, 1909; Preuss' review of the literature relating to the religions of primitive peoples in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* for October, 1910; Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures* (1910), Chapter IX.

⁴ See the works referred to in the previous note. Also Hartland's Address before Section H. (Anthropology) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (York Meeting, 1906); Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion* (1909); Haddon, *Magic and Fetishism* (1906); and J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough and Early History of the Kingship*, to whose theory of an absolute separation between religion and magic the subsequent discussion referred to above is due.

⁵ As a living biological authority has said, with regard to life and living things, "At the present time the student of living things shows a tendency to regard any phenomenon as explained, when once it falls under known laws of physiological stimulation or metabolism, although the ultimate causes of these things are unknown." (L. Doncaster, "Vitalism," *Science Progress*, Jan, 1912, vol 6, p. 388.) Or, as Tennant expresses it (*Hastings' Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 3, p. 262): "Experience shows us one thing coming after another, but not out of it; observation reveals succession, and regularity of succession, but nothing more." The entire article on "Cause and Causality" may be consulted with profit. For clear statements of the concept of "cause" and "causality," see especially Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, and Francis Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*.

⁶ Practically all of the Melanesian material is from Codrington. For Australia, a number of authorities have been consulted, more especially Spencer and Gillen and Howitt.

⁷ The following psychology of resemblance is interesting in this connection as showing the spontaneous interest taken in resemblances for their own sake: "Up to a certain, or rather an uncertain, point, the perception of identity or likeness between two things is in itself, a source of pleasure to man." It is with keen delight that children recognize in a picture, "a thing which they have actually seen. . . . And so with ignorant people when they look at a picture, the great, if not the only, source

of pleasure seems to be the detecting of the likeness to something they know. They pass by the pictures which might communicate new ideas, and rejoice to find some face or some place which they know." (Fry, in *Contemp. Rev.*, vol. 75 (1889), p. 665.)

^{8,9} In the west end of Savaii were two circular openings among the rocks near the beach, where the souls of the departed were supposed to find an entrance to the world of spirits, away under the ocean. The chiefs went down the larger of the two and the common people had the smaller one. They were conveyed thither by a band of spirits. (Turner, p. 257.) Spirits of the dead were supposed to descend down a hollow pit, to Pulu, the dominions of Saveasiuleo. "May you go rumbling down the hollow pit" was the common language of cursing. (p. 258.)

¹⁰ C. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals* (1889).

^{11,12} "A singular clump of *Casuarina* was close to the westward of the cliffs, and its dark naked aspect contrasted with the stunted gum-trees and scattered palms, sparingly sprinkled over this sterile tract of country." (Stokes, vol. I, p. 428.) Compare with Codrington's description, the following: "Its [the wind's] melancholy sighing through the branches of the she-oak tree caused an unceasing and almost fearful sound, that one might imagine to be the distant wail of spirits." (Angas, vol. I, p. 125.)

¹⁴ Quoting Henry Balfour, Esq.

¹⁵ W. F. Flinders Petrie, *Egyptian Decorative Art* (1895).

¹⁶ "At Bugoto, in Ysabel, ghosts cross the pool of *Kolap a pauro* by the narrow tree-trunks which lie over it. But, before they are admitted into the presence of the *Bolafagina*, the *tindalo* lord of the place, they must have upon their hands the conventional outline of the frigate-bird, the passport to the Eleusinian fields. The oath by *Daula*, the name of the frigate-bird, is in Florida, where *Daula* is a *tindalo*, solemn and binding. At Ulawa, the sacred character of such an oath is denoted by the word *kaula*. Many ghosts reside in these birds which are powerful to aid at sea; hence an image of the frigate-bird frequently finds a place upon the prow or the stern of a canoe. Dr. Rivers believes that the sacredness of the frigate-bird is not native to the island, but has been imported. I was not informed and forgot to ask on what grounds he bases this view. When Dr. Rivers publishes the results of his field-work in Melanesia, many of these points will doubtless be illuminated.

¹⁷ F. E. Hulme, *Natural History Lore and Legend* (1895), pp. 255-259.

¹⁸ See Gould, *Birds of New Guinea* (1875-1888), vol. 4, *Birds of Australia* (7 vols. 1840-1848, 1851-1870), vol. 2, *Birds of Asia* (7 vols., 1850-1887), vol. 1; Newton, *Dictionary of Birds* (1893-1896), p. 486; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th ed., vol. 24, p. 80.

¹⁹ There are the following confirmatory descriptions from Australia: "Then there is the Laughing Jackass, or Gigantic Kingfisher, a most comical bird. . . . They seem to be generally convulsed with laughter when an unlucky traveller meets with an accident, when drays get stuck, or when one is vainly looking for water." "Suddenly I heard a strange sound; it was the *laughing jackass*, or mocking-bird, whose laugh is exactly like a man's. The bird was nowhere to be seen; like the nightingale, he hides

in the recesses of the forest." In similar strain Lumholtz speaks of "the tittering ha! ha! ha! ha! of the laughing jackass." (E. B. Kennedy, *Four Years in Queensland* (1870), p. 108; G. Verschuur, *At the Antipodes* (1891), p. 49; Lumholtz, *Op. cit.*, p. 207; W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines* (1897), p. 126.

"The laughing jackass, a senseless term, is a butcher bird, and its note bears a slight resemblance to the coarse and boisterous laugh of a man, but is much louder and more dissonant." (W. H. Breton, *Excursions in New South Wales, etc.*, (1833), vol. I., p. 273.)

Bennett writes of the laughing jackass: "Its peculiar gurgling laugh, commencing from a low, and gradually rising to a high and loud tone, is often heard by the traveller in all parts of the colony, sending forth its deafening noises whilst perched upon the lofty branch of a tree."

An Australian lady referred to it as the unparalleled "feathered donkey." (Bennett, vol. I., pp. 222-3.)

²⁰ Cf. D. S. Jordan, *A Guide to Study of Fishes* (1905), p. 264.

²¹ The bonito, which is one of the principal articles of food in the New Hebrides, is not, he says, a sacred animal in that island. Codrington's information about the Solomon Islands was second-hand, and Dr. Rivers thinks it probable he was misinformed with regard to the sacredness of the bonito there. (This information was given me in 1910. I have had no opportunity to get the more recent views of Dr. Rivers on these matters.) See also, with respect to the significance of this sacredness, J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. II.

²² J. Mathew, *Eaglehawk and Crow* (1899), p. 146.

²³ Taplin, *The Narrinyeri* (1879), p. 48, p. 91.

²⁴ Ridley, *Kamilaroi, etc.* (1875), p. 138.

²⁵ Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899); Strehlow, *Die Aranda und Loritjastämme* (1908); vol. I., pp. 28-29; Angas, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand* (1850), vol. I., pp. 97-98.

²⁶ Roth (*Ethnological Studies*, p. 153, p. 160) speaks of a dreaded water-spirit by the name of *Kammare*; and Angas (vol. I., pp. 97-8) tells us that the Moorundi, near the great north-west bend of the Murray, live in dread of a water-spirit inhabiting the Murray, and having the form of an enormous star-fish.

²⁷ Woods, *The Native Tribes of South Australia* (1879), p. 202.

²⁸ Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (1904), pp. 453, 376-377, 363, 366,—also *Journal of Anthropological Institute*, vol. 16, p. 27; Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai* (1880), p. 252; *Anthropos*, vol. 4, p. 210, p. 230. See also Lane-Fox, *Catalogue of Anthropological Collections, etc.*, p. 31, 32. For the nature of the Casuarina, cf. *Annales des Sciences Naturelles Botaniques*, 2 sér., t. 18, pp. 5-10. *Linnaea*, 1841, pp. 747-756 contains an article, "Bemerkungen über den anatomischen Bau der Casuarina," by H. R. Goffert; see *Ree's Cyclopaedia*, vol. 7., art. *Casuarina*."

It would be fanciful to identify *Tharamulun* or *Daramulun* with *Baru*, since the "God" of initiation for the Kurnai is *Bunjul*. So too, of doubt-

ful value is such evidence as the fact that in the Mukjarawaint tribe, the dead when not put into a hollow tree, were placed on the pollarded branches of a *Casuarina*.

²⁹ Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (1904), pp. 566-568. This suggests a bird of the kingfisher type.

³⁰ Lummholtz, *Among Cannibals* (1889), pp. 201-205.

³¹ The Italics are my own.

³² Taplin, *The Narrinyeri* (1879), p. 53.

³³ Fraser, in his *Aborigines of New South Wales* (p. 43), gives a similar incident from New South Wales: "Our Australian is a great coward when brought into contact with the unknown, especially if he can regard the thing as having some relation to the domain of spirits. One day when a blackfellow was present, one of my boys was blowing soap-bubbles; the man was frightened when he saw them and ran round the corner to hide from them."

^{33a} Cf. J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines* (1881), p. 50; A. J. Peggs, in *Folk-Lore*, vol. 14, 1903, pp. 340-341; Codrington, p. 348; Strehlow, vol. I., p. 17.

^{33b} Fison and Howitt, *Op. cit.*, p. 218.

³⁴ Dawson, p. 534, p. 64.

³⁵ Mauss, *L'Origine des pouvoirs magiques dans quelques sociétés Australiennes* (1904), p. 40. See also Hubert and Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions* (1909), p. 171.

³⁶ Howitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 354.

³⁷ This attitude is, however, not general in Australia. A similar variation in attitude towards twins and triplets meets us in Africa, some tribes welcoming their arrival others always destroying them. Any unusual occurrence in the birth, however, frequently will merit death to the infant; as, for example, the custom of the Baganda prescribing that infants born feet foremost be killed and buried at cross-roads. Cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. II., p. 507.—A native informant tells me that though twins are common in Dahomey and triplets not infrequent, they are always allowed to live and no stigma or suspicion rests either on them or on the mother.

³⁸ *The Hibbert Journal*, January, 1910.

³⁹ *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 2, p. 270.

^{40,41} G. Turner, *Samoa* (1884), p. 327, 264.

⁴² A Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* (First Series, 1882), p. 12; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (2 vols., 1906), vol. 2, p. 4; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol 2, p. 160.

⁴³ Cf. Lockyer, *Stonehenge* (1906); W. Y. E. Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries* (1911).

⁴⁴ *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 2, p. 156.

Not far from the quaint pueblo of Laguna in New Mexico rise seven black, ragged, peculiar looking rocks and these according to a Laguna tradition are the prison houses of seven spirits. (*The Southern Workman*, Nov., 1910, p. 618.) Leonard's explanation of the sacredness attaching to a particular stone described by him among the tribes of the Lower Niger is probably applicable to a large proportion of similar sacred stones.

He writes: "The natives are ignorant altogether of its history. How it, the only stone in the vicinity, got there, or where it came from, is a blank and a mystery, which renders it all the more sacred;" it "excited in him the same feeling of awe and mystery that any object did, which to him was incomprehensible." (A Leonard, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes* (1906), p. 306, p. 312.)

⁴⁵ Hugh Clifford in *Dublin Review*, January, 1911, p. 152.

⁴⁶ See particularly Sir John Evans, *Ancient Stone Implements of Great Britain and Ireland*; *The British Museum Guide to the Stone Age*; Boyd-Dawkins, *Early Man in Britain*; Wilson, *Prehistoric Man*; Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries*. A Teleut tradition states that the reality of the shamanistic powers of a shamanka ancestress was tested by shooting an arrow at her, not unlike the experiment tried upon Captain Cook, though with different success. The Buryats of the Altai, upon finding that Makhunai was incombustible, having tested this alleged property by covering him with seventy cart-loads of straw, which were then set on fire, agreed that he possessed magical powers; and since that day the authorities of Irkutsk have allowed the shamans to carry on their profession. (*Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, p. 24, 134; but see p. 137, where it is stated that, "In the Kolymsk district an old shamanka who could do no tricks was much esteemed, while a clever young wizard who could perform the most complicated shamanist miracles was of no repute.") In some African tribes, to be born feet-foremost was ominous. In Scotland, according to Gregor, "those who were born with their feet first possessed great power to heal all kinds of sprains, lumbago, and rheumatism, either by rubbing the affected part or by trampling on it. The great virtue lay in the feet." (*Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. III., p. 271.)

⁴⁷ A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples* (1894), p. 238.

⁴⁸ R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism* (1904), p. 179. To the same effect is the brief entertained by the Apaches that if the bull-roarer is made from a tree obtained from the mountain heights, which has previously been struck by lightning, "it possesses special qualities in controlling the elements." (Antonio Apache, in Article on "Apaches," in *Hastings' Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, vol I.) "The word 'rune' seems properly to mean 'secrecy,' as it was long considered a wonderful secret how one man could by such simple strokes communicate his thoughts to another. From this it was a natural step to attribute to runes a secret magic power; and so we have pretty frequent accounts of their use as charms." (Montelius, *The Civilization of Sweden in Heathen Times* (1888), p. 209.) "Le nombre des fétiches" writes François, "est considérable au Dahomey. Toute manifestation d'une force que l'indigène ne peut définir, tout phénomène qui dépasse son imagination ou son intelligence est fétiche. Tous les maux qui accablent le noir dénotent l'existence d'un fétiche." (G. François, *Le Dahomey* (1909), p. 96.)

⁴⁹ A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa* (1906), p. 88.

⁵⁰ Veness, *Ten Years of Mission Life in British Guiana* (1875), p. 29.

⁵¹ R. C. Thompson, *Semitic Magic* (1908), pp. 33-34.

⁵² Hertz Bey, *Guide to the Arab Museum at Cairo*.

⁵³ S. L. Krebs, *The Law of Suggestion*, p. 64.

⁵⁴ Cf. the article on "Alchemy" (European) in *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. I, p. 294.

⁵⁵ "Ipse Gerbertus (Silvester II) fecit arte mechanico horologium et organa hydraulica, ubi mirum in modum, per aquae calefactae violentiam, implet ventus emergens concavitatem barbati et per multos foratiles tractus aereae fistulae modulatos clamores emittunt." Cf. Hare, A. J. C., *Walks in Rome* (1871), p. 406; Young, *Story of Rome* (1901), p. 179. Similarly, among the Arabs, "any man noted for his intelligence is supposed to have a *tabi* who reveals all manner of things to him." *Hastings' Encycl. of Rel. and Ethics*, vol. I., p. 670. "Even heathen Arabian poets speak of Palmyra as having been built for King Solomon by the Jinn;" and, Nöldeke believes, "the demons were brought into the story because the edifices of the city seemed too marvellous to be the work of men." *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Dufton, *Narrative of a Journey through Abyssinia* (1867), p. 167; M. Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia* (2 vols., 1853).

⁵⁷ See *The Threshold of Religion*.

⁵⁸ See *The Individual* (1900), pp. 200-203.

⁵⁹ E. S. Hartland, in a recent article in *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (vol. IV., "Death and Disposal of the Dead,—Introductory"), again refers to a universal fear of a corpse.

⁶⁰ Cf. *The Church Times* (English Weekly), April 16, 1909.

⁶¹ See *Descent of Man*, vol. I, p. 76.

⁶² *Northwest Coast*, 1857, p. 212. Quoted in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. I., p. 201.

⁶³ Eells, quoted by Yarrow, in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. I, p. 176.

⁶⁴ *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 6, p. 612.

⁶⁵ Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 18; J. Mathew, *Eaglehawk and Crow*, p. 91; Peggs, in *Folk-Lore*, vol. 14 (1903), p. 341, p. 356.

⁶⁶ C. Hill-Tout, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 35, p. 137.

⁶⁷ *Semitic Magic*, pp. 19, 109, 120, 132. Cf. Frazer, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 15; Yarrow in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. I.

⁶⁸ Turner, "Hudson Bay Eskimo," *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 11, p. 272.

⁶⁹ *Impressions of a Careless Traveller*, p. 125.

⁷⁰ *Origin of Worship*, p. 40, pp. 106-107.

⁷¹ Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 18.

⁷² The Nagas of India make sacrifices and propitiations to those who have died a natural death, but not to those who have been killed by some calamity, such as an attack by a tiger, being run through with a spear, etc.

⁷³ *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians* (1905), p. 115.

⁷⁴ Horses have been known to run away when an attempt was made to drive them past the place where animals have been butchered.

^{75, 76} Murdoch, "Point Barrow Eskimo," in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 9, p. 51; p. 45.

^{77, 78} Boas, "Central Eskimo," *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 6, p. 240; pp. 634-636, p. 640, pp. 640-641.

⁸⁰ H. Y. Hind, *Explorations in Labrador* (1867), vol. 1, p. 59.

⁸¹ Dall, *Contrib. to N. Amer. Ethnol.*, vol. 1 (1877), p. 29.

⁸² A. B. Ellis, *Yoruba*, p. 244.

⁸³ Bowen, *Yoruba Language*, p. XX.

⁸⁴ Ridgeway, "Presid. Address," in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. 40, p. 18, citing Torday and Joyce.

⁸⁵ Maspero, *New Light on Ancient Egypt*, p. 89. "The peoples frequented by the traders of Elephantiné, through hearing of Egypt, its industry, its wealth, its armies, ended by conceiving for her an admiration somewhat mingled with fear; they learned to consider her a superior power, and the Pharaoh a god, whom no one dared to resist" (*Ibid.*, p. 21).

⁸⁶ E. Westermarck, "The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships," in *Sociological Papers* (London, 1905).

^{87, 88} Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, (2 vols., 1906), vol. 1, p. 626; p. 596.

⁸⁹ Ross, *Social Psychology* (1908), pp. 32-33.

⁹⁰ I agree with Ross (*Social Psychology*, pp. 202-203, p. 215) that a rapid and wide departure from the customary and familiar produces in many—I should be inclined to say, in nearly all of us—a distressing sense of self-alienation; but I differ with him when he says that much of man's fear of the unknown and untried was due to his animistic fears. I should be inclined to state it the other way and attribute his animistic fears to his innate fear of the unusual and the unknown.

A similar mistake seems to me to be attributable to L. T. Hobhouse, when he says (*Morals in Evolution*, vol. I., p. 20): "From this state of fear, custom is his great deliverer. What has been done once in safety, may possibly be done again. What has been done many times, is fairly sure to be safe. A new departure is full of dangers; not only to the man who takes it, but to those with whom he lives. . . . Custom is the one sure guide to law; custom is that part of law which has been discovered. Hence the reverence of primitive society for custom; hence their terror of the innovator." But, for the savage custom is a *sanctum per se* and not for him a conservation of those rules and laws which are found socially useful. Hobhouse seems to be reading our attitude into the native.

⁹¹ Cf. *British Museum Handbook to Ethnographical Collection*, p. 31. The following must be included in the same psychological category: "They will not whistle under a rock, having a tradition that some of the natives did, while feasting under one, and it fell from a great height and crushed them to death" (Barrington, *A Voyage to New South Wales* (N. Y., 1796), vol. 2, p. 34).

⁹² A man must accept and feed a white elephant when given him by a superior, even though the keep involves his ruin, as frequently happens. In Siam, wherefore, the phrase 'to have a white elephant on your hands is too huge a joke for enjoyment.' An old Chinese drawing represents a white elephant as worshipping the sun and moon. Cf. T. W. King, *Siam and Java*, pp. 237-241.

⁹³ Boas, "Central Eskimo," *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 6, p. 640.

⁹⁴ De Quatrefages, *The Human Species* (Int. Scientif. Ser.), 1879, p. 74.

⁹⁵ Rattray, *Some Folk-Lore, etc., in Chinyanja*, p. 194. Numerous things may cause this impotence: Should the umbilical cord fall on the pubes, should a child eat eggs, should a person get wounded with a porcupine-quill, should a rabbit run against a man's leg, he becomes a eunuch.

⁹⁶ See Alberti, L., *De Kaffers* (Amsterdam, 1810).

⁹⁷ K. Baedeker, *Southern Italy*, p. 402. For similar instances see J. A. McClymont, *Greece* (1906), p. 22; J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* (1907), pp. 75 ff., 113 ff.; Vergil, *Aeneid*, VI, 237-242, VII, 84, 563-571.

⁹⁸ Turner, "Hudson Bay Eskimo," in *Rep. Bur. Ethnol.*, vol. 11, p. 272.

⁹⁹ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, vol. 2, p. 40.

¹⁰⁰ "When Harb, the grandfather of the Khalif Un 'awiya, together with another man, was engaged in clearing a marsh for purposes of cultivation, white serpents were seen to fly out of the burning weeds; and when both persons died forthwith everyone perceived that the Jinn had slain them." (Article on "Arabs, Ancient" in *Hastings' Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 670.)

Frazer writes: "Primitive man believes that what is sacred is dangerous,—it is pervaded by a sort of electrical sanctity which communicates a shock to, even if it does not kill, whatever comes into contact with it. Hence the savage is unwilling to touch or even to see that which he deems peculiarly holy. Thus Bechuanas of the Crocodile clan, think it 'hateful and unlucky' to meet or see a crocodile; the sight is thought to cause inflammation of the eyes. Yet the crocodile is their most sacred object; they call it their father, swear by it, and celebrate it in their festivals." He "thinks that often in the primitive sentiment of religious awe and fear . . . the feelings of reverence and abhorrence are almost equally blended. . . . In course of time one of the contradictory feelings is likely to prevail over the other, and according as the feeling which finally predominates is that of reverence or abhorrence, the being who is the object of it will rise into a god or sink into a devil." (*Golden Bough*, vol. I, pp. 55-57. First edition.)

¹⁰¹ See Spinoza, *Tract. Theol. Polit.*

¹⁰² See Koran, *Sura* 20, 26-27.

^{103, 104} Hare, *Walks in Rome*, p. 480, p. 430. Compare the crime of Saul in consulting the witch of Endor, I. Samuel XXVIII; see also Acts XIX, 19, where the hold of Christianity upon the people was shown by the fact that, "Not a few of them that practised curious arts brought their books together and burned them in the sight of all." See also, Thompson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 36, 46, 48, 58 of *Introd.*

^{105, 107} Hare, *Op. cit.*, p. 371 (Leo I. was Pope from 440 to 416 A. D.); p. 356; p. 469 (quoting from Mrs. Jameson's *Sacred Art*).

¹⁰⁸ E. G. Gardner, *The Story of Siena, etc.*, 1903, p. 208. See also Ch. 2 and 7.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., for example, Torrey, *Difficulties and Alleged Contradictions in the Bible* (1907).

¹¹⁰ B. Pascal, *Thoughts*, p. 71. See on "Miracles."

^{111,112} B. Pascal, *Thoughts on Jesuits and Jansenists* (Trans. C. K. Paul), p. 285; p. 286.

¹¹³ *History of Pantheism* (London, 1879), vol. 2, p. 149.

¹¹⁴ Veness, *Ten Years of Mission Life in British Guiana* (1875), p. 27.

¹¹⁵ *History of Pantheism*, vol. 2, p. 271. p. 318.

[Compare also the following expression of this fact by Iverach: "Take surprise, and we find that while we call by the same name the similar phenomena of an animal and a man, yet surprise is relative to the experience of the individual. We are not surprised at railways, telegraphs, telephones, motor cars, these have become the commonplaces of civilization." (James Iverach in article on "Altruism" in *Hastings' Ency. of Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 356.) Jules Verne, in *Ten Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*, has expressed a truth with regard to our tendency to believe the marvellous in the remark: "That the vulgar should believe in extraordinary comets traversing space, and in the existence of antediluvian monsters in the heart of the globe, may well be; but neither astronomer nor geologist believes in such chimeras." The man trained in that field is on familiar ground; but to the uninitiated all things are possible and a mere statement that they exist makes their existence plausible.

Moreover, it usually follows that an attempt to subject the marvellous or the miraculous to too close scrutiny destroys faith in it. Hence, a wise provision of the church which invites little questioning of the truth of its alleged facts. George Eliot seems to have this in mind when Savonarola looking forward to his burning in the square at Florence, takes it for granted that a miracle will save him from the flames: "While it was easy for him to believe in a miracle, which, being distant and undefined, was screened behind the strong reasons he saw for its occurrence, . . . It was at the same time insurmountably difficult to him to believe in the probability of a miracle, which, like this of being carried unhurt through fire, pressed in all its details on his imagination and involved a demand, not only for belief, but for exceptional action." "The miracle—But no! when Savonarola brought his mind close to the threatened scene in the Piazza, and imagined a human body entering the fire, his belief recoiled again." (*Romola*, Ch. LXIV.)]

¹¹⁶ J. A. H. Murray, *New English Dictionary*, vol. 6.

^{117,118} Skeat, *Etymol. Dict. of the English Language*, under "Miracle," "Wonder."

¹¹⁹ *The Century Dictionary*, vol. 4.

¹²⁰ Murray, *New Engl. Dict.*, vol. 2, p. 73.

¹²¹ *Century Dict.*, vol. 6, p. 6585.

¹²² *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 660.

^{123,124} Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1336; p. 626.

¹²⁵ *Hastings, Op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 660. Nöldeke, from whom this quotation is taken, concludes that "thus they presuppose that man must take pains to protect himself against the injury which would be inflicted upon him by the higher powers, if he did not continually strive to pacify them."

¹²⁶ H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. 2, p. 411.

¹²⁷ See Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, pp. 91.92; P. Topinard, *Science and*

Faith (1899), pp. 227-228; W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2, Chapter on Instincts; Jenks, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages* (1897), pp. 56-57; Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 202-203, p. 215.

¹²⁸ A very interesting article entitled "Our Superstitions" appeared in the *Outlook* for August 26, 1911, from the pen of H. Addington Bruce. In a canvass of Harvard professors Mr. Bruce found that eight out of ten believed in some superstition to the extent of being influenced in their actions by this belief. One partial explanation for the persistence of superstition, he suggests, "is the innate tendency of the human mind to lend credence to the uncanny and the marvellous."

¹²⁹ Romanes, *Animal Intelligence* (1881). See also Darwin, *Descent of Man*.

¹³⁰ On the authority of a friend. He observed that terror was manifested by his dog when he, hidden from the dog, played the piano through a window against which it was temporarily placed. He repeated the experiment at another time, and with like results.

¹³¹ In the experience of the writer, a stirring of the leaves by a small stick, which the animal had not seen thrown, frightened a quiet horse so that it broke from its hitching-post. He could cite many similar instances.

¹³² *Studies of Childhood* (1895).

¹³³ Karsten, in his *Origin of Worship* (1905), considers this action of animals in the presence of unusual phenomena animistic, i.e., as an attributing of spirits to such objects by the shy dumb beasts.(!)

¹³⁴ *Modern Theories of Religion* (1910).

¹³⁵ *Science et Méthode* (1908).

¹³⁶ G. Stanley Hall, *Educational Problems* (1911), vol. 2, p. 67.

¹³⁷ W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society* (1907), p. 196. See also G. Stanley Hall, in *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 7, p. 39; S. Lane-Poole, *Story of Cairo* (1902), p. 26; A. Seth (Pringle-Patterson), *Man's Place in the Cosmos* (1892; 1902).

¹³⁸ James' postulate that interests in unusual sounds "for ought we can see are without any utility whatever" is simply preposterous. (See his *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, p. 325.) The writer is not prepared to hold that the rocking of the cradle quiets the infant because it furnishes the conditions under which our ancestors, "probably arboreal" slept. Still it seems possible to hold that the rocking of trees and the swaying of limbs may have had some effect upon the nervous structure of animals that lived mostly in this movement. These "probably arboreans" whose organism was properly attuned, whose nervous structure was lulled and not irritated by these rhythms of the forest world, might in the long run possess some valuable advantages over those not similarly accommodated and not so favorably adjusted to their environment. See G. S. Hall, "A study of Anger," in *Amer. Jour. of Psych.*, vol. X, p. 590-1, and his *Educational Problems*, vol. I, Ch. II-III; Bolton, "Rhythm," in *Amer. Jour. of Psych.*, vol. VI, pp. 146-66; R. McDougall, in *Psychological Review* (1902), pp. 465-80; Bliss Carman, *The Making of Personality* (1908), p. 121. Moreover, James disregards the social advantage derived from music of securing concerted action—its compelling and unifying power.

¹³⁹ See an interesting discussion in G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence* (1904), vol. 1, pp. 211-215, p. 465.

¹⁴⁰⁻¹⁴¹ In *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 537, Article on "Animism."

¹⁴² "When children see a strange and somewhat alarming object or occurrence, they immediately assume what may be called a 'take-care' attitude, as if they should say, 'Look out; that object may hurt us; take care'; but there is not the slightest thought of its being animated by a spirit. Now, it seems to me that this 'take-care' attitude is perfectly natural and primitive. Why should it not have been the attitude assumed by our ancestors when they were in the presence of what they did not understand?" (Irving King, in the *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, 1911, p. 115.) See also this author's *The Development of Religion* (1910) and the present writer's review of that book in *Man* for August, 1911, where King's use of the usual and the unusual is criticized.

¹⁴³ E. S. Waterhouse, *Modern Theories of Religion*, p. 353. See an interesting discussion in William McDougall's *Social Psychology*, Chapter on "The Principal Instincts of Man."

¹⁴⁴⁻¹⁴⁵ Nöldeke, article on "Arabs" in *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 660.

¹⁴⁶ An excellent discussion of the concept of *cause* will be found in Dr. Lowie's review of Cornelius (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Apr. 25, 1912).

¹⁴⁷ *Journal of American Ethnology and Archeology*, I, 5.

¹⁴⁸ From Thwaites' *Jesuit Relations*, III, 211.

DYNAMISM, THE PRIMITIVE NATURE PHILOSOPHY, AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGION AND MAGIC.¹

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It was generally agreed until very recently that the original philosophy of nature was animism. This view was first set forth in an epoch-making book, *Primitive Culture*, by Edward B. Tylor. A brief statement of his theory will serve as a convenient starting-point for our discussion.

Tylor seeks to demonstrate that out of naïve thinking about the visions of dreams and trances and from comparisons of life with death, and of health with sickness, arose a belief in the existence of spirits as the powers animating nature. "What men's eyes behold is but the instrument to be used, or the material to be shaped, while behind it there stands some prodigious but half human creature, who grasps it with his hands or blows it with his breath." This belief, which according to him represents the first philosophy of nature, he calls animism. The phenomena mentioned generated initially the idea of the "double," also called "ghost" or "soul." Each man was believed to have a ghost, which could temporarily leave the body and appear at a distance from it. By a process of extension souls were ascribed to animals and even to plants. The separation which takes place at death between the double and the body is responsible, according to this view, for the production of spirits; so that, at their simplest, spirits are the souls of men, animals, or plants, liberated from a body. Spirits may enter and inhabit any organism, but they do not belong to it as a soul belongs to its body. A soul, it is true, can also leave its body, but only for a short time, under conditions such as sleep; otherwise death follows. Thus, in the mind of the savage, the world is animated by untold numbers of souls and spirits or free souls.

"Animism," writes Tylor, "is, in fact, the groundwork of the philosophy of religion, from that of savages up to that of civilised men. . . . It is habitually found that the theory of

¹ A chapter from *A Psychological Study of Religion; its Origin, Function and Future*; to be published by Macmillan in the late summer of 1912.

animism divides into two great dogmas forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities. . . . Animism, in its full development, includes the belief in controlling deities and subordinate spirits, in souls, and in a future state, these doctrines practically resulting in some kind of active worship."² This is his definition of a "minimum of religion."

"The doctrine of souls, founded on the natural perceptions of primitive man, gave rise to the doctrine of spirits." "The conception of a human soul served as a type or a model on which he framed not only his idea of other souls of lower grade, but also his idea of spiritual beings in general, from the tiniest elf that sports in the long grass up to the heavenly Creator."³

Credit must be given to Hobbes for having clearly anticipated the Tylorian animism. In the *Leviathan* we read: "And for the matter, or substance, of the Invisible Agents, so fancied, they could not, by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth or in a looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines called them *Imagines* and *Umbrae*; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please."⁴

This doctrine of souls and spirits, in so far as it purposes to express the first philosophy of nature, is rapidly giving way under the combined weight of anthropological and of psychological data. An increasingly large number of competent writers would now place earlier than the Tylorian animism, or at least side by side with it, another fundamental and universal belief, arising from commoner and simpler experiences than visions;

² E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, chap. XI, pp. 385, 386.

³ Vol. II, chap. XIV, pp. 99-100.

⁴ *Leviathan*, ed. A. R. Waller, 1904, chap. XII, p. 71.

namely, a belief in the existence of an omnipresent, non-personal power or powers.

The names best deserving mention in this connection are probably those of Daniel G. Brinton, in the United States, and of R. R. Marett, in England. In his *Lectures*, published in 1897, Brinton⁵ advanced the theory that "the hidden and mysterious power of the universe" is at first expressed in terms denoting "infinite will." He quotes from Miss Fletcher that *Wakan*, a word of the Dakota Indians, "is the deification of that peculiar quality or power of which man is conscious within himself as directing his own acts, or willing a course to bring about certain results," and he continues: "The universal postulate, the psychic origin of all religious thought, is the recognition, or, if you please, the assumption, that conscious volition is the ultimate source of all Force. It is the belief that, behind the sensuous, phenomenal world, distinct from it, giving it form, existence, and activity, lies the ultimate, invisible, immeasurable power of Mind, of conscious Will, of Intelligence, analogous in some way to our own; and—mark the essential corollary—that man is in communication with it." And again: "The idea of a World-Soul, manifesting itself individually in every form of matter from the star to the clod, is as truly the belief of the Sioux or the Fijian cannibal as it was of Spinoza or Giordano Bruno." He holds further that this Will-Power, this World-Soul, is first posited in moments of ecstasy or trance, in periods of rapture, intoxication, or frenzy. "This influence is at first vague, impersonal, undefined, but is gradually differentiated and personified."

The striking features of this theory are, (1) that the idea of personal beings was not man's first explanation of movement and action in the world; (2) that man began with a quasi-impersonal notion, which Brinton defines in terms of "will." "All Gods and holy objects were merely vehicles through which Life and Power poured into the world from the inexhaustible and impersonal source of both;" (3) that this notion was first revealed in ecstasies and trances. A psychologist might call it a psychic automatism.

It is unfortunate that into this most interesting conception of man's earliest philosophy and its derivation from the sense

⁵ Brinton, Daniel G., *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, 1897, pp. 60, 47, 164.

of our own will Brinton has introduced notions unnecessarily complex and of much later origin. At certain points he seems ready to attribute to primitive man some of Emerson's ideas about the Over-Soul.

R. R. Marett, in an important essay entitled *Pre-Animistic Religion*,⁶ urges "that primitive or rudimentary religion, as we actually find it amongst savage peoples, is at once a wider and, in certain respects, a vaguer thing than 'the belief in spiritual beings' of Tylor's famous 'minimum definition.' " "The animistic idea represents but one among a number of ideas, for the most part far more vague than it is, and hence more liable to escape notice; all of which ideas, however, are active in savage religion as we have it, struggling one with the other for supremacy in accordance with the normal tendency of religious thought towards uniformity of doctrinal expression." Marett, like Brinton, is disposed to see in man's sense of will-power the archetype of the original conception of the Mysterious Power; but he avoids the latter's error of including too much in the primitive conception. His conclusion may be stated in his own words thus: "The attitude of Supernaturalism towards what we should call inanimate nature may be independent of animistic interpretations."⁷

In another chapter of the same book (p. 137), where he endeavors to push the origin of religion a step farther back than animism, he concludes that "Mana, or rather the tabu-mana formula, has solid advantages over Animism, when the avowed object is to found what Dr. Tylor calls a minimum definition of religion. Mana is coextensive with the supernatural; Animism is far too wide. Mana is always Mana, supernatural power, differing in intensity—in voltage, so to speak—but never in essence; Animism splits up into more or less irreducible kinds, notably 'souls,' 'spirits,' and 'ghosts.' Finally, Mana whilst fully adapted to express the immaterial—the unseen force behind the scene—yet conformably with the incoherent state of rudimentary reflection, leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal, and, in particular, does not allow any notion of a high individuality to be precipitated." I maintain that in seeking to replace personal agents (animism) by *Mana*,

⁶ First published in *Folk-Lore* in 1900, and reprinted in 1909 in *The Threshold of Religion*, Methuen and Co., London.

⁷ Marett, R. R., *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 30, 17.

"which leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal," Marett disregards the only definite line of cleavage which can be used to differentiate religious from non-religious life, that is, the line separating the attitudes and actions that involve the idea of personal power from those that do not. In my view of the matter, when the distinction between personal and impersonal is in solution, religion itself is likewise in solution.

In the *Monist* for 1906, Arthur O. Lovejoy offers a criticism of Marett which deserves attention.⁸ The latter, as we have seen, finds the essence of the preanimistic belief to be the apprehension "of the supernatural or supernormal as distinguished from the natural and the normal," and so he proposes the term "Supernaturalism," or preferably "Teratism" as a name for this primitive attitude. "But," says Lovejoy, "Mr. Marett appears to me to place the emphasis on the wrong side. . . . The pre-animistic belief—the belief which is, at all events, independent of animism—is not best described as "supernaturalism," or "teratism," for the fundamental notion in it is not that of the unpredictable, abnormal, and portentous, but that of a force which is conceived as working according to quite regular and intelligible laws—a force which can be studied and controlled. A better name, then, for this group of beliefs would be Primitive Energetics."

I question the appropriateness of the expression "quite regular and intelligible laws." There is without doubt, I should say, much that is unpredictable in the behavior of *Wakanda*, or *Manitou*, or *Mana*. And, in any case, the means used to bring into play the mysterious Power does not indicate the apprehension of a definite and stable quantitative relation between this means and the effects produced. The power invoked, therefore, is not a mechanical power, but a magical force.

Irving King,⁹ in a chapter entitled *The Mysterious Power*, brings together the philological and other data bearing upon this subject. The terms *Manitou* (Algonquin), *Wakanda*

⁸ Lovejoy, Arthur O., "The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy," *Monist*, 1906, vol. XVI, pp. 357-382.

⁹ King, Irving, *The Development of Religion*, Macmillan and Co., 1910. Anyone interested in this point will find a good summary of the evidence in Chapter VI of Irving King's book, or in Lovejoy's shorter article quoted above.

(Sioux), *Orenda* (Iroquois), *Mana* (Melanesian), designate a non-personal Power or Potency considered to be at the basis of all natural phenomena. The same notion is found among the Australians. It appears in particular in their use of the *Chir-inga* or bull-roarer.

I shall not attempt to put before the reader the linguistic and historical evidence that can be adduced to show that the belief in non-personal forces is prior to animism. It is now generally admitted that, among nearly all primitive peoples of whom we have accurate knowledge, the generic and widely used words previously thought to mean a personal divinity and often a "High God," really designate a far less definite conception,—that of power or force. Originally these words no more designated personal gods than does *Mana*, which Codrington defines thus: "That invisible power which is believed by the natives to cause all such effects as transcend their conception of the regular course of nature, and to reside in spiritual beings, whether in the spiritual part of living men or in the ghosts of the dead, being imparted to them, to their names and to various things that belong to them, such as stones, snakes, and indeed objects of all sorts, is that generally known as *Mana*. . . . No man, however, has this power of his own; all that he does is done by the aid of personal beings, ghosts or spirits; he cannot be said, as a spirit can, to be *mana* himself . . . he can be said to have *mana*."¹⁰

With regard to the historical evidence, it is now generally conceded that as one approaches the original conditions of the race, religious practices dwindle away, while magical behavior is everywhere in evidence. Howitt declares that "if religion is defined as being the formulated worship of a divinity," the Austrian savage has no religion.¹¹ Frazer reflects the views of Spencer and Gillen, of Howitt, and probably of every recent first-hand student of Australia, when he writes: "Among the aborigines of Australia, the rudest savages as to whom we possess accurate information, Magic is universally practised, whereas Religion, in the sense of a propitiation or conciliation

¹⁰ Codrington, Dr. R. H., *The Melanesians* (Clarendon Press, 1891), p. 191.

¹¹ Howitt, A. W., "Australian Ceremonies of Initiation," *Journ. of the Anthropol. Institute* (British), 1884, XIII, p. 432.

of the higher powers, seems to be nearly unknown. Roughly speaking, all men in Australia are magicians, but not one is a priest; everybody fancies he can influence his fellows or the course of nature by sympathetic magic, but nobody dreams of propitiating gods by prayer and sacrifice."¹²

Because of the presence of magic and the absence of religious rites among the most primitive tribes known to us, some argue that the belief in the non-personal powers implied in magical behavior antedated the belief in the unseen personal being involved in our conception of religion. This deduction is unwarranted; for the Australians, although they are without religious customs and ceremonies, believe in the existence of some sort of Great Being. It is not my chief intention, however, to prove the priority of the belief in non-personal powers to the belief in unseen personal agents; but to maintain the *independent origin* of these beliefs. The question of precedence loses much of its importance when these two concepts are not supposed to stand to each other in a genetic relation. It seems to me probable, however, that the non-personal view preceded animism.

The theses which I maintain in this chapter, then, are, first, that the belief in non-personal powers is neither a derivative of animism nor a first step leading up to it, but that the two beliefs have had independent origins; and, secondly, that animism appeared second in order of time.

I have begun by giving the opinions of certain writers and referring to some historical facts upon which these opinions are based. The psychologist in search of knowledge concerning origins turns naturally to the child to supplement anthropological data. What are the first explanatory concepts of the child? In response to what experiences, and in what order, were they evolved? Unfortunately the available data here are also meagre and often indefinite.¹³

¹² Frazer, J. G., "The Beginnings of Religion," *Fortn. Rev.*, vol. LXXVIII, (1905), p. 162. Comp. *The Golden Bough*, 2d ed., vol. I, pp. 71-73.

¹³ Sully, J., *Studies in Childhood*, chap. III, IV, pp. 91-108; Tracy, *Psychology of Childhood*, chap. II, pp. 4, 5, III, p. 3; Alexander F. Chamberlain, *The Child*, (The Contemporary Science Series), 1900, pp. 147-148; Perez, *The First Three Years of Childhood*.

Long before a child speaks, he uses things. His interest early extends to causes, and when language appears, with the questions, "What for?" and "Why?" he is already in possession of the abstract ideas of cause and effect.¹⁴ At the end of the third year begins that period of incessant questioning so wearisome to parents. Children wish not only to complete their information about the appearance and the other sensible qualities of objects, but, first of all, to know for what purpose things exist, and how they came to be. Before the end of his third year, Preyer's boy asked, referring to the creaking of a carriage wheel, "*Was macht nur so?*" and not very much later children will ask, "What makes the wind?" "What makes the train move?" "How do we move our eyes?" (girl four years and seven months). "When there is no egg, where does the hen come from? When there was no egg, I mean, where did the hen come from?" (five years old). If I had gone upstairs, could God have made it that I had not?" (boy four years old). From this age on for many years the interrogation point is always wriggling in the mind of the child.

Now, inquiries concerning the causes of things imply an idea of power, for power means at its simplest merely that which produces something. I believe that this primary idea of power, which a child possesses before the end of his third year, is not the idea of a *personal* power, and is not derived from the idea of persons. It would seem to me preposterous to suppose that the first "What does that?" of the infant implies the idea of a personal cause. Is it not much simpler, as well as quite sufficient, to conceive that for him the cause of an event is that which appears to his senses as preceding it? (I waive for a moment the question as to whether or not the crudest idea of causation includes more than the idea of necessary sequence.)

That very young children do conceive of non-personal causes seems indicated in the following instance. A child one year and eleven months old wanted her mother to lift her up that she might see the wind. Is there any sufficient reason for

¹⁴ The following instance shows how early concepts appear in the child. A boy eight months old had enjoyed stuffing things into a tin box. Afterwards he looked for holes in all his toys. (Perez, *Ibid*, p. 199.)

It is to be hoped that soon someone will, by systematic observations of the child, complete the present meagre and scattered data, and so aid in the elucidation of the present problems.

thinking that this child expected to see a human being or an animal? To my mind, she simply expected to see something passing by. "Something" is a much simpler notion than that of an animal or human being. This expected thing was, for her, what plucked her dress, moved the tree, etc. Why should she have gone to the length of imagining an object, known only in this way, to have the definite characteristics of men or animals? Her actual experience with the wind was with something which had not these characteristics; it was known to her only as that which pushed or pressed against her. Why not conclude, then, that she simply expected to see some familiar natural object, such as smoke, vapor, cloud?

It may be argued that because the child speaks of these things as alive he identifies them with men and animals. That he is usually ready to attribute life to these inanimate causes is not to be doubted. Some little children when asked what things in the room were alive replied, "Smoke," "Fire." C. said his cushion was alive, because it slipped from under him. The same child, on being told that a certain stick was too short for him, answered, "Me use it for walking stick when stick be bigger."¹⁵ The wind, the smoke, the clouds, anything having the appearance of self-movement, falls in the category of "living" things. But, although for the child a man and the wind may both be alive, it does not follow that he conceives of the wind under the likeness of man. The concept "life" is for him wider than that designated by the same word in the mind of the civilised adult. "Life," it seems, means to the child merely the capacity of self-movement; while the concepts "man" and "animal," involve in addition certain ideas of structure,—head, mouth, limbs,—and modes of behavior.

This idea of forces capable of self-movement or of producing movement and change is simpler than the concept "person," and may, therefore, be expected to appear earlier. The relevant facts of child psychology all confirm this view. It is evident, however, that the much more complex notion of personality does not lag far behind. It includes for the child men and animals and is readily extended so as to include certain physical objects, the moving, puffing, and smoking locomotive, for instance. Having reached this stage, does he

¹⁵ Sully, J., *Diary*, in Appendix to *Studies in Childhood*.

gradually come to conceive of all causes as personal? If so, he would pass through a second stage in his philosophical development, a stage which it would be proper to call animism. I prefer to think that non-personal causes continue to do duty side by side with personal agents throughout childhood. There are indeed many facts, some of which are cited in this and in another chapter, which justify the opinion that the original idea of non-personal causes remains in the mind, and that at no time, either in the history of the child or of the race, does the term animism represent adequately the philosophy of primitive man.

I have represented the original notion of causal Power as independent of the sense of personal effort. But there can be no doubt that the moment soon comes when one's intimate experience of striving is projected into the world of external causes.

A passage from G. F. Stout¹⁸ will set clearly before us the point in question. "Causation for the 'plain man' involves more than mere priority and subsequence; it carries with it a vague, and, for science, a futile representation of what Professor Pearson calls 'enforcement.' The traces of this bias are often found even in scientific exposition. Thus it is plainly in evidence whenever 'force' is referred to as a cause of motion or as a reason why a body moves. . . . In common language such words as pressure, strain, stress, energy, resistance, impact, imply something more than can be included in a mere description of the space relations of the parts of matter. This something more is certainly rather indistinctly conceived. There is, however, no room for doubting that it consists in an assumed inner state of material bodies,—a state imperceptible to the external observer and uninterpretable in terms of the data yielded by external observation. Hence it follows of necessity that the only source from which the material for these ideas of force, enforcement, etc., springs is our own mental life."

The projection of the feeling of effort into natural forces I would place midway between the earliest idea of non-personal causal power and the fully developed idea of personal power. It is only after the child has begun to observe the *sequence* of events outside himself that he acquires a sense of his own person sufficiently clear to project into causes the feelings which he experiences when acting.

The little girl who says to her brother, "If you eat so much goose, you will be quite silly"; the man who holds that his luck changed because he married a shrew, or because so-and-so

¹⁸ Stout, G. F., *Analytic Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 178-179.

died; or the man who thinks his fortune returned because he wore a "lucky" suit,¹⁷ can hardly be supposed to invest the causes of these effects with the will-effort feeling. He has simply remained at the lower conceptual level, or has reverted to it. I affirm, then, that there exists a class of causes into which no will-effort feeling is projected, and that this class not only arises first but persists after more complex notions of power have been added.

It is to be noted further that a cause conceived under the analogy of a will-effort is not necessarily a personal cause. Even civilized man, as Stout reminds us, commonly endows physical causes with something of the sense of effort which he himself experiences, but nevertheless he does not conceive of these causes as truly personal. Facts show that in most communities, at certain periods, the idea of will-power has been seized upon and used as an explanatory category. There is, for instance, a variety of magic called will-magic, because the magical deed is supposed to be due, in part at least, to the will-effort of the magician. Such a notion is common among the North American Indians. According to Miss Fletcher, "The Sioux Indian has deified the power of which he is conscious within himself, the power by which he directs his own acts or wills a course by which to bring about certain results." They have a word *Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe*, for which there is no word in English unless it be "telepathy." "*Dhe-dhe* is 'to send' and *Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe* signifies to send forth one's thoughts and will power towards another in order to supplement his strength.

. . . For instance, when a race is taking place, a man may bend his thought and his will upon one of the contestants . . . in the belief that this act of his, this sending of his mind, will help his friend to win." Similarly, when a man is on the war path, a group of people, usually women, will gather about his tent and sing certain songs called *We-ton-wa-an*. "These songs are the medium by which strength is conveyed to the man facing danger; the act is *Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe*."¹⁸ But we must remember that we are not dealing here

¹⁷ Jastrow, Joseph, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, p. 252. On the use of analogy, see pp. 236-274.

¹⁸ Fletcher, Alice C., "Notes on Certain Beliefs Concerning Will Power among the Siouan Tribes," *Science* (New York), N. S., vol. V, 1897, pp. 331, 334.

with a primitive people. One need not revert to the American Indian to find illustrations of this belief. The idea of action exerted at a distance by a person's will is very common even among us.

Miss Fletcher, like Brinton and others, fails to mark the important distinction between a power conceived under the analogy of our will-effort, and a complete personification. The will power sent off by a person may be spoken of as having "life," in the sense in which the child first uses this word. But that it is not identical with a person is shown by the fact that the power is detachable in various amounts from a person, and is owned and controlled by a person.

The original idea of non-personal power possesses but one necessary characteristic: it is dynamic, it does things. Man's attitude towards it shows plainly that neither intelligence nor feeling is a necessary element in its composition. As the workings of this power are to a great extent unforeseen and uncontrollable, it evokes frequently dread and awe; but in so far as man thinks himself able to control and use it, it loses its mysteriousness and awfulness and becomes a familiar power. As it is not definitely conceived as intelligent will, the attitudes and the behavior it can elicit on the part of man are fundamentally different from those produced by the belief in personal, unseen powers. The former gives rise to magic; the latter, to religion.

For that conception of nature which most probably preceded the Tylorian Animism, or at least existed side by side with it, I would suggest the name *Dynamism*. This term seems to me preferable to Supernaturalism, because it does not thrust forward a distinction between nature and something above it; and preferable also to Teratism, proposed by Marett, because Dynamism does not direct the attention exclusively to the mysterious and wonderful as if these characteristics were fundamental to the conception. It is the idea of *active power* which is dominant in the conception of Impersonal Force, and this idea is well expressed by Dynamism. I prefer this term also to Manitouism, proposed by Lovejoy, because Dynamism suggests to most people the idea of power, while Manitouism either is without significance, or conveys a meaning not intended.

PREJUDICE, EDUCATION AND RELIGION.

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It is somewhat strange, seeing that a very large part of the world's pleasure and pain is due to prejudice of one sort or another, that the subject has received almost no study from those who have taken human nature as their province. The reason for this omission cannot be that prejudice is too rare an experience, or one too subtle for analysis. On the contrary, it is more than likely that its very universality and ubiquity have caused it to be ignored. Familiarity breeds contempt in the realm of psychology as well as in society,—which is itself, perhaps, a species of prejudice. In our daily thoughts and actions we are no more aware of its insidious presence than we are of our heart-beat, or our kinaesthetic sensations. Then again, we are thoroughly familiar with the *word*, and therefore it does not readily occur to us that our knowledge of the *thing* may not be exhaustive. Nietzsche has a fine passage on this point:

“Wherever primitive man put up a word, he believed that he had made a discovery. How utterly mistaken he really was! He had touched a problem, and while supposing that he had solved it, he had created an obstacle to its solution. Now, with every new knowledge we stumble over flint-like and petrified words, and, in so doing, break a leg sooner than a word.”

Our streams of consciousness, at their very sources, are colored with prejudices, and new ones are being constantly added as these streams slowly wend their ways through the course of life. 'Tis true the filters of education, travel, research and invention have been employed with gratifying results, but the waters of thought and feeling, will and desire are still far from being pure. Nor is a distilled, colorless consciousness either possible, or even desirable, for earth creatures like ourselves. A certain amount of natural prejudice is absolutely necessary for preservation and survival. For, imagine what would happen if the joys and sorrows, the successes and failures,

the honors and riches of others interested us as much as our own; or if we loved our friends' children as much as those which are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh; or if the lion and the lamb, the cat and the dog, should lie down together, and the hawk and the hen go to roost on the same perch. Nature herself has planted the seeds of prejudice in the primordial bits of protoplasmic stuff which are transmitted from one generation to another, and which serve to keep the genera and species of plants and animals separate and distinct. That Nature herself is prejudiced, we unconsciously proclaim, when we personify her and speak of her likes and dislikes, as her abhorrence of a vacuum, her favorite ways of accomplishing results, her ultimate purpose with regard to that particular species of animal called Man, etc. And who can explain why the loadstone will attract iron filings and behave so indifferently towards filings of brass; who can explain the mysterious chemical affinities and antipathies, or the tropisms of plants and lower animals? When the late Professor James spoke of "the order of Nature" as mere *weather*, "doing and undoing without end," his friend Davidson took him to task, contending that "even the weather reveals an harmonious spiritual intent, in that it contributes to the development of spiritual beings by supplying their bodies with food." And so, even the weather is prejudiced, as every farmer and fisherman will aver and prove by a thousand incidents, and a wealth of weather-lore as old as the race itself.

But, be that as it may, certainly the statement that *men and women* are prejudiced will need no proof. Rather would it require proof to substantiate the statement that a certain individual is entirely free from the taint, so convinced are we that to be prejudiced is the natural state of man, whereas the unprejudiced is the unnatural or overcultured condition.

If we seek for the source of prejudice, we shall find it, I believe, in the fact that we are organisms, possessing individuality and personality, bounded and limited, and therefore necessarily biased. For whatever is limited, is separated, and, in a measure, alienated from all that is external to it. The skin of the worm of dust, as Lotze somewhere says, splits the entire universe into two disparate parts,—the inner and the outer—and, to the worm, the former is by far the more important part. In the outer world, mighty empires may rise or fall, and he is

unconcerned; in the inner the slightest disturbance may make him feel that the whole scheme of things is all awry and on the road to destruction. The worm is evidently biased, but are not also those who tread him under foot? Our skins separate us from all the rest of the universe; completely insulate and isolate us, as it were, so that we can know and feel only what takes place within us, and must content ourselves with merely imagining the pains and joys of those nearest and dearest to us. Mothers are thus removed from the babes at their breasts by barriers that are forever impenetrable. Furthermore, our imperfect sense-organs shut out the rich universe from us, except those few bits of it which are neither too coarse nor too fine to be received by them. To its remaining fulness we are as insensible as stones. What the universe would mean to creatures possessing fifty or a hundred sense-organs, instead of a paltry half dozen, we cannot even imagine. We know how surprised we are when with the aid of an instrument we increase the power of one of our senses and find that things are altogether different from what they seem. So upset do we become that we immediately begin to philosophize and write ponderous volumes on Appearance and Reality, on The Thing-in-itself and the Thing-outside-itself, and other such illuminating treatises. Our organisms, our nervous systems, are so moulded and set that we are given but little choice in determining what impressions shall be received and what rejected, or in what manner they shall be received and what reactions, mental and physical, they shall call forth. Consequently we go through life re-creating the universe, each one in his own partial, imperfect way, and no two are ever exactly alike. Only an omniscient and omnipotent God—an Absolute—can be without prejudice, but strangely enough, the most prejudiced among us are the very ones who think they possess these divine attributes.

What is true of our bodies and sense-organs, in this respect, is perhaps even more true of our consciousness. Attention, we know, is eclectic; focusing upon some things and ignoring others for the time being. The same is true of interest, memory, imagination, association and the other mental processes. Our intellects, as Bacon pointed out, are “not of the nature of a dry light, but receive a tincture from the will and affections, which generate accordingly knowledge *ad quod vult*, for what a man would rather was true, that he more readily believes.”

. . . "In innumerable ways," he goes on to say, "and those sometimes imperceptible, the affection tinges and affects the intellect." It is proverbial, for example, that love renders us blind, and the same applies to hate and anger, and fear and hope, and every strong emotion which constricts the mind and perverts or paralyzes the judgment.

Consider too, the sense of self, which magnifies out of all proportion the things that pertain to our own ego, and makes us feel, to use Emerson's aphorism, that "difference from me is the measure of absurdity." Again, consider the instincts and habits, habits of thought as well as of action, which enslave us and reduce us almost to the level of automata, unable to think or act for the most part in any but habitual ways. Our personalities—what we refer to when we use the first person singular—are simply the sublimates of our numberless inherited and acquired impulses and tendencies, our temperaments, early associations, attachments, affections, our unreasoned and half-baked ideas, the beliefs that were inculcated, the tastes—aesthetic and otherwise—that have become ingrained, and all the varied experiences of our daily lives, now forgotten for the most part, but by no means lost or ineffectual in determining our present thoughts and conduct. Our souls may be likened to the ocean deep—the surface waves and ripples we call consciousness; the vast depths with their currents and life abounding we call the subconscious, or subliminal, or instinctive, etc. This latter is the stuff characters are made of, as well as dreams, and this is the medium—the subconscious—in which, as will be seen, our prejudices germinate and grow. So much for sources.

What now is prejudice *per se*? Professor Patrick, who was the first psychologist to study the subject (in his article on "The Psychology of Prejudice," *Pop. Sci. Mo.*, vol. 36, pp. 633-643), defined prejudice as "an individual deviation from the normal beliefs of mankind, taking as the standard, the universal, the general, or the mean." This definition limits prejudice to the intellectual functions, and leaves out of consideration the many more prejudices growing out of instinct, feeling, taste, habit, volition, the finer emotions, etc. But, even within the above narrow limits, the definition will not hold, for it is equivalent to the now obsolete expression *Vox populi, vox dei*, and the fallacious inference that those who do not subscribe to public

opinion are prejudiced heretics. By this token we should have to regard Socrates, Galileo, Bruno, Luther, Darwin and a host of other reformers and innovators, as men of prejudice, which would manifestly do violence to our conception of the men and the meaning of the term.

Moreover, prejudice does not consist in deviating from a popular standard of any sort—the popular standard may itself be a gross prejudice—but rather in an *undue* prepossession in favor of, or against, anything, be that what it may,—a man's personality, or his doctrine, the color of his hair, or the shape of his nose. By undue prepossession is meant a kind of mental cramp or tension which renders the individual unable to see or consider anything, but from a single point of view, when several points of view are equally possible. Undue prepossession and deviating from the standard of the people or the average man are as unlike as night and day. There are times and conditions, when not to deviate is to be prejudiced. The people have seldom been the criterion of truth, nor is the testimony of ten millions who are blind to be weighed against that of one man who sees. Indeed, the criterion of truth, the Pragmatists tell us, is not mathematical but psychological, not quantitative but qualitative, not universal but particular. It is to be found within the individual, in the effects which his ideas and beliefs produce upon his life and his general development, as shown by his works and his daily conduct. If his prepossessions militate against his normal development, mentally, morally, socially, or physically; if they lower his general efficiency and make him a worse husband, father or citizen than he otherwise would have been, they cannot but be considered prejudices of the harmful sort, the kind that are to be eliminated; but if on the other hand they are conducive to further development, to a richer life, a better *Aufklärung*, or to the elaboration of a viewpoint or hypothesis, which later generations will accept, they are productive of positive good, and must be considered normal and beneficial, regardless of the views of the people. As a rule, only time, "the final judge of appeal from the verdicts of successive ages," can determine the worth and truth of these, which explains why so often later generations erect memorials in honor of those whom earlier ones burned or stoned or otherwise persecuted and dishonored.

Professor Patrick concludes that prejudice is but the popular

term for that which is technically known as "apperception." A college student, riding by a plot of level ground in the suburbs of a city, apperceives it as a possible ball ground; a young girl, as a tennis court; a speculator, as an addition for town lots; an undertaker, perhaps, as a possible site for a cemetery. Each apperceives the same plot of ground in the light of his or her previous experiences and interests, and that is prejudice. To this interpretation we must take decided exception. Prejudice, so far from being synonymous with apperception, is the exact opposite of it. Prejudice is the refusal or inability to apperceive, rather than apperception itself. A child apperceives a long watermelon as a large pickle. It is acquainted with pickles, but has never seen a watermelon before. This new object resembles old familiar pickles, therefore we will call it such for the time being, says the child, and that is a pure act of apperception. But, if the child, on being told that the object is not a large pickle, but a watermelon, should insist on maintaining that it is a pickle, and refuse to think of it in any other way, it would be prejudiced. Likewise the college student, the young girl, the speculator, and undertaker. It is but natural that each should see in the plot of ground a different thing, according to their different experiences and interests, but they would be prejudiced if each insisted that it was suitable *only* for the purpose he or she had in mind, for, as a matter of fact, it is suitable for all four purposes. Apperception causes each to consider the ground from a particular point of view; prejudice disables them from considering it from any other point of view, even after it has been clearly pointed out. The apperception of the unduly prepossessed is loaded, as it were, with strong volitional and emotional ingredients; they apperceive only as suits their purpose, to other points of view they are blind, to other arguments they are deaf.

In other words, apperception is the natural process of learning; prejudice is the determination not to learn, or the inability to learn, owing to mental blindness. Again, apperception is a conscious or unconscious judgment of resemblance between a given object and similar objects previously experienced, and this judgment is a valid induction to the extent of the experience upon which it is based. In calling the watermelon a large pickle, the child did what every productive scientist has done—it reasoned inductively and noted similarities. Prejudice, on

the other hand, has an eye only for differences, which it delights to magnify and multiply. Apperception is constantly correcting its errors, accommodating itself to new conditions, appropriating new facts, thereby causing the mind to grow and develop. Prejudice has an aversion for growth, is perfectly content with its existing condition, has no errors to correct, no new truths to learn. If there is to be any change or development or adaptation, it must take place in the other fellow who manifestly needs to be changed,—to be brought to see the true light, which is, of course, its own dim light, sufficient only to reveal the Cimmerian darkness that envelops it. Apperception waits upon time and makes trial; prejudice needs no additional time, and forbids trial. Apperception broadens and liberates; prejudice arrests, narrows and encrusts.

The late Professor James told of a biologist who once said to him, "that if such a thing as telepathy were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of nature, and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits." His deep interest in science prejudiced him against anything which threatened to overthrow its conclusions, even though that something might be truer than his science. No one, perhaps, is entirely unfamiliar with this warm, kindly feeling towards something that is dear,—a cherished belief, a fond illusion, a pet theory—which we feel ourselves outgrowing and compelled to abandon. Says Emerson: "The creeds into which we were initiated in childhood and youth no longer hold their place in the minds of thoughtful men, but they are not nothing to us, and we hate to have them treated with contempt."

Such instances as these show clearly the emotional and volitional roots of prejudice,—roots which penetrate and ramify the whole soil of subconsciousness, as it were, vitiating our thinking and determining our attitude and reaction to all the various life situations and experiences, as they occur. Were we passionless, without instinct and love and hate and anger and desire and interest and ambition, we might coldly apperceive all things properly and without prejudice. But the Reason in Nature has not seen fit to evolve us thus; these emotions, desires, interests and will-acts have proved themselves necessary and valuable not only for our development from the lower forms of life, but for

our continued development as human beings; for our commercial, industrial, political,—even our scientific progress.

However, it should be remembered that what is normal and beneficial in a certain measure, becomes abnormal and injurious, when that measure is either increased or diminished out of bounds. Error and evil, we know, are located in deficiency or excess, and “right and justice are found in moderation in the golden mean, in the true balance—between overdoing and underdoing, going too fast and too slow.” *Harmful prejudice is located in deficiency or excess, in lack of mental and moral balance*—that is the main thesis of this paper. The scales of reason and justice are tilted by old and hardened ideas, fixed associations, habits, interest, passion or what not, so that an impartial reaction to a given situation is almost impossible and but little desired by the prejudiced individual.

Time does not permit the giving of many examples which would elucidate and support the above statements. I shall merely enumerate the more important types of prejudice, following with an illustration or two under each head. There are first, the deep-seated generic and racial prejudices, which have the important biologic function of keeping the races separate and distinct, in order perhaps, that they might develop to the fullest their own peculiarities and native genius. Next are the national, tribal, and familial prejudices; geographical, political and economical ones, which when kept within reasonable bounds, have not a little sociological value, but when carried to excess have led to wars, feuds, cruelties and injustices of every description. Then there are the personal prejudices—asthetic, religious, moral, philosophical, academic, professional, etc., which in moderation have their undoubted psychological value, but which again in excess have caused all the inhumanities that have made countless thousands suffer and mourn.

Illustrations: Our physiological and asthetic prejudices against the black and yellow races,—which, we are told, they heartily reciprocate,—are natural and need but little to be said in their defence. To the anthropological arguments in proof of the essential unity of the races of mankind, the remark of a carpenter to Professor James is an apt reply: “There is little difference between one man and another,” he said, “but that little counts.” Or, as Nietzsche expressed it, “One drop

of blood too many or too few in the brain can make our life unspeakably miserable and hard, so that we may have to suffer more from this one drop than Prometheus did from his vulture." And the poet-philosopher Browning:

"Oh the little more and how much it is!

And the little less, and what worlds away!"

But, when this prejudice engenders wild passion and paralyzes reason; when it denies common justice, forgets the "square deal," and curdles the milk of human kindness in the breasts of men, it serves no useful biologic purpose, but inflicts instead incalculable injury upon the subjects of it, as well as upon its objects. Whole tribes and races have either been exterminated or scattered to the four ends of the earth, and there is hardly a crime in the catalogue of foul deeds that has not been instigated by it.

"Frenchmen," said Coleridge, "are like grains of gunpowder; each by itself smutty and contemptible, but mass them together and they are terrible indeed!" Johnson referred to Americans as "a race of convicts who ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging." He was willing to love all mankind, he said, "except an American."

This and the succeeding types may be denominated "secondary" or acquired prejudices to distinguish them from the preceding ones, which are "primary" and fundamental. Secondary prejudices spring from an exaggeration of value attached to superficial and accidental differences, such as language, customs, traditions, minor peculiarities, etc., but not from the fundamental biological difference of protoplasm. They may lead to wars in which each will fight for his own country, right or wrong; to high tariffs, boycotts, etc., but they can never become so deeply ingrained as to beget a profound feeling-complex almost equivalent to a psycho-physical aversion to miscegenation. The sexes can still find each other attractive, notwithstanding the many secondary prejudices which might struggle to keep them apart. This is a basic distinction worthy of emphasis.

To be somewhat prejudiced in favor of one's kith and kin and close friends is rightly esteemed a virtue, but to insist that they are the earth's paragons, to be blind to their more serious

faults, to condone or defend their crimes, is, to say the least, not a virtue. The same applies to matters pertaining to one's self. One can hardly be expected to literally love others as himself, or to take the same interest in them and their affairs and possessions as in his own; but if he regards himself as the centre of the social system and is unable to recognize the claims and merits of others, he is suffering from a mental malady for which the term 'prejudice' is a euphemism. One naturally prefers to associate with individuals belonging to his own social class, but to withhold the hand of fellowship from those who are in a lower level, to speak or think contemptuously of them, or regard them as "unclean" or "outcaste," as is done in India and parts of Europe and America, is a species of snobbery or prejudice which is harmful to all concerned.

According to some four hundred proverbs, woman is mentally inferior to man, deceptive, cunning, vain, conceited, quarrelsome, mischievous, dishonest, untruthful, garrulous, fickle, and, lately, it has been added that she is "more deadly than the male." This sex-prejudice manifests itself in its more acute forms in the opposition to higher education for women, to their entrance into the professional, commercial, industrial and political worlds; to the granting of equal pay for equal work, and worse still, in the various statutes, now happily decreasing, which deprive married women of their human and property rights.

Aesthetic appreciation is proverbially a matter of individual psychology. The Chinaman does not admire our white teeth, which remind him of a dog's, nor our rosy color which is like that of a potato-plant. We, on the other hand, fail to find attractive certain features which he regards beautiful. Both would be prejudiced if they denied to each other the possession of any aesthetic sense at all. So too in matters of dress. The cowboy or miner, who condemns a man because of his starched collar and kid gloves, is as prejudiced as he who looks with contempt upon them because of their flannel shirts and coarse boots. It is proverbial that "good clothes open all doors," and that a thief in gentleman's clothing is proof against suspicion, whereas the honest man in rags is often treated as a thief.

It is but natural that one should have a higher regard for

his own religion than for others, if for no other reason than that it meets his needs better than others could; but to maintain that all other religions are false, or mere superstitions and idolatries is a pernicious prejudice, the bitter fruits of which need no describing.

Concerning many moral questions there is legitimate difference of opinion. Prejudice enters in when the right to the existence of this difference is denied.

The case of Ingres, a classicist artist of the first half of the nineteenth century, who excluded Shakespeare and Goethe from the gathering of great men around the Father of Poetry, because he suspected them of Romanticism, is paralleled in literature by the intense prejudice of Carlyle against Scott, because of his florid and descriptive style.

But it is in the realm of philosophy that we find prejudice's paradise. The fierce logomachies prejudice has here instigated, have filled our libraries with mind-destroying books, the only antidote for which is the modern pragmatism, which hold that all the various philosophical systems are but the autobiographies of their respective founders and disciples. The late Professor James disposed of the whole matter with the two words, "tough-minded" and "tender-minded." Every philosopher in the history of speculative thought belongs to the one or the other of these two types, and therefore, if you know his type, you know the essence of his philosophy, and *vice-versa*.

Science is in but a slightly better plight, notwithstanding the almost worshipful attitude of the layman towards it. Agassiz, to his dying day fought with all the strength of his learning against the Darwinian theory of evolution; and now M. Poincaré informs us that all theoretical science is but a mass of pious prejudices, and that we should not speak of theories, or mathematical axioms even, as true or false, but rather as more or less convenient, or useful, or beautiful. The race has been chiseling and rechiseling the universe to suit its changing needs and fancies, and according to its ability and the excellence of the tools with which it worked at the time. And each generation, when it saw the work it had wrought, labeled it "good" and "true" and "final." But who knows what good is, what truth is,—and can finality be ere the crack of Doom?

The field of education or pedagogy must be passed over entirely

for the same reason that a wise man avoideth a hornet's nest. But it may not be so imprudent to refer to the prejudice which makes the possession of the Ph. D. degree the *sine qua non* for obtaining a position in college or university. This prejudice has both padded the graduate enrolment in our leading universities and filled our institutions with snobs and incompetents.

Party politics is but another name for prejudice, and its evils are notorious, but, when a Westerner recently declined a nomination to an office, because he could not, as he said, be a politician and a Christian at the same time, and he preferred to be the latter, he gave voice to a prejudice which is seriously injurious to a republican form of government, and to its progress among the slower nations.

We are told that there was not a little sectional prejudice in this country during the latter part of the last century, and that it came near disrupting the nation. All peoples have known it, and Nathanael gave expression to it twenty centuries ago when he asked, "Can there any good come out of Nazareth?"

The struggles between capital and labor, between the independent merchants and the trusts and monopolies, between producers and consumers, furnish their full quota of the ugly state of consciousness we are describing.

Few would agree with the apostle of Futurism that "to admire an old picture is to pour our sentiment into a funeral urn, . . . to consume our best strength in the useless admiration of the past," but to admire a picture or anything else simply because it is old is a species of prejudice which works hardship upon the new and young, and is harmful to progress. The familiar story of Michel Angelo, who was practically compelled to bury his statue of Cupid and later to dispose of it as a Roman antique, is a case in point.

Finally, there are various professional and occupational prejudices. Theoretically, honest labor of whatever sort, is no disgrace, but practically it often makes a deal of difference whether one is a hod carrier, a ditch digger, a cobbler, bootblack, bar-keeper, pawnbroker, merchant, lawyer, doctor, banker and so on through the whole list. There are prejudice-breathing proverbs for almost every vocation. Thus we are told

"A lawyer and a cart-wheel must be greased;" that "a lawyer is a learned gentleman who rescues your estate and keeps it to himself;" that

"until hell is full no lawyer will be saved," etc. "A doctor is one who kills you to-day to prevent you from dying to-morrow." "A new doctor, a new grave digger," "If you have a friend who is a physician send him to the house of your enemy." "Hussars pray for war and doctors for fever." "A politician is one that would circumvent God." "Critics are men who have failed in literature and art." "A usurer, a miller, a banker, and a publican are the four evangelists of Lucifer." "Highways and streets have not all thieves: shops have ten to one." "Nine tailors make a man." "Six awls make a shoemaker." "A servant is a paid enemy." "Who has many servants has many thieves," etc.

In a democracy, these prejudices are easily overcome, but in India and those other parts of the world, where every trade and occupation "has its exact place arbitrarily fixed in the scale of degradation," this type of prejudice has raised insurmountable barriers and robbed untold millions of all hope and ambition and desire for improvement.

This list, representative perhaps, but by no means exhaustive, will suffice to show the enormous rôle which prejudice has played and still plays in the lives of nations and individuals. Each type, if traced back to its origin, will be found to have served some important function either in preserving life in the struggle for existence, or making it more comfortable and thus assuring progress and development; in establishing social forms and institutions and making them stable, or in bringing out and intensifying certain traits and characteristics which have been useful to the race. What other explanation, for example, can be given for the prejudice in favor of the old and tried, and against the new, the unknown, the strange and alien?

But, in admitting its value as an evolutionaal factor in the past history of the race, it should not be forgotten that like the many organs which were once necessary and useful but have now become rudimentary and harmful, so, many of our prejudices have outlived their usefulness and are now serious hindrances to our further development. For the conditions of existence are no longer so harsh and brutal as in the days of the jungle. Civilization has greatly ameliorated the life-struggle and made it so very different that the conditions for survival and supremacy are no longer hate and strife and brute strength, but rather love and sympathy and understanding and mutual aid. Violent elimination of the different is being supplanted by peaceful and sympathetic assimilation, which means a richer

life from every point of view. Culture is controlling instinct and impulse, and culture is the product of education.

This brings us to the second thesis, which is, that it is the function of education and religion, using these words in their widest connotation, both to rid us of our secondary prejudices, and to so control the primary and more fundamental ones that no evil consequences will come of them. For, if education is to realize its end, which is the drawing out to the fullest extent and the harmonious development of all the powers and capacities of the individual, or in other words, if its aim is character-building and the increase of efficiency, it must sedulously weed out the secondary prejudices as soon as they make their appearance in the consciousness of the child. For, prejudice, as has been seen, prevents growth and expansion; it narrows and poisons and slays. It is half sister to hate and cousin to the whole brood of vices. The function of education, on the other hand, is one with the function of religion, namely, to expand the soul and increase the spiritual efficiency of human beings. Especially is this true of the Gospel of Love and Brotherhood and Unity which has not only wrought miracles of conversion and regeneration, but has more genuinely educated the minds and hearts of men than all the secular learning of scientists and philosophers. Love, which is the essence of religion, reveals and illumines the truth, which also is the aim of education, but prejudice and hate conceal it and oppose it. Love attracts and unites; hate and prejudice repel and separate.

Perhaps we cannot go so far as Vivekananda, the Hindu mystic, who says:

"This separation between man and man; man and woman, man and child, nation and nation, earth from moon, moon from sun, this separation between atom and atom is the cause really of all the misery, and the Vedānta says this separation does not exist, it is not real. It is merely apparent, on the surface. In the heart of things there is unity still. If you go inside, you find that unity between man and man, women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and poor, the gods and men; all are One, and animals too, if you go deep enough, and he who has attained to that has no more delusion. . . . When man had seen himself as One with the infinite Being of the Universe, when all separateness has ceased, when all men, all woman, all angels, all gods, all animals, all plants, the whole universe has been melted into that oneness, then all fear disappears. . . . Then will all sorrow disappear. . . . Then all jealousies will disappear. . . . Then all bad feelings disappear." Unto such an one-

"belongs eternal peace, unto none else, unto none else." (Cited by William James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 152-154.)

A little of such mystic music is good to hear. It elevates the soul and titillates the dim sense we all have of oneness with the universe. And 'tis true that to know all is to forgive much, if not entirely all; and true also is the saying of Arnold Bennett that "when one has thoroughly got imbued into one's head the leading truth that nothing happens without a cause, one grows not only large-minded but large-hearted." But it is not necessary to throw ourselves into the cosmic melting-pot and lose all sense of identity and individuality to be worthy citizens of the twentieth century. We can retain and cultivate our personalities, and peculiarities even, much to our own advantage and humanity's, if only we are broad-minded enough to recognize with the poet that,

"There are nine and sixty ways
Of composing tribal lays
And every single one of them is right."

and are willing to let each one "take for God's truth that which harmonizes with all the best he knows, and helps and strengthens, him in nobility of life."

The Japanese are fond of employing their beautiful sacred mountain, Fujiyama, as a symbol of truth. The pilgrims who gather around her gaze upon snow-capped Fujiyama, but of all their number, not two gaze upon the same Fujiyama. And though their artists have painted many thousand different views of her, and all are true, yet is Fujiyama truer, richer and more beautiful than them all. He who has seen only one view of Fujiyama is to be pitied as a spiritual pauper who knows nothing of her exhaustless and everchanging splendors; he to whom it has never occurred that there could be more than one view is an unreflective child, and he who would destroy or suppress all views, except the one that appeals to him, is a fanatic and a fool.

To keep the mind plastic, active, and alert so that it may readily turn and catch a glimpse, at least, of every passing phase of truth; to expand the soul by larger doses of love and sympathy; to increase its efficiency for the beautiful-good by weeding out the poisonous prejudices that generate fanaticism, and bigotry and intolerance; and finally to teach each one both to play his own part well in the universe's orchestra, and in

tune with his fellow players, that is the endless task which education has to perform. Not to eliminate every vestige of prejudice from the soul, for that would be to efface all individuality and enthusiasm, but rather to control it and so direct it that it will be a help instead of a hindrance—if that could be accomplished, many of the problems that now vex us sorely would disappear. Then would the Gospel of the God-man be comprehended; then would his will be done.

THE REESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD.

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The following paper was read before the Worcester Central Association of Congregational Ministers, in Worcester, recently, and is here given as it was then read. It is analyzed thus:

- I. The Question Stated and Its Content Determined.
- II. Reasons for the Loss of Religious Conviction in the Educational World.
- III. The Educational World Accepts the Fundamental Data of the Religious Experience of the Race.
- IV. The Trend of Modern Thought Demands the Interpretation of Religious Phenomena and Their Significance in the Terms of Life Rather than in the Terms of Reason.
- V. God and Man, and the Relationship Between Them: What Is It?

I. THE QUESTION STATED AND ITS CONTENT DETERMINED.

What do we mean by the *Educational World*? For one can conceive of not only the *Scientific World*, being an integral part of the *Educational World*, but also the *Popular World*. But in a very real sense, the *Scientific World* is a part of the *Educational World*, and came into existence only by reason of the advances of the *Educational World* which made necessary many of the branches into which that sphere of intellectual activity is to-day divided. So then, if I overlap and occasionally touch upon that part of our discussion designated as the *Scientific World*, it will be because of the necessity of such overlapping. Here it may be stated that this paper formed a part of a discussion of the reestablishment of religious conviction in (1) The Educational World, (2) The Scientific World, (3) The Popular World.

Two vague terms meet us at the outset of this discussion—namely, “*Religious Conviction*” and “*Educational World*.”

In my own mind I am not at all sure as to what was intended

that these terms should denote, neither am I sure just what will be the content given them by this audience. So that, at the outset of this discussion, it will be necessary, both for myself and for my auditors, to determine first just what we shall mean and understand the title of this discussion to mean.

By "*Religious Conviction*" do we mean the assent to some set *formula of doctrine*, the acceptance of the church with its ordinances as the only means of salvation, the infallibility of the Bible, the acceptance of the ecclesiastical dogma of miracles, and the story of a six-days creation? If so, then I say that no amount of preaching and teaching will reëstablish religious conviction in the *Educational World*, and I certainly should not be regarded as a religious man. If by religious conviction we mean that expression of God in human life in such a way as to show, unmistakably, the divine working in human frailty—with the profoundest sense that, apart from this kind of life, human life is only serving its lowest ideals—then I unhesitatingly say that we can hope for the reëstablishment of religious conviction in the *Educational World*.

To me, then, as Harnack has said, religion is "eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God"; or as President Henry Churchill King has described it:

"We shall therefore look for religion not as something apart from life, but in the very midst of it, knit up with cell and sex, with all human relations and employments and tendencies and strivings—inextricably involved in all. And we shall look for its glory not in a majestic isolation, but rather in its ability to permeate and dominate all life."

Another expression is given to this fact in the following lines:

"Let each man think himself an act of God,
His mind a thought, his life a breath of God;
And let each try by great thoughts and great deeds,
To show the most of God and heaven he hath in him."

Religion, therefore, I conceive as that expression of God in human life, where man is found living in the highest possible relation to his fellow-men, for their well-being and the growth of his own spiritual experience; and religious conviction as that dominating passion of life and intellectual attitude bringing with it the deepest conviction that the true life is lived only in this relation.

If by the "*Educational World*" we are to understand that

part of our church congregations whose privilege it has been to have received a college or university training in contradistinction to the purely professional educators, I think we shall give to this term a content and meaning more in accordance with the opportunity that is offered and held out to the average minister of religion to reestablish religious conviction in the *Educational World*. For we must recognize, at the outset, that the Christian ministry stands small opportunity in reestablishing or even establishing religious conviction in the *Educational World*, if by such a term we mean professional educators and the faculties of colleges and universities. Giving then to the term "*Religious Conviction*" the meaning already expressed; and to the "*Educational World*" that where the preacher has the opportunity of influencing the college or university trained minds of his congregation we may proceed with our discussion of "The Reestablishment of Religious Conviction in the Educational World."

II. REASONS FOR THE LOSS OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD.

1. Does the *Educational World* accept the data of the religious experience of the race? Such, of course, is tacitly affirmed by the title of our discussion, or there could certainly be no reestablishing of the conviction which the religious experience of the race is capable of producing. The rapid advances, made by psychology and sociology, as divisions of the great field of anthropology, undeniably justify one in affirming that the *Educational World* does accept the data of the religious experience of the race. If religious conviction needs reestablishing, what are the reasons for religion having lost its hold upon the educational world? I think we must say that it is because of a radical misunderstanding, rather than by reason of any rationally justifiable grounds of incompatibility. In the large and youthful enthusiasm that came in with the new attitude of science, in the middle of the nineteenth century—which did not leave untouched either philosophy or religion, and gave to the physical phenomena a new interpretation—the ideas of physical science transcended their own field and considered religion as a thing altogether unnecessary, because there was now no place to be found for it within the meaning of the laws of organic development. And, whatever might previously

have been said about religion being a device of priest-craft to hold people in subjection, now seemed to substantiate such an explanation of religion,—an explanation that was sooner destined to be destroyed by the very progress and advances of science, than it was cherished to live. This misunderstanding of religion came about through a fundamental misunderstanding of the essential grounds of both science and religion.

If there is one fact above all others which the new science and newer education have revealed, it is the fact of man as essentially a religious being—not to go into the discussion of the late President W. R. Harper as to the relation of religion to arts, science, and other branches of human intellectual acquisitions, as published in his *Religion and the Higher Life*,—nor yet to consider the theory, which Andrew Lang recurs to in his *The Making of Religion*, namely, that man had degenerated from a higher life. As Prof. George Galloway, in his *The Principles of Religious Development* (p. 72) says “The fact that men everywhere, and always have developed religion . . . points to the truth that religion must have its roots in human nature.” The late Auguste Sabatier has amply, if oftentimes erroneously and with a sometimes grotesque intellectualism, shown that religion is and always has been, the one great factor that has secured for man the opportunity and power of advancement. And though there are not lacking, even to-day Christian men of learning and leading in learned circles, who still hold that there are peoples without religion—such as for instance, when Sir John Lubbock, in his *Marriage, Totemism and Religion*, gathers up the work of a singularly happy learned long life, and reaffirms his opinions of fifty years ago concerning what he calls particularism and individualism in religion in contrast to that theory which holds to its universality. While, in the writings of the late Dr. Daniel G. Brinton, a man of little or no religious sympathy with the Church as religious, we have a champion of that position which affirms that the first people possessing no religion has yet to be found; and “religion is ‘that reference of a man’s life to a world governing Power which seeks to grow into a living union with it’ ” (Pfeiderer, quoted by Galloway, *Op. cit.* p. 58).

The Christian Church, of course, has always held, in theory, at least, if not in practice, this essential relation of human beings in the bond of religion, and always works on the assump-

tion of the innate knowledge of God in man. But, like many other facts which are constituent in the church's vital faith, it has been only half believed and lived. Its finest fruition has had to be revealed by the labors of learned Christian men and men of science like Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir W. Crookes, President G. Stanley Hall, Dr. Franz Boas, and Professor Alexander F. Chamberlain.

2. Granting then, as we firmly believe, that man is an incurably religious being, and that his truest life is realized in profound religious experience—there is another factor which has been not a little potent in destroying religious conviction in the *Educational World*, though in a totally different way from that which was conceived under the influence of the new organic development theory. I refer now to the so-called higher critical movement in the field of Biblical literature, archeology, history and doctrine. And it has been just here that there has arisen that second cause of the loss of religious conviction for the educated man. For here, the danger was, not in denying any such thing as religion or the fact of the religious experience of the race, but to him the practical denial of religion on the part of those who were supposed to be the conservators of religious truth, by reason of the attitudes they sustained to every other investigator in the same field—and their denial and destruction rather than the reconstruction, of those things in the Bible which were regarded as being the highest and most perfect expressions of religious truth,—and, therefore, the most authoritative. Here the difficulty was greater, because more genuinely personal. It was the engendering of disbelief and indifference because of "war within the camp," as it were. There was still an acceptance of the fact of religion, and religious experience, as well as the will to believe—but, if the professors and teachers of theological learning and divinity were at war with themselves regarding these heretofore fundamental truths of the Christian Church, where were they to look for that positive expression of religion that would help them? When faith has been assailed, thereby causing indifference, it is not a great step to a species of open immorality. In other words, it came to be thought that religion had no relation to life itself and the fact of conduct and character.

3. And, perhaps, greatest of all the causes of the loss of religious conviction in the educational world was this separation

of conduct and religion, character and belief. It is in this fact, too, that we must find the reason for the success of that pseudo-scientific intellectualism of Haeckel with his specious and Godless monism. This fact, too, has had that peculiar effect upon both the demands of the intellect and also of moral perception, of making the spiritual life seem very unreal for them.

III. THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD ACCEPTS THE FUNDAMENTAL DATA OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF THE RACE.

With the naming of only these few causes of the loss of religious conviction in the educational world, let us now turn to see whether the educational world accepts the data of religious experience. And I shall here name only those data of the most fundamental importance, namely (1) the existence of a supreme power or force—or God; (2) the existence of man as a being distinct from the rest of the creatures of the world; (3) the fact of evil; (4) the necessity of redemption, and regeneration.

1. No history of education can be written without reckoning with the Christian Church. And, while the teachers of the Church have always insisted upon the existence of a personal Supreme Power as responsible for the world and the life that now is, not all the world of Christian civilization has vitally accepted the dogma of the schoolmen. Their reasonable doubt arose solely through their manner of teaching this great fact—and if doubt expressed itself in atheism, it was because the teacher persistently refused to get the learner's point of view. And yet, no great scientific discovery has ever been made by the man who did not accept this dogma in some form. If it was not a personal God, it was a great law, or the activity of mere blind forces, set in motion in some far off and remote time of the world's history.

The Church, in her best days, has never been anything but a sympathetic sponsor for the progress and growth of education and enlightenment. But she has changed her methods now. In her best teachers and educators, she has become as progressive as the most progressive movement. She has taught the world to look upon the unerring law operating in nature as the great and gracious God—in whose image man himself is made. Though there may be many valid arguments against the design

theory, perhaps next to the theory of moral government, it is and is likely to be one of the most powerful for influencing the minds of the educational as well as the popular world. Our modern education is built up on the great theory of the unity and personality of the world ground (cf. Bowne, *Theism*, passim; Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, passim; Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, chapters VIII-XV).

This unity and personality of the world-ground is the Christian's God and Father "who in holy love created and sustains all." Before the world of nature could be understood as perfectly as it is understood to-day, men had to work in the holiest obedience to all the laws that permeate it. Here then, we may undoubtedly affirm a truth acceptable, in one of its many forms, to the members of the educational world.

2. Man is one with the rest of the creation as regards his physical being and well-being. The doctrine of man with his essential physical relation to all the world, plus those additional qualities and attributes which make him also a member of another kingdom, is one of the most fundamental truths in the educational world—for the anthropologist, the psychologist, and for the sociologist.

"Whatever view may be taken of him, he is a part of nature, the summit and crown of it, to be sure, but still embraced and held in it. He is born, and grows, and is dependent on the same chemical and physical laws as the animal world about him. He is subject to the common laws of organic life. Even his mental life is at present conditioned in the healthy action of a complex of natural forces. Thus, however clearly his possession of reason may suggest to faith a connection with a higher sphere, the roots of his being undoubtedly connect him with the great aggregate of nature. And it is specially to be noted, . . . that those who deny . . . the existence of God are emphatic in the complete identification of man with nature" (Valentine, *Natural Theology*, p. 90).

Those arguments and experiments of the ultra-Darwinian and Haeckelian biologists (both by the study of embryology and the relative truth that certain animals can be shown to be prone to the diseases and weaknesses of the flesh which are also common to man, and that such ailments in these certain animals can be treated in just the same and in as successful a manner as they are treated in man), which would prove man to be merely a creature of the creative cosmic forces, and be nothing more, are open to many modes of disproof and discredit. The educa-

tional world accepts the fact of man—as witness not only the results of the work of anthropologists, but also the multitudinous productions of psychologists and sociologists. They recognize too that man is open to two modes of influence, each producing a life of character the result of the dominating influence. In other words, that a man can become, in a truer sense than the Nietzschean sense, a super-man; or he can become a sub-human creature. The material evolutionist and some evolutionary sociologists attempt to produce this super-man merely in special and beautiful physical environments. Other interpreters of life see that there must be something other than mere non-human and non-moral environment, and strive first to clean out man's impure motivations and teach him that unmistakable truth—that right living and character are begotten only in right thinking and the expression of his better-self in some form of service. And this is where the datum of man that forms part of the data of religious experience also forms a part of the philosophy of science in the educational world. In him, that is his flesh, the religious world sees a war being waged, the combatants being evil and righteousness. On this double truth concerning man two other data of the religious experience are founded, namely 3) the problem of evil, and 4) the necessity of redemption and regeneration, both of which will now engage our consideration.

3. From the far-off distance, the fact of evil has been bemoaned in man's efforts to live to the extent of his greatest aspirations. We cannot even here stop to indicate the theories of the origin of evil, nor yet to say much in regard to its nature: for both lines have been very diversely conceived. In spite of that kind of reasoning which says 'God is all, God is mind, therefore there is no matter'; or 'God is all, God is good, therefore there is no evil,' the man in the street as well as the member of the educational world feels that such reasoning explains too much and not enough. The struggle and war of the lower nature with the higher nature of man, and the failure of the higher over the lower, is the fact of evil here spoken of and meant. In a sense it may be said that this fact of evil is one of the chief things recognized by the Christian Church—because the Church was built, constructed, and conceived to destroy the work and havoc of evil. Even a rank evolutionary ethics recognizes this fact of evil, too, and tries to meet it with its own

specific, even as the Comtean doctrine of the God-Humanity tries to meet it by making the race itself God. One system of thought, and not a little influential either, interprets this commonly recognized fact thus

"God (good) could never make man capable of sin. It is the opposite of good—that is evil—which seems to make men capable of wrong. Hence evil is but an illusion, and error has no real basis. . . . The superstitious parent of evil is a lie (*"Science and Health,"* 267 thousandth, Boston 1903, p. 481)."

With this thing that has proven itself the enemy of man's highest *well-being* what must follow but his defeat or victory? And so we come to the fact of Redemption.

4. We are thus brought to the fact of redemption as a necessity in the world. Redemption in more ways than one is recognized by the educational world. But the greatest redemption which it conceives of is absolutely identical with that view of the religious world, namely the redemption from evil to righteousness, from Satan to God.

The *Educational World* accepts these data of the *Religious World* or experience, and thus sustains to religious experience a common though not a perfect relation. And it is because of the imperfect relation existing between these two worlds that we are come together at this discussion, if perchance we may solve the problem so clearly to our own satisfaction as to go back to our spheres of labor and begin immediately reestablishing religious conviction in each of these indicated realms: 1) of science, 2) of education, and 3) of the popular mind.

Personally, this problem has always had more or less fascination for me in my work as a minister of Christ's truth and the most glorious life. If there is so much in common of the absolute facts of life among men of diverse intellectual temperaments, as our discussion includes, just how shall we set about reestablishing the perfect relation, which, in this instance, we call the reestablishment of religious conviction?

IV. THE TREND OF MODERN THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA IN THE TERMS OF LIFE RATHER THAN REASON.

There is a sense in which it is perfectly justifiable to say that truth is not an absolute quantity or quality, but rather relative; especially when we mean that truth is never stationary

in the sense that it brings one to a certain place or position and leaves him there an unmovable object. We should rather liken it to a secret and silent dynamic and vital power, most fully expressed only in human lives, which brings one up from a lower plane to a higher and truer—the real place where one should rest and be, but from which place he is ever going out into new paths, and bringing in new treasures, and growing richer with each new excursus from the house of truth into the highways and byeways of life. And the minister of the things of Jesus Christ should certainly be an occupant of this house of truth that he may bring to those well versed in the knowledge of things and time, the real vitality of all thinking and life. In other words, as a prime requisite, he must learn to adjust himself to the best of the earth's knowledge and its interpretations; for these will be for him the byways and highways into which he must make his excursions.

Tremendous have been the damage and destruction caused by this servant of truth by the reason of intellectual blindness, or the arrogance of faith as being able to subsist without the companionship of knowledge. I have in mind especially the case of a brilliant student of geology, an earnest Christian and worker in the church, until after an interview with his pastor, whose intellectual life was so narrow that his God was equally small. He insisted that, if this young science-student accepted the modern views of the origin of things, with their involved incompatibility with the belief of the Church, he would be worthy of dismissal from her privileges. The day came when this minister of truth had but a handful of hearers.

If it is true that there are but few in the educational world, who do not accept the great fact of some fundamental or supreme power, who is the essential center of all that is, and which great fact is not only the pivot on which all truly religious experience depends, but also all progressive and positive knowledge rests, and on which the whole educational world a mathematical demonstration? Or shall we not rather interpret this fact of religious experience to these people to make it an absolute necessity in their lives? Shall we try to demonstrate God's existence as a great personal being—after the order of a mathematical demonstration? or shall we not rather interpret God in the terms of life than intellect? The trend of thought

in educational and religious circles demands that this fact be demonstrated in the terms of life; and here is where we shall ever see that truth for which all evangelical religious scholars stand, namely that faith in God produces salvation from the lower self to the embodiment of the divine character in human lives, rather than character being the causative factor in salvation, or of the true religious conviction. As already suggested, when the fact of God is interpreted in the terms of life and action—the world begins to have a new appearance. In the plain, dull nasturtium leaf, the new eyes of the new heart see God and his wondrousness. The blades of grass now speak of the goodness of God; and earth becomes filled with heaven, and every common bush aflame with the holy life of God—and a new life courses through the veins, and the person wonders why he shut out the light of God's countenance, and the joy of the divine life, so long. In the multitude of new experiences and existences he now sees signs of God's purposes in creating man and the world. Instead of by the imperfect philosophical argument of Descartes, the world will be more readily saved by the appeal to life and purpose. The Cartesian doctrine will always be an imperfect argument and incapable of leading one to true general conclusions about God. It will be more useful, perhaps to the man already religious. But we must go farther and recognize that when a man applies his faculties of inquiry and observation to the world outside him, he finds himself confronted with facts which have greater meaning and strengthen the beliefs which he derives from his own qualities and his own experiences. He sees that the world is full of marks of active design, which are in daily operation throughout all nature. He conceives a designer. Why does he conclude that every effect must have had a cause? Because it is the final answer of his own consciousness. Upon this all science and knowledge rests. You must always, in the last analysis, come to something which is known, but in fact unprovable.

This I mention merely by the way, that, before we can attempt intellectual work regarding the Being and existence of God, we must carry human beings along that road where we may lead them to discover God in life and action, revealing himself in the language of the soul's need. On this aspect of the truth I have treated at greater length in my recently published article on "The Authority of Jesus and its Meaning for the Modern

Mind," in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education* (vol. 4, No. 3, July, 1911). In President Churchill King's *Taylor Lectures* at Yale University, on *The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life*, we find an admirable discussion of the difficulties which beset this great spiritual and religious fact. I can only mention the book with a brief quotation:

"The religious life can never be one of mere passive appreciation, or aesthetic admiration; it requires through and through the active ethical will. . . . The very existence of harmonious personal relation to God requires such an ethical will, The character of God, then, can never be a mere subject of passive aesthetic admiration; it demands a moral surrender to the will of God, and strenuous endeavor to embody that will in life."

V. GOD AND MAN, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM: WHAT IS IT?

All other essential facts in experience regarding life and God can only be rightly conceived as this fact is adjusted to the life of man. The Apostolic word will remain true as long as man's highest relations are expressed in this oneness and unity with God and service for men: "For ye are laborers together with God; ye are God's husbandry; ye are God's building."

The fact that man is not man by mere animal instincts in contrast to intellect and character is not always recognized by the world in general. Though comparative psychology, and the science of genetics are fast growing branches of human knowledge, and are adding not a little to our knowledge of both man and the lower animal kingdom, their effort to bridge the great gulf between man, even the lowest, and the highest of the lower forms of animal life is a task for which it is even too soon to venture to utter any kind of prophecy. We have the fact of man and his essential difference from other animals. This fact is generally accepted both by anthropologists and biologists. Religious experience rests itself upon the assurance that though man is a child of this world, according to the flesh, yet he is more truly a child of the heavenly country, that is a spiritual, because he is unmistakably the offspring of God. It is a fact worthy of note that it is not the person notable because of great physical or bodily endowment that survives in the memory, or whose life is recorded for and his character re-counted among the rising generations—but it is rather the man who has shown

to the world how much of God and heaven there is in him: a man like our Lord himself, one like Robertson of Brighton, one like Drummond of Sterling—*men who have shown God to the world!* There are many things regarding both God and man that will forever cause mental uncertainty and sometimes even doubt because it is impossible for the intellect to grasp them and master them. But to demonstrate that life can be lived with God, is the way to bring the surest poise and sanity to life.

Man has experiences, which, at once attest his relation to dual kingdoms. The lustings of the flesh assure him that he is an animal, and sometimes no better; the promptings of the Spirit link him with the Infinite and Eternal, and he stands in awe before the Ineffable.

“Eternal Light, Eternal Light
How pure the soul must be,
When placed within thy searching sight,
It shrinks not, but, with calm delight,
Can live and look on thee!

The Spirits that surround thy Throne
May bear the burning bliss,
But surely this is theirs alone,
Since they have never, never known,
A fallen world like this.

There is a way for man to rise
To that sublime abode;
An offering and a sacrifice,
A Holy Spirit's energies,
An advocate with God.”

And in this realm of experience the true key is the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. In him we have the acme of God's revelation of love and light. In Jesus we have learned that the Jehovah of the Jews is more than the Absolute of the Christian philosopher: *He is our Father*. In this pivotal point of God's Fatherhood through Jesus Christ, every minister of religion has the source of inspiration and enthusiasm with which he may go to work to make God real to men. “In all religions we have a subject and an object, and a bond of relationship between them,” which is that “the faith that the deepening spiritual life reaches beyond the present time-order, is a legitimate faith, that the values which give meaning to this life are not subject

to decay and destruction because they are of God." (Galloway *Op. cit.*)

Not in the Church as constituted to-day are we as ministers of the word of truth to place that absolute assurance that it is the sole heir of God's instruments of salvation. True it is one, and that one sanctioned by our Lord. The Church is rather the home and ought to be the place of nourishment, fellowship, and the school of training. When we have taught the Church's necessity in human life in this aspect, we may rest assured that to those whose faith has been destroyed because of the glaring inconsistencies of Christian lives, we shall present to them an aspect of the religious life which places the Church as God's visible tabernacle in which men shall find food for their souls, strength for their lives, and directions for their services—and from the Church they may go out and work out their own salvation through those channels of service which offer the greatest means for the service of God in the service for men.

"We know no deeper law in the building of character, than that righteous character comes through that association with the best in which there is mutual self-giving"

says Churchill King. We have tentatively defined Religion as the realization of those true relations in which men mutually give themselves for help.

"And," continues Churchill King, "the problem of character implies not only a bare recognition of man's moral freedom, but a sacred respect at every point for his personality. If a man is ever to have a character at all, it must be absolutely his own; he must be won freely into it. In this free winning to character, no association counts for its most that is not mutual. I become in character most certainly and rapidly like that man with whom I constantly am, to whose influence I most fully surrender, and who gives himself most completely to me" (*Theology and the Social Consciousness*).

"Religious Conviction" is that intellectual attitude and dominating passion of life which realizes that Jesus has given himself fully to men to transform them into his own character and likeness. Our part in reestablishing this conviction in the educational world is to interpret this great social and religious truth in the terms of life of a like kind.

For a technical consideration of this theme, as far as it is treated in literature, and the sources from which I have derived most help I am indebted to the following authors.

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MODERN JUDAISM (QUESTIONNAIRE).

By DR. J. H. KAPLAN,

Selma, Alabama.

The following *questionnaire* has been prepared for the purpose of obtaining reliable information concerning the present condition and the probable future of modern Judaism. Certain questions, in particular, are of paramount interest. Such, e. g., are the retention or abandonment of the Sabbath, the relations of Judaism and Unitarianism, the rôle of the stage and its possible substitution for the pulpit, the preservation of Jewish separatism, or the acceptance of assimilation with the non-Jewish world, etc.

QUESTIONNAIRE.

1. Do you believe a day of rest, that is, a Sabbath, is essential to a religious life?
2. Do you believe Judaism can live without a Sabbath?
3. Do you think one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath?
4. Do you believe that by any effort, however great, the Jews could and would observe the Sabbath?
5. Do you believe that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation of Judaism, or a gradual loss of all things Jewish?
6. Do you believe Judaism would gain or lose by a Sunday-Sabbath?
7. Do you think that Reform Judaism leads to an ultimate assimilation of Jew with non-Jew?
8. Do you believe that Unitarianism and Reform Judaism could permanently unite in one congregation?
9. Do you believe a complete assimilation of Jew with non-Jew would be a loss or a gain to the spiritual forces of civilization?
10. Do you believe the stage, purified and reorganized, can take the place of the pulpit, and if so, would you consider that a gain or loss to religion in general?

11. Supposing the Jew has no distinct religious message for the world any more than Germany or Russia has a distinct political message for the world, do you believe the Jew's privilege, right, or duty, would still be to preserve his individuality and separate religious existence?

Those interested and willing to answer these questions, are requested to send their replies (with name and age) to Dr. J. H. Kaplan, Selma, Alabama.

LITERAURE: BOOKS, ETC.

La parole catholique. Discours choisis de nombreux orateurs. Par Le Chanoine JEAN VAUDON, Missionnaire, Ancien Supérieur de Séminaire. Première Série. *La Paroisse. Tome I. L'Installation dans la Paroisse. La Prise de Possession de la Paroisse. Pour les Prêtres de la Paroisse.* Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1911. xiii, 354p.

Bibliothèque de l'Enseignement scriptuaire. *La Loi et la Foi. Etude sur Saint Paul et les Judaïsants* par A. DE BOYSSON, Directeur au Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice. Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1912. viii, 339p.

These are two characteristic productions of French Catholicism. The first is a selection of sermons and essays by various members of the clergy on all aspects of the parish and the priest, the duties, opportunities, dangers, etc., of the ministry; the opening essay (pp. 8-33) is by a Bishop (anonymous) who treats of the parish in figurative fashion,—the parish has a soul and a body, the priest is the head and the church the heart, the faithful are the limbs, etc. Other contributors are the late Archbishop of Cambrai, the Bishops of Constance, Limoges, etc. Several sermons and essays (pp. 261-339) are the work of Father Delaporte, Superior General of the Prêtres de la Miséricorde. Canon Vaudon cites the saying, aimed at the Church, "What destroys religion in France is the 40,000 sermons preached there every Sunday," but observes on this point (p. xii): "No! what destroys religion in France is not the priestly word, but the contempt of some, the indifference of others, or the cowardice of a very large number in face of duty." Good sermons and good books there are; it is good hearers and good readers that are wanting. The deaf and the blind are so of their own volition. The closing section of the book (pp. 340-351), by Father Rauzan, Superior General of the Missionaries of France, bears the title "The priest, principal cause, and only efficacious remedy of the evils of the church." This manual will doubtless be of service to the priests for whom it is intended. Rev. A. de Boysson's *The Faith and the Law* is intended for clergymen and students in the higher seminaries. After an introductory chapter dealing with the question of the date of the New Testament documents concerned, especially the Epistle to the Galatians, the author has a historical section (pp. 29-191), which treats of the first controversies, the Council of Jerusalem, the Judaizing opposition after the Council, and the beginnings of the Judaizing gnosis; and a theological study (pp. 191-334) concerned with the doctrine of St. Paul as opposed to the Judaizing view, justification by faith, the progress of the supernatural life, and the relations between the doctrine of St. Paul and that of Our Lord. On pages 335-336 is a brief bibliography, in which the names of Ramsay, Round, Sanday and Headlam, among others, appear. The author concludes that "the Church has kept the first Gospel which it received, without experiencing the need of accepting a new one." Clementine doctrine and Judæo-philosophy failed to influence the development of dogma or of ecclesiastical institutions. Nor is the doctrine of St. Paul to

be regarded as the result of his personal religious experience; that only made him feel more keenly and express with more conviction and energy the truths he had elsewhere learned.

A. F. C.

La philosophie de William James. Par TH. FLOURNOY. Sainte-Blaise; Foyer Solidariste, 1911. 221 p. With portrait.

This little book grew out of the address delivered by the author, Professor in the Scientific Faculty of the University of Geneva, at the anniversary meeting of the Association chrétienne suisse des Etudiants, held at Ste.-Croix, October 8, 1910, an occasion at which it had been hoped Professor James himself would be present to renew "my old acquaintance with the *jeunesse studieuse* of Vaud and Geneva," and it is under their auspices that it is now published. In 1860, William James, "stud. phil.," was received as *hospes perpetuus* (April 4 to July 27) of the Genevese section of the Society of Zofingen, and, on leaving, was made an honorary member. *The Catalogue of Members of the Society*, published in 1861, gives his occupation as "merchant, New York," which curious fact gives rise to some reflections by Prof. Flournoy on the seeming contrast with his after-career. In a most sympathetic way the author treats of James and his philosophy under the following headings: Artistic nature, first influences, rejection of monism, pragmatism, radical empiricism, pluralism, tychism (or fortuitism), meliorism and moralism, theism, the will to believe, etc. An appendix (pp. 197-219) reproduces a *compte-rendu* of James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, contributed by Prof. Flournoy to the *Revue Philosophique* in 1902; and pages 9-12 contain a list of French translations of his works, a very brief sketch of his life, and a list of the principal notices of his life and death which have appeared in the French language, 1910-1911. The start of James on his way to lasting fame as a philosopher is thus described (p. 36):

"In so far as it is possible to explain the personality of a man of genius by environmental influences, it may be said that William James, when about to commence his proper career, had drawn from his family milieu that moral and religious conviction, which was to remain the permanent inspirer of his philosophy, and from the school of the natural sciences that concrete mode of thought, which fitted so well his innate artistic temperament, and later expanded in his two doctrines, so closely related, of pragmatism and radical empiricism." James will not live in the history of human thought as the founder of a school of philosophy (his philosophy was "rather an attitude communicating itself by contagion of feeling than a doctrine that could be taught by didactic exposition"), but as "one of the great prophets of intellectual and moral liberty; an apostle of the strenuous life and personal faith; a figure of deliverance standing against all systems tending to fetter, to narrow and to stifle the spontaneity of human beings and their spiritual development; one of those rare and lofty individualities, who have succeeded in uniting the two poles of our nature, the sense of the Real and the sense of the Ideal, in a truly living synthesis, inspiring with enthusiasm and energy all who approach them" (p. 191).

A. F. C.

L'origine de l'idée de Dieu. Etude historico-critique et positive. Ière partie: historico-critique. Par le P. GUILLAUME SCHMIDT, S. V. D. Vienne, Autriche: Imprimerie des Méchitharistes, 1910. Pp. xiii, 316.

This book, well-provided with indexes (subjects; tribes, peoples, countries; native words and expressions; authors), is reprinted from the journal *Anthropos* of which the author is the editor. The six chapters treat of the following topics: The philological period in the study of the religions of historical peoples (the school of Lepsius, Schwarz, Kühn, Müller, Baudry, Bournouf, Bréal, Meyer, Ploin, etc.); the ethnological period of the study of the religions of uncivilized peoples (theories of Lubbock, Spencer, Tylor, etc.; progress of the animistic theory with the philologists and others; pan-Babylonianism); the position of the theologians; later views more favorable toward animism; the monotheistic pre-animism of Andrew Lang (pp. 72-124); criticism of Lang's theory (pp. 125-244; Howitt, Tylor, Foy, Marett, Hartland, van Gennep; the Australian supreme beings, etc.); the preanimistic theories of magic (pp. 245-297; Guyau, King, Marett, Hubert and Mauss, Preuss, Lehmann, Vierkandt, Hartland, etc.). For Father Schmidt religion is to be defined as "the recognition of one or several personal beings, who rise above terrestrial and temporal conditions, and the feeling of dependence with regard to them." The term *personal*, and not *spiritual*, is used, because, in his opinion, religion "includes forms and periods in which the idea of spirituality had not yet developed" (p. 4). It also serves, he thinks, to emphasize the incorrectness of the theory of "magic," discussed at length in chapter vii, which would see the very beginnings of religion in the idea of "a universal and impersonal magic force." With such a definition the strictest Buddhists and the European atheists are both ruled out of consideration. The author observes further: "The mere recognition of the existence of a supernatural being and the feeling of dependence with regard to him would constitute only a theoretical religion, with which man, considered abstractly might content himself. But it is precisely in those first times of human evolution, with which we are dealing, when thinking, feeling and acting are all one, that such a purely theoretical religion seems *a priori* impossible, and the intellectual and affective recognition will at once express itself in external actions. Then we have a complete and veritable religion, because it is living." The exact manner in which, in the most primitive period, this external recognition manifested itself first and most commonly is difficult to say. Father Schmidt rejects the opinion of certain recent ethnologists who refuse to admit the existence of religion, where no well-characterized prayer is to be found. He holds that, while religion, in its perfect form, may require the presence of moral or social prescriptions, prayer, sacrifice and the observation of certain ceremonies, "there is a real religion, wherever the existence of any single one of these manifestations can be demonstrated." moreover, in primitive times these manifestations, generally, have not yet assumed the character of fixed forms or ceremonies,—"they are rather spontaneous and in correlation with external events and states of mind, being for this reason in a large measure still subject to change." It is with this view of the nature of religion that Father Schmidt, whose knowledge of the literature of the subject is very large, résumés critically

the history of the idea of God in modern scientific literature from the school of Max Müller and its antecedents down to the polemics of Lang and the increasing out-put of the opponents and supporters of the theories of "magic," "pre-animism," etc. The thesis, which he himself seeks to maintain, in this work, is that "a primitive monotheism" has existed, of such a nature that it is not at all necessary to assume that it has been preceded by a long series of lower forms, or "developed with the primitive forms of mythological evolution." This "primitive monotheism," Father Schmidt maintains, "is a real monotheism, but so simple in structure, that it could be born, without difficulty, at the beginning of a really human (*i. e.*, intellectual) evolution" (p. 31). In the opinion of Father Schmidt (p. 38) "the empire of the animistic theory appears still to be almost universal." The theologians have paid too little attention to it and their attacks upon it have often suffered from their lack of ethnological equipment, etc., but this is now being more or less overcome. Naturally, much space is given to Andrew Lang and the "anthropological school." The author points out the great lack of harmony among the critics of Lang and his theories, especially concerning the bearing of the new facts adduced from the religious life, ideas and institutions of the Australians and other primitive races and peoples. But the general result is, on the whole, rather favorable to Lang (p. 243), in so far, at least, as the existence of the idea of a supreme being among certain uncivilized peoples is concerned. In attempting to explain the origin of this idea, however, there is great difference of opinion. In opposition to current theories of the magical origin of religion, etc., Father Schmidt (p. 294) claims to demonstrate that "only the absolute priority of 'normal (=pro-fane)' causality, and not magical causality, can explain psychological, ethnographic and prehistoric facts." Again, "at the beginnings of human development we must place power and not impotence, the positive and not the negative, the effort and the capacity to know causes, and not 'primitive stupidity'." The author expresses surprise at the aversion of scientists to "personality," which Lang's theory places at the beginnings of religious evolution, and their tendency to explain religion through unconscious forces. We await with interest the appearance of the second part of this valuable and scholarly work.

A. F. C.

Harper's Library of Living Thought. *The Revolutions of Civilization.*
By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D. C. L., LL. D., F. R. S., F. B. A. London and New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911. Pp. xi, 135. Figs. 1-57.

In this little book, the seven chapters of which treat of the nature of civilization, the periods of civilization in Egypt, the periods in Europe, the fluctuations, relations of different activities, the national view of civilization, conditions of civilization, the well-known British Egyptologist sustains the thesis that "civilization is an intermittent phenomenon" (p. 5), and also "a recurrent phenomenon." To study its recurrences, to determine the principles underlying its variations, and to discover the character of its "summer" and its "winter," its growth and its fall, etc., "we should examine the longest series of its revolutions and see what they have in common." In Egypt, according to Dr. Petrie, "we

can trace the past of man in continuous history for over 7,000 years, and can put in order a prehistoric age which may well extend our view to about 10,000 years;" and, over the whole of that time we know what were the products of every century; in the long range of vision we can discern eight successive periods of civilization, each separated by an age of barbarism or decline before and after it" (p.11). Two of these periods are prehistoric and lie beyond 6000 B. C., and for these pottery and other more primitive arts must be used for comparison. But for the other six periods Dr. Petrie employs sculpture as the standard test of advance and retrogression. The art-data in question are used to "trace through eight successive periods the repeated growth, glory and decay of art in Egypt, indicating the evolutions of civilization through some 10,000 years." Taking as guide, "the best-defined position in the development of art, the close of the archaic age in sculpture, when a perfect harmonizing of the several parts is first reached" (p. 84), the author fixes this date for the various periods as follows: Eighth, 1240 A. D.; seventh, 450 B. C.; sixth, 1550 B. C.; fifth, 3450 B. C.; fourth, 4750 B. C.; third, 5400 B. C. Dr. Petrie believes that "the Mediterranean and Egypt, as a whole, form therefore a single group in the history of civilization," and "the phase of the wave of civilization was identical in Egypt and Europe to within a century, where it can be observed in three periods; and in three earlier periods it was generally connected and may have been identical." According to the author, "the remains parallel to the first three periods in Egypt still lie in the 21 feet of neolithic ruins in Knossos,—this depth is a greater amount of accumulation than that which contained the ruins of the subsequent three periods of the Early, Middle and Late Cretan Ages" (p. 48). The parallelism of the other periods is as follows:

Period	In Egypt	In Europe
IV.....	3d-6th Dynasties.....	Early Cretan
V.....	7th-14th Dynasties.....	Middle Cretan
VI.....	15-20th Dynasties.....	Late Cretan
VII.....	21st-33d Dynasties.....	Classical
VIII.....	The Arab.....	Medieval

While the data for Asia are not so convincing or so apropos, the recurrences of civilization are noticeable there also, and what little we know of ancient American culture suggests a similar course of events. But "the Eastern phase, on the whole, keeps about 3 1-2 centuries in advance of the Mediterranean," and this difference of phases causes "the constant struggle between East and West." In the words of the author (p. 108): "The impression that civilization always comes from the East is due to the East being a few centuries ahead of the West in its phase. Thus, on the rise of a wave the East is more civilized; while on the fall of a wave—which does not attract attention—it is less civilized." While, "with Mesopotamia always leading, it is bound, politically, to overrun the West a few centuries before the rise of the West in each period," nevertheless, "on the whole, the West more usually controls the East, because from the time of its maximum, during the gradual decline of each period, it is always on a higher plane than the East." The phase belongs to folk

and not to land, in the opinion of Dr. Petrie, as the history of the Etruscans (if an Asiatic people) in Italy, the Greeks in Bactria, and the Arabs in Spain seems to indicate,—i. e., “the phase of an intrusive people is that of their source and not that of their new region; the phase of civilization is inherent in the people, and is not due to the circumstances of their position” (p. 113). Of the breaks between periods, etc., we are told that “every civilization of a settled population tends to incessant decay from its *maximum* condition; and this decay continues until it is too weak to initiate anything, when a fresh race comes in, and utilizes the old stock to graft on, both in blood and culture; as soon as the mixture is well started, it rapidly grows on the new soil, and produces a new wave of civilization.” There can be “no new generation without a mixture of blood,” and “parthenogenesis is unknown in the birth of nations.” With the successive periods ‘there are lesser intervals of barbarism between the civilizations, and the civilization-phase in each period is longer at each recurrence.’ This, as the author points out, “is in accord with the common idea that the world is getting more civilized as the ages go on, in spite of the crushing fact that in many kinds of civilization the successive recurrences show no improvement” (p. 119). A gain has been made in quantity, not in quality,—“the total amount of civilization is greater because it is longer.” Another result of this “widening-out of the phases,” has been to “separate the best period of each form of culture” (e. g., in the early days the arts of sculpture and painting, mechanics and wealth, were all nearly contemporaneous), and thus “art is decadent before the mechanical ability is free, and before the wealth has grown.” As to forms of government,—every invasion by a new people—the necessary foundation of a new period of civilization means the following succession: Autocracy (four to six centuries), oligarchy (four to five centuries), gradual transformation to democracy (four centuries), their steady decay after democracy has attained full power, and autocracy upon its ruins. The facts of marriage and the succession of human generations ensure “a period of greatest ability, beginning about eight centuries after the mixture, and lasting for four or five centuries in different subjects.” This, rather than periodical changes of climate, determines the regular recurrence of civilization. As to the future, Prof. Petrie holds that conditions are such that “the production of a new European art, and its subsequent activities cannot be expected for many centuries” (p. 130). Moreover, “the future progress of man may depend as much on isolation to establish a type, as on fusion of types when established” (p. 131). Hence the important rôle of eugenics in the future. A. F. C.

The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature. Vol. 21. *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*. By JAMES HOPE MOULTON. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911. xi., 170p.

Ibid. vol. 26. *The Moral Life and Moral Worth*. By W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911. vii, 147 p.

Ibid. vol. 14. *An Introduction to Experimental Psychology*. By C. S. MYERS. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911. vii, 156 p.

The nine chapters of the *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*, whose author is Greenwood Professor in the University of Manchester, discuss the fol-

lowing subjects: The Aryans and their language, general description of the Avesta, Avestan verse-forms, early history of the religion, Zarathustra, After Zarathustra, The Gâthâs: literary features, Contents of the Gâthâs, The Yashts and the later Avestas. There is a Bibliography ("a few of the most necessary books,"—those named in the text are generally not repeated) and an index. As Professor Moulton observes (p. 1), "the continent of Asia, apart from the tiny country of Palestine, has produced very little poetry that has made any impression upon the West." Even Omar was happy in finding a translator, who could win him the attention of the English literary world. The early Persian religious poetry also interests the thinker more than the man of letters." It was not until 1771 that the Avesta was really brought to the West, although Mss. (the oldest known is dated 1278, A. D.) lay hidden long before then in the Bodleian and certain other European libraries. From the vicissitudes of wars and the fanatical destructiveness of the Moslems, etc., the Avesta has suffered so much that, according to Prof. Jackson, "two-thirds have disappeared since the last Zoroastrian monarch sat on the Persian throne" (p. 14). As the author points out, Darmesteter's sceptical attempt to demonstrate that "the Gâthâs are no older than the first century of our era, and the Sassanian editors are to be credited with very much more originality than tradition allows," never won favor,—indeed, "its brilliant author never made a convert among experts." One evidence as to "the remarkable faithfulness with which the Gâthâs have been preserved," is the test of meter. The Later Avesta has suffered much more from glosses, etc. The Bible of Zoroastrianism may have been touched in two or three points by Babel, but its influence cannot have been great for the early period. Mithra, Prof. Moulton suggests, "seems to have belonged to the upper air rather than to the sun" (p. 37), and he regards him as probably of alien origin,—cf. Assyrian *metru*, "vain." *Anâhita*, a river-genius, or water-spirit, especially associated in the Later Avesta with Mithra, may also be non-Aryan. As to the historicity of Zarathustra there seems to be no doubt, but when and where he lived is harder to determine; and "legend has added immensely to the scanty record of the Prophet's life." The great importance of the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. in religious history (Buddha, Confucius, Socrates) lends some countenance to the traditional dates for his birth and death, viz. 660 and 583 B. C.; linguistic arguments, on the other hand, suggest a much earlier date. The birth-place of Zarathustra, where he spent his early life, seems to have been in Adarbaijân. He probably preached first in Bactria, making a convert of King Vish-tâspa,—“the Constantine of the new faith,” and then “returned later on the full tide of success to press his propaganda in his native land.” But he won only a partial victory over the lower forms of faith which he opposed and “a counter-reformation set in before the Gâthic dialect ceased to be spoken” (p. 74). It is in the Gâthâs (really verse introductions, *résumés* and *aperçus* for a lost substratum of prose), “the kernel of the Avesta is to be found,”—the author gives a good *résumé* on pages 97-118. The Yashts and Later Avesta demonstrate “the degeneration which marks the centuries between Zarathustra and the Sassanians.” In the words of Prof. Moulton: “Into the Avesta the Magi brought, to speak

generally, the elements which we find in the Vendidad. The Gâthâs are almost as innocent of ritual as the New Testament: like the prophets elsewhere, Zarathustra seems to have cared little for outward forms of worship. The Magi supplied the omission, and it suffices the record with sincere relief that their book of offices is in prose" (p. 78). Moreover: "They hardened the Prophet's profound adumbrations of truth into a mechanical system of dogma, therein showing the usual skill of priests in preserving the letter and destroying the spirit. Zarathustra's doctrine of Evil was developed into a systematic division of the world between Ahura Mazdâh and Angra Mainyu. Every angel and every creation of the former had its exact counterpart in the infernal order. The fact that the ingenious process was not always completed may be evidence of the limitation of Magian influence during the formative period of Parsism. The Amesha Spentas are only perfunctorily provided with fiends to match." It was through "the Sassanian reform that the Parsi faith was unified and established." The failure of Parsism to become a world-religion in part, at least, "lies in its weakness on that side where literature makes itself, even when its creators like the writers of the New Testament are totally unconscious of any literary mission" (p. 28), and "around the figure of the founder himself there is no halo, nor anything out of which a halo could be produced." Again, in spite of the pure and lofty character of the concept of Zarathustra, "the absence of the attributes of grace and love is by itself sufficient reason for the failure of Parsism to establish itself as a world-religion" (p. 64). In the Yashts and Later Avesta Zarathustra ceases to be a man and becomes "a purely supernatural figure, holding converse with Ahura Mazdâh on theological and ritual subjects, which rarely come near the practical and homely religion inculcated by the singer of the Gâthâs. Nor is Ahura himself less changed" (p. 120). The story of Persian religious development is important in the evolution of our own faith, for two by-products of Persian thought loom large in the early history of Christianity—the Parsi heresy of Manichaeism, and the most important and long victorious cult of the Mithra, the latter seemingly a direct descendant of unreformed Iranian religion, scarcely touched by Zarathushtra's ideas, but considerably mixed with indigenous elements from the countries where it took its rise" (p. 79).

A. F. C.

Prof. Sorley's purpose in his monograph (perhaps too theoretical and didactic) on *The Moral Life* is to give "a popular account of the nature of goodness in human beings." It is not addressed specially to the philosophical student, but to the wider public interested in the subject. The topics treated are: The moral life, temperance, courage, wisdom, some other personal virtues (industry, prudence, thrift), justice, benevolence, religion and the moral life. For his ethnological orientation the author seems to have depended on Westermarck, from whom he cites Howitt's anecdote of the young Australian on page 4. The statement (p. 4) that "so far as our evidence goes, morality in some form has always been a factor in human life," seems justified. How far it is true that "in early societies there is no distinction between custom and morality" is less

certain. And the author is right in recognizing the difficulty in estimating "the amount of difference that actually exists, or has existed between the moral codes of different communities." It is not exactly true to say (p. 7), "the progress of moral ideas depends upon their emancipation from custom." From the author's point of view "morality is internal; it belongs to the inner life; and this is the mark which distinguishes it from the law of the land and the conventions of society." As to connection with law it may be said that "it is yet possible that the man of exact performance may remain untouched by the spirit of morality." A man's character "is made both for him and by him." It is based on heredity and developed by "experience" (environment, education, etc.). Prof. Sorley believes that "the term intellectual virtue is not a misnomer, although it does not, as with Aristotle, indicate a class distinct from moral virtue" (p. 21). The two terms, physical virtue and intellectual virtue, as used in Greek ethics, are found by modern writers to be of doubtful application. The personal and the social aspects "are inseparable in the moralization of man," and "if we make this fundamental distinction of personal and social the basis of a classification of the virtues, we must bear in mind the limits of the distinction." Room must also be made, the author thinks, for a third class,— "virtues corresponding to what have been called theological virtues. The cardinal virtues thus consist of: (1) Personal virtues, such as *temperance, courage, wisdom*; (2) social virtues, such as *justice, benevolence*; (3) religious virtues, or excellences in the personal attitude to the ultimate meaning of life. One of the triumphs of modern progress is the discovery of the virtue of courage "in regions intellectual and philanthropic, where its presence was not clearly seen by ancient morality" (p. 61), the widening of our conception of it "by associating it with active devotion to the claims of truth and of benevolence." The thought that "industry directed to a worthy end is an essential part of virtue is, in its clear statement, a modern, a very modern idea" (p. 72). Justice, being "the volitional habit which disposes a man to respect the rights of others," is essentially a social virtue. The discussion of benevolence (pp. 115-125) closes with the following bit of good advice: "In making moral pocket-handkerchiefs for the natives of Borrioboola-Gha, do not forget your station and its duties; in cultivating your own garden, always remember that you are a citizen of the world." Religions have not always been ethical, but "religion is never separated altogether from conduct" (p. 132),—nor can religion and morality be kept apart for long, "unless, as in some creeds, God is confined to heaven, and the world given over to the Devil." In connection with this book one should read certain sections of Dr. Franz Boas' *The Mind of Primitive Man* (N. Y., 1911) and also Dr. A. L. Kroeber's article on "The Morals of Uncivilized Peoples," in the *American Anthropologist* (N. S. vol. XII, 1910, pp. 437-447).

A. F. C.

The portions of Professor Myers' handy *Introduction to Experimental Psychology* (the chapter-subjects are touch, temperature and pain; color-vision; the Müller-Lyer illusion; experimental esthetics; memory; mental

test and their uses) which interest us particularly here are those which record evidence derived by the author and his fellow-investigators from the primitive peoples of Australasia, etc. As to color-vision the author observes (p. 43): "thus neither in animals, nor among children or savages, is there evidence of a development of the color sense along a definite path," and "there is no evidence that man has acquired his color vision say by an early evolution of the red (or blue) sense, later by the appearance of the green, and lastly by the appearance of the blue (or red) sense." Information concerning the color-sense of primitive peoples is given on pages 29-36. Of the Müller-Lyer illusion, we learn (p. 55): "Among very primitive peoples, *e. g.*, those of the Torres Straits, the illusion turns out to be distinctly smaller than in England, while less primitive peoples, *e. g.*, the Todas of Madras, stand midway, in size of the illusion, between the Torres Straits Islanders and Englishmen," but "it is probably because of his unfamiliarity with geometrical figures that the savage experiences the Müller-Lyer illusion in a less degree than the civilized man,—for him such figures have less 'meaning,' and, consequently, he is less influenced by the figure as a whole when estimating the length of one of its parts." As judged by the E test the visual acuity of the uncivilized peoples examined (p. 94) "is not very different from, though perhaps on the whole slightly superior to, the acuity of Europeans living a corresponding out-of-door life." As to sensitiveness to difference of pitch, "whereas the Murray Island (Torres Straits) and the Aberdeenshire adults differ enormously, there is very little difference between the school children of Aberdeenshire and those of Murray Island, who are now being taught by a Scottish teacher" (p. 99). Judged by the "spacial threshold" test of skin-touch, the Papuan Murray Islanders stand first having the lowest "spacial threshold," being able to distinguish a two-point from a one-point touch, when the compass points are separated by a distance of about a third of what is necessary in the case of the university men who stand at the opposite end of the list" (p. 100). Between the Papuans and the Todas come the Dayaks, and after the Todas the Englishmen, Scotchmen, etc. This result is, in some ways, quite surprising, as is also a similar greater capacity among primitive peoples to discriminate between lifted weights. And there seems to be "fair experimental evidence that the sensibility to pain is greater among civilized than among primitive people." There is a brief Bibliography (pp. 151-153), and an Index.

A. F. C.

Die Indogermanen im alten Orient. Mythologisch-historische Funde und Fragen. VON MARTIN GEMOLL. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1911. viii, 124 p.

This book has an attractive title and a good index. In an earlier volume, *Grundsteinen zur Geschichte Israels* (Leipzig, 1911) the author set forth the thesis that the Israelites took over their religion from the lords of the land of Canaan, who were of Indo-Germanic stock. The father of Israel *Abraham* and the ancient priest *Aaron* he brought into relation with *Ahura* (—Mazda); and *Jahwe* with Indo-Iranian *Yama*. He likewise dis-

covered Celtic myths in the Old Testament, and does many other things of the same sort, as a confirmed Aryanomaniac. The volume under review treats of the following: Tamūrā—Tahmūra—Takhmo urupa; Attis—Adad; Ahura—Arthur—Abram—; Gideon—Gwydion und Gilead—Galaad; zum Gilgamesepos; die Hatti—Mitani und ihre Verwandten. Here the comparative method has run wild, and Indogermanic peoples are picked out all over Asia Minor (the Hatti, Mitani, Chaldi, Cassites, Elamites, etc., are all such), while philological *rapprochements* of the most impossible sort are ventured upon. For Hr. Gemoll the *Hatti*, by their very name, betray relationship to the old Teutonic *Chatti*; Tamūrā—Thahmūrath—Nimrod, Attis—Adad are really Indogermanic deities,—so, too, is the famous Marduk. Not content with identifying *Ahura* and *Abram*, the author maintains that “the legendary old British King” is identical with them both,—moreover Lot and Lear are the same, and “the story of Lot must have been carried to Palestine by some Celtic people.” The Grail story comes in here also; and Gideon is identified with Gwydion, also Gilead with Galahad. From these and many other similar arguments the conclusion is reached that “Palestine was once inhabited by Celts.” The Iwein—Gawein legend, too, is “a European Gilgamesh epic,” indeed in Gawein—Gwalchmai lies hidden Gilgamesh. If this monograph has been composed as a “stunt” to show the dangerous possibilities of the comparative method, with attachments of solar and lunar mythology, its existence might be justified; what useful purpose it otherwise can serve is difficult to imagine.

A. F. C.

Beiträge zur Assyriologie und semitischen Sprachwissenschaft, herausgegeben von FRIEDR. DELITSCH und PAUL HAUPT, VII, 4: *Beiträge zur babylonischen Astronomie*. Von ERNST WEIDNER. Mit einer Sternkarte und 6 Abbildungen im Text. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press), 1911. 101 p.

This discussion of the astronomy of the ancient Babylonians deals with “The ways of Anu, Enlil and Ea” (text, translation, notes, etc.); the significations of *Agû* (of the moon, the sun, Venus) and *Azkaru*; the observation of the moon by the Babylonians; Babylonian knowledge of the apparent lunar and solar diameters and the origin of the sexagesimal system. It is a very special and technical study based on the original documents themselves,—etymological notes and an extensive word-list (pp. 84-97) are given. The basis of the sexagesimal system, the “six,” lies in a six-fold division of the sky by the ancient Babylonians (p. 100). This stands in relationship with their calculation of the firmament in terms of the apparent diameter of the moon. The Babylonian text on moon-observations, translated on pages 60-68, contains much folk-lore and weather-lore, omens of luck and of evil, etc. One of the weather-prognostics is that “when the new moon appears covered with clouds, there will be rain.” The large number of terms in use applying to the moon, its phases, etc., shows how carefully and persistently it was observed in ancient Babylonia,—according to some, she was the world's first great teacher in the art of observing the heavens.

A. F. C.

Unsere Schrift. Drei Abhandlungen zur Einführung in die Geschichte der Schrift und des Buchdrucks. Von Dr. KARL BRANDI, ord. Prof. an der Univ. Göttingen. Mit 89 Abbildungen im Text und drei Beilagen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1911. vii, 80 + 12 p.

This well-illustrated little monograph treats in three sections of writing and civilization, history of the forms of the letters of the alphabet, writing and technique, style, etc. Pages 77-80 contain bibliographical data; the three appendices are facsimilies of pages set up in various sorts of Gothic, Roman, Italic, etc. The illustrations in the text cover all periods of German writing, normal and abnormal. The manysidedness of writing is as marked at various periods of history as has been that of other borrowed forms of culture,—in the troublous times of the early Middle Ages, with their political divisions and limitations in the way of communication, etc., varieties of writing grew up which the paleographers of the 17th and 18th centuries mistakenly called "national" (cf. West Gothic, Lombard, Merovingian, Irish, Anglo-Saxon), but which are now recognized as having been in no wise coincident with the vacillating political boundaries of those nations (p. 3). The influence of the Roman Church, of the Renaissance, etc., is to be noted. The struggle between "Gothic" and "Roman" is still going on in Germany, the former having the advantage of a certain "patriotism." The limit of distortion possible can be seen in the Augsburg H and S dating from 1740, as compared with some of the letters in vogue at the beginning of the art of printing itself. Noteworthy also are the esthetic "fringes" of such writing as that practiced by the humanists of the Roman Curia (see p. 35). Interesting is the story of the development of the writing of the capital letters (pp. 39-49),—the author styles K, "a sort of comet in the sky of letters." The cursive employed on a Würzburg epitaph in 1687 is particularly adorned without losing its firmness (p. 49). In what direction German writing and printing are moving to-day is not absolutely clear, but Prof. Brandi detects "a strong mutual effect between the fluid forms of the German and the simpler forms of the Latin script." This, perhaps, suggests the direction of the future. Mixture of form and style now prevail in many manuscripts; and numbers, like that of the Königsberg Professor, cited on page 75, are neither German nor Latin.

Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel. Eine soziologische Studie. Von ALFRED VIERKANDT, Privatdozent an der Universität Berlin. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1908. xiv, 209 p.

We review here very tardily this book of Dr. Vierkant, which, like his other valuable and interesting monograph on *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker* (Leipzig, 1896), seems not to be well-known in America. The present volume consists of a historical section (pp. 6-63), treating of invention and economic life, custom, language and political life, religion and myth; art, science, the physiognomy of modern culture; a psychological section (pp. 64-101) devoted to the historical structure of consciousness (basal idea, the development of mental life in the individual, perceptions and recollections, thought-process and conviction, affective life and formation of values, action, creative activity); and a sociological section (pp. 102-

200) concerned with the mechanism of culture-change (the conservation of culture, different types of culture-change, the process of acculturation, the three requisites for culture-change, necessity, "leading individuals" in culture-change, the realization of the new, the last causes of culture, evolutionary tendencies, the irrational character of culture and the nature of the historical). There are also a brief introduction and conclusion. From the point of view of the author, the general characteristic of the human mind, which makes itself evident in the phenomena of society and civilization is the fact of continuity, or lack of spontaneity, according as we observe it with regard on the one hand to content and on the other to form. Everywhere innovations are not mere fiat activities or productions,—they have behind them a long history. Culture proceeds from culture,—these investigations of human peoples and races now existing, or having previously existed abundantly demonstrate. New phenomena of culture do not arise with absolute spontaneity; the rôle of the intellect and the will in their production is comparatively small, and the latter "must be set in motion by strong drastic and severe motives." The historic structure of human consciousness is continuity, which, on its negative side, reveals itself as lack of initiative or spontaneity. According to Dr. Vierkandt (p. 2): "The pressure of tradition, of imitation, of custom dominates both in the practical and in the theoretical realm of human consciousness to a much larger extent than popular opinion is aware of. The capacity to initiate both in thought and in action is much smaller and indolence here much greater than is generally assumed." In the first part the author illustrates the force and validity of the law of continuity from all aspects of human culture,—the origins of agriculture and the domestication of animals; the discovery of the use of fire, of the art of printing, etc; the origin and development of language, the development of cult out of magic, the long pre-history of certain myths, the pre-history of modern animism; development of drama out of mime, influence of technique on ornamentation, origin of communicative drawing; mythology and dialectics as forerunners of science; the contrast of the high level attained by some parts of our culture and the low level still characterizing other parts. In the consideration of the historical structure of human consciousness, two types are recognized, a lower type, that of persistence, and a higher, that of adaptation. Changes of quality in evolution depend on summations. The birth of a new creation generally follows a longer developmental history, by means of which it first becomes complete and ripe for the contemporary age. The three requisites for culture-change are maturity (*Reife*), need (*Bedürfnis*) and initiative of individuals (or acculturation),—there are, of course, accidental outward impulses, etc. For real success all three factors are necessary, the lack of any one seems fatal or inhibitive. In the case of "leading individuals" ideal motives may be effective; the group, however, needs other interests. Economic interest is often suppressed by religious or social motives etc. There are four last causes which may stand behind the determining requisites as motive forces: (1) contact with other peoples; (2) change of external relations, change of place or of natural endowment, geographical changes,

the discovery of new natural resources (even though the latter be only a sort of stone capable of furnishing a new ornament); (3) a change in the human material and its relations, increase or decrease of population, change in the number of a special group, etc.; (4) a certain change may have as a consequence further variations. Dr. Vierkandt emphasizes "the immense importance of the trivial" and "the composition of the great out of the small" (p. 201). This is true both in the individual and in the racial life. The great in human things, wherever it may be found, consists in "the accumulation of small component parts." The trivial explanation in the mental sciences is the one to be first sought out,—the near-by, simple, drastic and trivial motives serve best for the explanation of cultural facts. In general, it may be said, "the simpler the explanation, the greater probability that it is the right one." This applies especially to the beginnings of culture, but also, with certain exceptions in the case of the higher civilizations and particular individuals, to other forms of culture (p. 155). The author treats in an interesting way of the difficulties attending successful innovations in customs, language, social institutions, etc. The difficulty of developing and getting accepted a new word is particularly emphasized. On this point interesting data are to be found in R. M. Meyer's *Vierhundert Schlagworte*, which the author refers to (p. 139).

A. F. C.

Weltanschauung, Volkssage und Volksbrauch in ihrem Zusammenhang untersucht von HEINRICH BERTSCH. Dortmund: Druck und Verlag von Fr. Wilh. Ruhfus, 1910. xii, 446 p.

The author of this book is, *magno intervallo*, perhaps, a Teutonic Thales, who sees water everywhere, an aqueous mythology as the primitive outlook on the world. The subjects of the thirteen sections of this work are: Earth and water (the ocean-ring, the subterranean ocean, the water-hell, birth from the waters, the subterranean ocean and springs, creation of the world out of the waters, the end of the world through water, the poisonous breath of the water); earth and the water-dragon (the serpent coiled round the earth, the giant serpent beneath the earth, the primitive dragon and the creation of the world, the flood-dragon and the end of the world, the coiled serpent and the ring as omens, the loosing of the flood-dragon and the final battle, the deadly breath of the dragon); dragon, water-course and spring (water-course and serpent, spring and serpent's jaws, the many-headed serpent); the water-tree of the earth's depths (trunk, branches and roots as symbols of the water-course, tree and forest as realm of the dead, as place of births, as primitive and terminal flood, tree-spirits and wood-spirits as water-beings); water-dragon and water-giant (the many-armed giant, giant-head and spring, the inexhaustible present, the many-headed giant, the primal giant and the creation of the world, primal giant, end of the world and the final conflict); water-beings singing and speaking (water-spirit as singer and musician, as seer and prophet); water-beings in fog and cloud (fog and cloud as smoke, vapor and concealer, as hair and beard, as web, rope and bridge, as fabric and clothing, as body and parts of the body, as realm of souls, as wall and rock, as omen and augury); treasure and treasure-keeper (the treasure

in the waters, the forms under which the treasure and the treasure-keeper appear); the water-spirit in tempest and storm (the winged giant, the fire-spitting giant; the giant with eyes of fire, the one-eyed giant, the skittle-playing giant, the treasure-giving giant, the giant as musician, the storm-giant as death-demon, the storm-giant as wanderer and hunter, the path of the storm-giant as omen); storm-symbols (glowing coal, the fiery coach, the bell, hammer and ax, key and staff; animaliform water-beings in myth, belief and custom (ox, cattle, horse, wild-boar, sow, dog and wolf, the goat, the deer, the cat, the hare, the fox, squirrel, mouse, lion, sheep, birds); earth and sky (the dome of heaven, the celestial ocean, the flood-gates of heaven, the pillars of heaven); the structure of the world (the world-tortoise, the cosmic egg). Practically everything is "a symbol of water" from the primal serpent to the one-eyed giant, and from the oak-tree to the stars in the heavens. The stag, *e. g.*, is a symbol of water (p. 367) on account of his antlers (cf. the many-branched tree), his habitat in the forest, and his great swiftness,—the author elaborates this argument on pages 367-373. By this method, thus employed, almost anything can be demonstrated,—for this water-theory goes even farther than the sun-myth theory and other philosophies of the time when "imaginative insight" is given free rein. Bertsch's mythology gives us a water-heaven and a water-hades, a water-womb for the birth of all the children of men and a watery grave for them after life is spent; a beginning of the cosmos in water and its end in water; a symbolism of the snake and the ring permeating everything; vegetable and animal life in a thousand forms symbolizing water,—Proteus, himself, the multiform, among them; the idea of the treasure and its keeper widespread in the folk-thought of the world. A wider knowledge of the latest literature of the mythology of savage and barbarous peoples would have helped the author much in the way of material. If a phrase may be borrowed from the field of ideas with which he deals, it may be said quite truthfully that the arguments advanced in this attempt at a comparative mythology "will not hold water."

A. F. C.

Natursagen. Eine Sammlung naturdeutender Sagen, Märchen, Fabeln und Legenden. Mit Beiträgen von V. Armhaus, M. Boehm, J. Bolte, K. Dieterich, H. F. Feilberg, O. Hackman, M. Hiecke, W. Hnatjuk, B. Ilg, K. Krohn, A. von Löwis of Menar, G. Polivka, E. Rona-Sklarek, St. Zdziarski und anderen herausgegeben von OSKAR DÄHN-HARDT. Band I. *Sagen zum Alten Testament.* Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1907. xiv, 376 p.

Ibid. Band II. *Sagen zum Neuen Testament.* Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1909. xiv, 316 p.

Ibid. Band III. *Tiersagen. Erster Teil.* Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910. xiv, 558 p.

These three volumes, with exact text-references, extensive bibliographies and good indexes, are typical of the German scholarship of the day. They represent the diligent study and research of the author since the appearance in 1898 of his modest little book, *Naturgeschichtliche Volksmüchen*. Out of subsequent investigations, with the assistance of many folklorists, who furnished authoritative material from the Slavonic countries, Scandin-

avia, Rumania, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, etc.—the author's own acquaintance with German, Dutch, English, French and Italian folklore literature was large, and he had also here the able assistance of his wife—was formulated the idea of a comprehensive series of volumes dealing with various aspects of nature-myths. Of these, three have been published so far treating, respectively, of *Old Testament Tales*, *New Testament Tales*, *Animal Tales*; other volumes are to deal with *Plant Tales*, *Tales of Sky and Earth*, *Tales of Man*. The series is to be concluded with a critical study of the *Nature*, *Growth and Migration of Nature-Tales*. By "nature-tales," is meant such tales as furnish "explanations" for the origins or the peculiarities of natural phenomena or facts of nature. The savage and the barbarian like the child, feel the irrepressible need to explain things, nor is this "instinct" absent from the so-called "higher races." And nature is the greatest stimulus to reflection,—the *why*, the *warum*, the *pourquoi* of the innumerable objects with which the world is filled, and the varied and endless activities that go on on earth and in sea and sky, furnish themes for thousands of tales, legends and myths invented for purposes of explanation; and later on many other tales and similar composition, which, in the beginning, served quite different ends, are metamorphosed into nature-studies. We may thus distinguish two fundamentally distinct groups of nature-tales, viz., those due to the necessity for poetic explanations of nature and invented solely for that purpose; and those turned from a purpose originally different to serve as nature-tales. These nature-tales, many of these at least, are important for the history of the human intellect on account of their great antiquity. The nature-tale (the animal-tale) is older than the fable; but many a fable turns, in the mouth of the folk, to a nature-tale, and so a whole, new series of nature-tales arises, which have nothing at all to do with the older stratum. The study of the nature-tale goes deeper into folk-psychology and the history of religion than does that of the *märchen*.

The first volume deals with *Old Testament Tales*, i. e., tales and legends, which, however far they have departed in some respects from the spirit and the word of the Bible, can hardly be given any other name. These tales have developed under the express influence of Iranian, Indian, Gnostic, Moslem, and Jewish tradition, and also under the influence of such apocryphal writings as the *Book of Adam*, etc. Taken altogether, they stand in such relation to the history and the essence of the Bible as to belong with it as mythological glosses or appendices. The seventeen chapters of the book treat of the following subjects: Creation of the world, creation of man, the creation of Eve, dualistic tales of the devil, etc., the Fall, the punishment of the serpent, the repentance of the exiles, bodily changes after the fall, origin of man's beard, Adam at the plough, Adam's size and stature, Cain and Abel, deluge legends, the sinful angels, the properties of wine, from Abraham to David, tales of Solomon, Jonah and Job. First are recorded the tales and legends of Christian, Jewish and Mohammedan peoples of the European—Asiatic regions, then those of other parts of the globe presumably derived from these, then parallel tales from distant countries and primitive peoples, many of which doubtless have had an

origin absolutely independent of Biblical statements or Oriental or European traditions. Thus, under the head of "creation of the world," Dr. Dähnhardt takes up the data from the Iranians, Babylonians, Hindus, Gnostics, Mandaeans, Manichaeans, Yezidis, peoples of the Caucasus, Gipsies, Finnic peoples, peoples of N. E. Asia, American Indians, etc. In the case of the creation-myth, as elsewhere, the author seems to assign too great a rôle to migration in explaining the resemblances of tales and legends found in widely separated regions of the globe, following here, however, the lead of so eminent a folklorist as Dr. Franz Boas. Some of the tales, however, are to be accounted for by separate invention in various parts of the globe. One very interesting legend tells how man was originally covered with a hard shiny substance, of which all that now remains can be seen in the nails of his fingers and toes. In the "Old Testament Tales," this reduction is a result of the Fall. Dr. Boas reports a tale of this type from the Tsimshian Indians (this Dr. Dähnhardt refers to) and the writer of this review obtained another, much closer to the "Bible type," from a Mohawk Indian in 1888,—the latter may have been borrowed, the former is probably indigenous.

The nineteen chapters of the volume on *New Testament Tales* are concerned with the following subjects: Tales relating to the annunciation of Mary and the visitation (*e. g.*, the half-eaten fish restored to life,—now the flounder or sole); the birth of Christ (the date-tree, the ox and ass in the stall, tales of other animals and plants, etc.); the flight into Egypt (the animals and plants that hindered and betrayed, or did homage, helped and protected, pp. 25-70); the childhood of Jesus (the clay birds, punishments, flower legends); later life of Jesus (driving out devils, stories of Jesus and Peter); story of Jesus' crossing the river; punishments for presumption and insolence, disrespect toward Jesus, etc. (men and women changed into animals, etc.); the creative power of the spittle of Jesus (gave rise to the snail, silk-worm, mushrooms, etc.); punishment of laziness; punishment of inhospitality (men and women changed into woodpeckers, plovers, swallows, cuckoos, tortoises, etc.); the "making young again" and the origin of monkeys (unsuccessful imitations of the miraculous power of Jesus, etc.); Peter as a musician; Peter as fisherman; creative pranks, Peter and the goat; tales of Peter, Paul and John; passion and death of Jesus (events during the entry into Jerusalem, the agony in the garden, the trial, the passage to Golgotha, the scourging and crowning; legends of the wood of the cross; the nails of the cross, actions of certain animals, birds, insects; the birds at the cross, legends of the cross-beak, robin redbreast, swallow, plover, stork, sparrow, crow, lark, dove; insects, frog, fishes; the marks on animals, birds, plants, flowers, etc., due to the passion and bleeding of Jesus; the sympathy of trees and plants with Jesus,—the unfeeling character of some; the burial and ascension of Jesus); stories of Judas Iscariot (trees on which he hung himself); legends of Mary (pp. 242-264); tales of Joseph, etc. The two chief groups of myths considered in this second volume have originated partly in the Orient (in apostolic and post-apostolic times) and partly in Europe (heathen antiquity and period of conversion to Christianity. Influences of

Teutonic, Celtic and Slavonic heathenism and folk-religion are seen, besides Jewish and Moslem. The Apocryphal history of the childhood of Jesus and some of the other apocryphal literature of early Christianity have contributed not a little. Analogical neo-formations of old legends and myths also occur. Besides Jesus, Mary and Peter are the principal figures of this nature-lore, and, in certain respects, Peter is the most interesting to the folk-mind.

The third volume is devoted to *Animal Tales*,—a collection rather than an interpretation. In the introduction (pp. viii-xi) Dr. Dähnhardt cites from Cushing's *Zuñi Folk-Tales* the version of the Italian folk-tale of "The Cock and the Mouse," as Cushing told it to the Zuñis and as they retold it to him,—this as an example of the metamorphosis of tale and legend which has been going on in the world from time immemorial. The subjects of the eighteen chapters (the legends are drawn from civilized and uncivilized peoples in all regions of the globe) are: Form and bodily peculiarities of animals (reduction and diminution, compression, extension; origin and appearance of hide, spines, shell, scales, baldness; origin of parts of animals from implements, etc.; peculiarities of individual parts of the body); marking and coloring of the bodies of animals (effects of pressure, origin of stripes, change from white to black, paling, colored eyes; painting, soiling, burning by sun, etc.); the winning of fire and of the sun and its results upon the animals, etc.; the exchange of property (*e. g.*, voices, horns, etc.) among animals; wagers between animals and their results; the origin of vermin (from the burned up bodies of monsters, snakes, or from their bodies after bursting to pieces; from transformed spirits, etc.); the distribution of gifts and names to the animals (dissatisfaction, etc.); the dwelling-places of animals (the learning of nest-building, etc.); the habitat of animals (tales of animals that live in the forest, in the water; of animals that live alone; of animals that live with man, etc.); customs and peculiarities of animal life (manner of movement, lack of capacity; smell; action in danger, etc.; peculiar likes and dislikes; wildness and tameness; theft; attitudes, etc., in different seasons); animals that shun light; "seeking" animals; food of animals; disobedience of animals when told by God to dig for water, to build roads, etc.; enmity and friendship among the animals; metamorphoses of men and women into animals (cuckoo, nightingale, lark, dove, swallow), often with reference to the voice; soul-birds (pp. 476-486). Animal-tales, more, in some respects than other stories and legends, testify abundantly to the unity of human nature and to the sameness of the psychic endowment of the race. This is equally evident, whether one considers the tales, resembling each other, which are due to independent invention and reinvention all over the globe, or those others, with more complicated or more numerous *motifs*, which must have spread to the places in which they are now found through migration or transmission in various forms. The fourth volume, as noted above, will treat in detail the question of the migration of animal-tales. On page xii of vol. 3, Dr. Dähnhardt cites von den Steinen and Jones as to the belief of primitive peoples (*e. g.*, American Indians) in their stories. Not a few competent authorities attribute to them "the same confident belief

that the convinced Christian has in the miracles of the Bible.''' Taken altogether, Dr. Dähnhardt's *Natursagen* is a collection of mythological and folk-lore material most valuable to all investigators and exceeding in scope and accuracy anything else yet published on the same topic. The fourth and critical and expository volume will, doubtless, be of equal merit. This book ought to be in every library of importance, both public and private, theological and secular.

A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

50. *Antiquity of Wine, etc.* In his article "Zur Urgeschichte der Rebe und des Weinbaues," in the *Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien* (vol. 31, 1911, pp. 283-296), Albert Stummer discusses the grape-vine and its cultivation, etc., in prehistoric times, with special reference to Western Europe. The conclusions reached are: In Southern Europe only can vine-growing be ascribed to really prehistoric times. The Grecian cultivation of the vine begins at the farthest during the bronze age, about the middle of the second millennium (B. C.), that of the Italian peninsula during the iron age, at the beginning of the first millennium (B. C.). The Central European finds of the grape-vine, those of the neolithic period and of the whole bronze age of Italy and Bosnia, as well as those of the earliest bronze age of Greece belong in all probability with the wild-grape, *Vitis silvestris*. The general opinion seems to be that viniculture reached Gaul from Greece, having begun at Massilia,—the colonists either brought with them Greek vines or cultivated the already existing wild vines. There is, however, some evidence that viniculture flourished in Gaul before the advent of Greek settlers. Roman viniculture arose independently of Greek, as is indicated both by historical data and by an examination of the words in both languages relating the vine, wine, etc. At the time of the Roman Empire viniculture and wine-keeping had already reached a rather high stage, furnishing the basis of the modern European viniculture, etc. In the Roman provinces the development of viniculture was hindered by the *Lex Domitiana* (not finally repealed till the third century), which forbade the making of new vineyards and ordered the destruction of half of those already existing in the provinces. The great promoters of viniculture in the provinces were the veterans. From the close of the third century onwards, Christianity began to take up its rôle of a protector of viniculture, which it has kept ever since in a great part of Europe, where monks and wine have often equally contributed to make cities and country-districts world-famous. Very interesting are the pictures preserved on ancient Egyptian monuments, etc., relating to viniculture, in its various aspects,—here viniculture appears at least as early as 3500 B. C., as already firmly established and pointing to a long earlier period of growth and development. Phenician, Assyrian and Semitic viniculture (of which our Bible has a good deal to say) seem younger than the Egyptian. The antiquity of viniculture in Egypt does not seem to harmonize well with the theory of Schrader and Hehn that it originated in Asia Minor. The abundance of the wild vine in the Caucasus and in the region of the Caspian also suggests a possible center of distri-

bution. Much interesting information concerning viniculture will be found in Bassermann-Jordan's *Geschichte des Weinbaues*. 3 Bde. (Frankfurt, a. M., 1907).

51. "*Demopsychology*." Professor Giuseppe Pitré, the famous Italian folklorist, delivered, in January, 1911, his inaugural address, as first occupant of the chair of "*Demopsicologia*" (i. e., Folk-lore) in the Royal University of Palermo. It has been reprinted (Palermo, 1911. 23 p.) from the *Atti d. r. Accad. di Scienze* (ser. 3, vol. 9) under the title *Per la inaugurazione del corso di demopsicologia nella r. Università di Palermo, prelezione*. "*Demopsychology*" has to do with all peoples civilized, uncivilized, and "savage," and one of its chief tasks is to emphasize the value for the history of the human mind and its various expressions of plays and games (and related phenomena), proverbs, etc., folk-tales, legends, songs, customs and usages, superstitious ideas and practices.

52. *Dew in folk-lore*. Dew plays a considerable rôle in the folk-lore of religion. In the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 22, 1912, pp. 89-95) Otto Knoop discusses "Der Tau im Glauben und in der Sage der Provinz Posen," both German and Polish data being recorded. In many places dew is looked upon as tears of the angels and of the souls in purgatory shed on account of the sins of human beings upon earth; and dew is collected to be used to cure certain diseases, especially those of the eyes, etc., freckles, baldness, cramps, open wounds and cuts, rheumatism, skin-diseases, burns, etc. The virtues of dew as a beauty-wash are also well-known. One legend tells how by licking the dew off the plants on a certain morning when all the birds drink it, one can learn their language. Another folk-belief is that "naked, or with only their shirts on, the witches, at the time of the new moon, collect the dew from the grass with bark sieves; by this means they deprive of their milk the cows that have been pastured on the grass,—and, as soon as their sieves are full of dew, they know that their pots at home are full of milk. The Polish people of Wongrowitz call the dew on which the birds are supposed to feed *ptasie mleko*, i. e., "birds' milk."

53. *Immortality*. In his article on "Die Entstehung der Unsterblichkeitsvorstellung," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 1-24), Anton Tschöcke seeks to give a psychogenetic theory of the origin of the idea of immortality. The very primitive treatment of the dead by the aboriginal Veddas of Ceylon (at first the dead seem to have been left unburied altogether),—bodies are sometimes covered with leaves and branches, a stone laid on the breast, the place of burial fenced about, etc., and the spot, whether death has occurred even though it is an inhabited cave, always abandoned,—represents about the earliest stage known. The next stage may be observed in the death-ceremonies of the South African Bushmen; after this the stage of the Makua and Makonde of German Africa. From

flight from the dead to ancestor-cult has been the course of the human mind in various regions of the globe. It is not from fear of the man's body or soul that the Vedda flees, according to Tschöcke, but from the "dead" man, still living and now stretched stiff and motionless on the ground. Out of this situation the idea of immortality has grown. The author considers the time elapsing before the abandonment or burial of the body to be a factor of importance in the development of the concept. The Veddas flee the corpse immediately after death; with the Bushman 12, and with the Makua-Makonde 24 hours elapse before burial. Both Veddas and Bushmen flee the corpse,—with the latter, after the burial the whole family hasten away at once; and no one will sleep on the spot, nor will even strange Bushmen, who recognize it as a burial-place, sleep nearby. This flight *after some time has elapsed since the death* distinguishes the Bushmen from the Veddas. After this the reaction from the death-situation becomes more and more complex,—the flight is delayed longer (*e. g.*, with the Makua and Makonde) treatment of the corpse occurs,—it is covered, buried, etc.,—the death is announced by cries, shots, or the like, mourning-ceremonies take place, often corresponding to the power, influence, etc., of the deceased, protective and "magic" rites are celebrated, etc. Here also the beginnings of the ancestor-cult are to be found,—food and drink are deposited on the grave, and before wars and other great undertakings the aid of the dead is sought through sacrifices. There is a gradual lightening of the motives from the dark basal tone of painful fear to the lesser nuances of feeling. But more searching and satisfactory investigations of the death and funeral ceremonies of savage and barbarous peoples are necessary before any gradational scheme of the development of the idea of immortality can be made out, if, indeed, such views can ever be substantiated.

54. *Kant and Judaism.* In his article on "Kant und das Judentum," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 295-299) Dr. Beermann answers the condemnation passed upon the Jewish religion by Kant in his *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*. The great German philosopher there declared his opinion that "Judaism is no religion, but a code of laws;" that it is indifferent to the moral sentiment, barren of the love of man, unreceptive of the idea of immortality, conceives of God as a despot, not as a moral power; and that Christianity has nothing in common with Judaism. Kant's Anti-Semitism is, perhaps, merely an example of the onesidedness of men of genius. Dr. Beermann does not think it can be explained (*as, e. g.*, in the case of Voltaire) from his unfavorable experiences with individual Hebrews, for Kant's personal acquaintances with men of this race (Mendelsshon, Dr. Herz, S. Maimon, etc.) were pleasant enough.
55. *Life-values and culture-values.* In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 131-166), H. Rickert discusses "Lebenswerte und Kulturwerte." Biologism and Nietzsche, the biological "mode-philosophy," biolo-

gism and biology as a natural science, culture and life (pp. 151-166), are treated with some detail. According to the author, the misuse of biological ideas for "philosophic" ends has had an unfavorable reaction upon biology itself. Similar vagaries occurred once in physics, when it was sought to found ethical norms upon Newton's law of gravitation. To-day like mistakes are being made in the attempts to use the biological ideas of "natural selection" and "the struggle for existence in the determination of the moral life. Culture-values are sought to be founded on life-values; but vitality is a means, not an end, or the end.

56. *Maize and maguey in ancient Mexican mythology and religion.* In his article, "Le maïs et le maguey chez les anciennes populations du Mexique," in the *Journal de la Société des Américanistes de Paris* (N. S. vol. 7, 1910 [1911], pp. 5-35), L. Diguët has a section (pp. 31-34) on the tutelary deities of these important food-plants. The principal maize and maguey deities among the Aztecs were the following:

(1) *Centeotl* (from *centli*, "maize," and *teotl*, "deity"), the goddess of maize, had a rôle somewhat corresponding to that of the classical Ceres; she presided over harvests, and, in general, over all vegetable production. The agricultural Totonacs venerated her as their chief deity, and as she hated human sacrifices, offered up to her doves, partridges, rabbits, etc.,—such creatures as lived in the cultivated fields. The Aztecs, however, offered human sacrifices to her. *Centeotl* had many other names, e. g., *Chicomecoatl* (Seven serpents), goddess of plant-germination, worshiped in time of drought and famine; *Chalchiuchihuatl* (Jade woman), goddess of abundant harvests and personification of good and evil,—also the deity of the stone-cutters. According to the condition of the maize-fields and of the harvests in general, she was invoked by the following names:

Xilonen, deity of the young, tender ear of maize.

Tlatlahuicenteotl, the goddess of the red maize.

Itlacentoteotl, goddess of the white maize.

Tonacayohua, she who nourishes us.

Centeotl seems also to have been regarded as the goddess of *maguey*, but pulque had its special deity in *Tezcatzoncatl* (from *tezcatl*, "obsidian mirror," and *tzoma*, "to cover with straw").

(2) *Tezcatzoncatl*, the deity of *pulque*, the intoxicating liquor made from the *maguey*, had as brothers some dozen or other demi-gods or deities of inferior rank. He was the god who caused men to lose their reason and to commit all sorts of strange and extravagant deeds, committing suicide, etc.; and hence he was called also *Tlatlahuani* ("The drowner"), *Tequechmecaniani* ("The hanger"), etc. There were said to be 400 priests consecrated to his cult in Mexico, where his temple was known as *Centzontotochtinintepan*, or "the temple of 400 rabbits." *Tochtli* ("rabbit") was the name applied to drunken people, and the priests of the cult of *Tezcatzoncatl*, were termed *ome-tochtli*, or "two rabbits." Among the Aztecs (according

to Sahagun) drunkenness was regarded rather as a manifestation of the god of *pulque*. When anyone was intoxicated and committed extravagant deeds, he was said "to have *his rabbit*;" and if he committed suicide by throwing himself from a high rock, he was said "to have been *rabbited*." The festival of the god *Tezcatzoncatl* was held to commemorate the invention of intoxicating liquor. Several legends attribute the invention of *pulque* to a woman. According to one myth the invention of *pulque* took place on Mt. *Chichinauia*, which, by reason of the form produced by *pulque* when fermented, was named *Popoconaltepetl*, "the foamy mountain" (from *popocon-atotl*, "foam," and *tepetl*, "mountain"). Another legend makes the settlement of the Huastecs on the Rio Panuco due to the drunkenness of a chief, which obliged them to abandon the plateau of Anahuac. The young woman, who made known the use of *pulque* to the Toltecs was called *Xochitl*.

57. *Mohammedan alms-tithe*. In the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 1-3), J. A. Decourdemanche discusses briefly "La dîme aumônière musulmane." This "tithe" is a curious sort of tax from more than one point of view. In the first place, while an inescapable religious obligation, on a par with prayer, fasting and ablutions it is to be spent by the faithful Mohammedan himself, under the control of his own conscience alone. This "tithe" (called *zekiah*) amounts to one-fortieth, or 2 1-2 per cent., levied upon two portions only of the assets of the individual, viz., silver or gold money, net product of labor; fruits of lands possessed,—with the exemption of a minimum known as *nesab* (varying according to the nature of the revenue), which is large in the case of food, relatively small in the case of gold, still smaller in the case of silver, while it is complete in the case of capital invested, *e. g.*, personal effects, salable merchandise, etc. Says the author: "The *zekiah*, thus established, evidently stimulates the utilization of capital as well as the establishment of a gold reserve in the country (the amount of gold exempted being double that of silver). We have here the germ of a whole system of political economy, based on religious prescriptions of a very simple nature." The calculation of the *nesab* and of the *wask* (the grain and fruit measure upon which it is based) in the case of crops, etc., varies with the different orthodox Mohammedan sects. The legal valuation of silver as to gold is fourteen to one.
58. *Nature-concept of peasant*. In a brief article, "Hat der Bauer eine eigene Naturauffassung?" in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (vol. 10, 1911, pp. 125-127) Dr. A. Vierkandt, author of several sociological-ethnological works (*Die Stetigkeit in Kulturwandel*, 1908; *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker*, 1896) raises the question whether the peasant really has a nature-concept of his own. It is surprising he thinks that, while primitive peoples, even some in the lowest stages of culture (the forest Veddas or the Pigmies of Central Africa may be exceptions), have what might be termed a distinct "nature-sense,"

the peasant appears as almost completely devoid of it. This is seen, *e. g.*, if one compares the peasant's talk about, explanations of, etc., natural phenomena, earthquakes, the moon, comets, and the like, with, say, some savage and barbarous peoples' explanations of the movement of the heavenly bodies, the difference between the moon and the sun, etc. If the savage seems absurd, he is at least imaginative and not stupid like the peasant. Much of the peasant's information badly digested quite often comes from the Bible, the school, popular lectures, newspaper items, etc., mixed in with which are some of his own ideas. Too chief reasons for this lack of a real nature-sense in the peasant are, according to Dr. Vierkandt, first his purely practical orientation, causing him to have little or no interest in theoretic questions; and, secondly, the influence of ecclesiastical teaching, which gives the peasant the Biblical ideas of nature and the things of nature. But neither of these explanations is quite satisfactory, nor are both together sufficient to explain the condition of mind alleged to exist. Dr. Vierkandt will be glad to have those who have any opinion on the subject or any information to offer, address him at Grosslichterfelde, Wilhelmstrasse 22.

59. *Psychology of animal-names.* Miss A. Werner's article on "The Names of Animals in the Bantu Languages," in the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 19-25, 92-99) contains a number of points interesting to the historian of human thought. The presence of names of animals in the "person-class" is one of the noteworthy features of Bantu speech. According to Miss Werner (p. 25), "it seems clear, therefore, on the whole, that names of animals have only been placed in the person-class at a late stage of development, and as a result of personification, probably, in the first instance, through the influence of the animal-story which is so marked a feature in Bantu folk-lore." In the case of certain names "we are dealing with names of animals transferred from their original class to the person-class, as a result of personification,"—such personification being due to the presence and activities of these animals in myths, etc. In *Uncle Remus* we are familiar with "Br'er Fox," "Br'er Rabbit," etc.; in the Bantu languages of South Africa we meet with "Mother Rabbit," "Mother Crane," "Mother Spider," "Mother Chameleon," "Father Centipede," "Father Crane," "Father Antelope," "Father Hawk," etc. Animal-name also often take the "plural of respect" like proper names. Some names of animals are very widely distributed,—"out of seventy Bantu languages we find that fifty have virtually the same name for *elephant*;" the names for *lion*, however, differ widely. The custom of *hlonipa* may have something to do with these differences. The Wanika, when digging for the *badger* do not call it *loma* but *godzo*, "from the superstitious dread that, if they called it by its real name, it would go further from them in its hole, and, if caught, would not prove as fat as it ought to be" (p. 94). In the Kigiryama dialect of Nika the word for *lion* is not the term common to other dialects of that language, *i. e.*, *dzimba*, but *muniambo*. The Ganda

term for *lion* is *empologoma* ("the roarer"), evidently not the original name. In Zulu, etc., the avoidance of the lion's primitive name might have originated, Miss Werner thinks, either in a superstitious fear of the animal itself (as seems to be the case with the names of the leopard and the wild-cat), or through *hlonipa*ing the name of a chief. In Herero the loin has a "surname" or "nickname." *Elibonzu*, the name of the lion in Kinga, "has every appearance of being a *hlonipa* word recently coined." The name for *elephant* in a number of Bantu languages is some form of *tembo*, a word, originally signifying "tusk" and then applied to the whole elephant. No instances of *hlonipa* of elephant-names seems to be on record. In Bantu folklore the lion is not always "the king of beasts,"—the elephant, the hare, the tortoise often exceed and outwit him;—in a Chinamwanga story the shrewmouse bluffs him. The lion is often the "silly" animal tricked by the hare.

60. *Religious psychology.* In an article on "Aufgabe und Methode der Religionspsychologie," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 97-104), Herman Bauke discusses the problem and method of religious psychology with special reference to the address of D. Wobbermin at the International Religious Congress held in Berlin in 1910. Professor Wobbermin expressed the opinion that "in no other study is the international character of modern theology so clearly marked as in the psychology of religion,—the influences of America on Germany are indeed so great that it is customary to speak of an "American religious psychology." The statistical method of Starbuck and others, as well as the James' method of noted cases are both criticized. The danger of the former is the purely biological-physiological judgment, that of the latter emphasis of the form pathological religiosity. The preference for the study of abnormal and pathological religious phenomena by American psychologists is explainable from the fact that the psychological investigation of these are less difficult. This is the opinion of Professor Wobbermin, and Bauke thinks that he has here placed his finger upon the weak spot in "American" religious psychology. In the same Journal (pp. 245-263) Dr. Roland Schütz discusses the "Grundsätze und Aufgaben der Religionspsychologie." The psychology of religion, laying claim to the position of a scientific *Fach* in theology, has the task of methodically influencing the theological sciences; it is not a special division of apologetics.
61. *Sexualia in Gnostic theory and practice.* In his article on "Das Geschlechtliche in gnostischer Lehre und Uebung," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (vol. 5, 1911, pp. 69-87) Wolfgang Schultz treats of the sexual in the theory and practice of the Gnostics, a topic considered in detail in the same author's book, *Dokumente der Gnosis* (Jena, 1910). In the system of the Gnostics, in whose ideas had coalesced many concepts and customs of Assyrio-Babylonian, Egyptian, Hellenic, Iranian, Jewish, and perhaps even Hindu peoples and cultures, are mingled

and united the didactic, the cult-side, the mythic and the sacramental. The hermaphrodite, the male-and-female, the spermatogenic theory of world-origins, the pneuma-woman, the primal virgin-prostitute-mother, the womb-phallus-embryo symbolism, the mouth-phallus union, the sacrament of male semen and female menstrual blood, the philosophic exhaustion of the symbolism of *coitus*, pregnancy, birth, etc., the actual carrying out by men and women of all the figurative and imaginative relations of the sexes, a communism of fleshly participation as well as of imaginative insight,—all this and much more is to be found in this sorry chapter of human history represented by the Gnostics of divers sorts, the Ophites, the Perates, the Valentinians, the Sethites, the Carpocratians, the Marcusites, the Simonites, and others earlier and later. The love of Pneuma and Sophia, of Eva and the Serpent, and the peculiar doctrines and ideas to be found in such works as *The Gospel of Eve*, *The Book of Noria* (wife of Noah), etc., belong with a remarkable sexomania, for which no complete parallel can be found among savages and barbarians, for the effluvia of civilized philosophies are always more “degenerate” than the doings and sayings of cultureless men and women. There is no evolutionary authority for reading back into primitive life much of the muck-philosophy of some of the Gnostic sects.

62. *Skulls of saints as drinking-vessels, etc.* In his article on “Menschenschädel als Trinkgefäße,” in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 22, 1912, pp. 1-33, 6 figs.), besides discussing the use of human skulls as drinking-vessels, etc., in prehistoric Europe, by the peoples of classical antiquity, and among savage and barbarous tribes in all parts of the globe (especially among tribes practicing, more or less, anthropology), Dr. Richard Andree treats of their cult-use. The employment of saints’ skulls as drinking-essels in early Christian and Medieval Europe, etc. The town of Ebersberg in Bavaria boasts of having possessed for almost a thousand years the skull of St. Sebastian, and for centuries (including the present day) thousands of pilgrims have sought health and blessing for mental and physical troubles in a drink out of this famous relic. In the seventeenth century water overflowing from the same vessel was thought to stay a plague among the cattle of the country. The great virtues of drinking out of this skull are dwelt upon in the Jesuit A. Widl’s *Divus Sebastianus Eberspergae*. (Monachii, 1688). The skull is ornamented and protected with silver, etc. Other skulls of saints now or formerly in use for this or similar purposes are: skull of St. Nantwein (13th cent.), used at Wolfratshausen, Upper Bavaria up to the beginning of the 19th century; skull of St. Quinunus at a nunnery at Neuss on the Lower Rhine in the middle of the 15th century; skull of St. Theodulphus at Trèves in 1668; skull of St. Marinus at the Benedictine cloister of Rott am Inn; skull of St. Alto at the cloister of Altomünster, Bavaria (up to 1869, at least, wine was given to drink out of it on the Saint’s day, Feb. 9); skull of St. Ernhart at Niedermünster in Regensburg, in the 15th century; skull of St. Gumpertus at Ansbach,

out of which the heathen Wends are said to have drunk. For many others, cited by Prof. J. N. Sepp, according to Dr. Andree, there is some little, but not convincing evidence. The Lama cult of Tibet is also well acquainted with the use of the human skull as a drinking-vessel (the legend concerning the origin of its employment is given on p. 25). Among the Aghori, one of the lowest of a fakir-sects of India, who are Siva-worshippers, the use of human skulls for drinking-vessels prevails. At their weddings such a vessel is handed over to the son-in-law by the father-in-law. On the island of Ceram the priests of certain tribes drink sago-wine out of skulls at the great sacrificial ceremonies. Skulls as drinking-vessels are also known from China, but the so-called "skull of Confucius" in the Museum of the University of Oxford is not his,—it probably came from the Lama temple at Peking. A skull drinking-vessel from the celebrated monastery of Kumbum is now in the U. S. National Museum at Washington. The use of the human skull as a drinking vessel in heathen cults and in Christian religions has been more extensive than is commonly believed or even suspected. Interesting also is the etymological connection of words for *skull* and *pot*, *vessel*, etc., in many European languages. This, and the discovery of portions of the skull (*e. g.*, in the Magdalenian Cave of Placard) used as such by prehistoric man, lead the author to observe (p. 18) that "the skull of his fellowhuman is the oldest drinking-vessel of man."

63. *Sudanese plant and animal folk-lore.* The article of Rudolf Priesze on "Pflanze und Tier im Volksmunde des mittleren Sudan," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 865-914) contains a collection of *kirari* or names, phrases, epigrams, etc., from the Haussa and Bornu languages of the Central Sudan, applied to plants and animals,—the author has already published *Haussasprichwörter und Haussalieder* (Leipzig, 1907), besides an article on *Tiermärchen der Haussa* in the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* for 1907. On pages 904-914 are given the native texts, interlinear translations and free renderings of several tales and songs, particularly of a Bornu song of the stork, who is styled "the saint of the birds" as the banyan is "the saint of the trees." He is the "rain-bringer,"—the down-pour comes fifteen days after his arrival. The great ape is believed to surprise and kill men; women he seizes, ties with vines or bast and drags them off to his hiding-place, where he outrages from time to time, but never kills them. Monkeys, in general are thought to have been men, metamorphosed for having disobeyed the commands of God and caught fish on holidays. The female donkey in Bornu serves as the symbol of mother-love, the proverb running, "there is no creature in all the world that so loves its child as the she-ass or the slave-woman." The jackal appears as "teacher of the wild animals," "teacher of the wilderness." The cat has "the evil eye." Of the hen it is said "God alone can satisfy her hunger." A characteristic proverb concerning the glow-worm is, "with the fire of the glow-worm no beans are cooked," *i. e.*, "with lying one does not get very far." Another

interesting saying is this: "Tobacco is better than a mother." The fruit of the tamarind is sometimes called "the cow of the poor," because poor people drink (as milk) the water in which it has been softened.

64. *Terms for "holy."* In a brief article on "Heilig" in the *Mitteilungen d. Schleischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 479-483), Dr. Wilhelm Kroll discusses the concept "holy." The author emphasizes the view that in the Old Testament, e.g., the idea of *sanctity* had originally nothing to do with morality, but grew up out of the cultus, and denotes things, which men might not touch immediately but only after having performed certain precautionary acts, rites, etc. In spite of all sacerdotal efforts to spiritualize religion, these *tabu-ideas* come to the surface again and again, from the depths of the folk-soul, as in the rites and ceremonies of baptism, and other practices of the various branches of the Christian church. The sight of deities (and among many savage and barbarous peoples of spirits, etc.) and contact with them is dangerous,—often too contact with anything that deity has handled or touched. The mysteries of the ancient Greeks and the religions of these and other civilized peoples of antiquity illustrate these points abundantly; as Dr. K. points out. The terms for "holy" reflect the development of the idea in question. Thus, *sanctus*, which finally even assumed the signification of "morally pure," originally designated "the fixed place set apart for a deity;" and *āgios* meant first "tabooed." A special study of *sanctus* has been made by W. Link, in his *De vocis sanctus usu pagano* (Königsberg, 1910). It is a long evolution from the tabu of physical uncleanness to the prescription of moral purity.
66. *Tolstoi and culture.* In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 179-191, W. Iwanow treats of "L. Tolstoj und die Kultur." According to the author "Tolstoi is not a direct expression of our folk-soul; he is rather the offspring of our cosmopolitan education, the product of our social summit, not of our folk-depths." In some respects he is to be compared with Socrates (pp. 186-189), but never was, like him, a theurgist. From the religious-moral standpoint Iwanow recognizes three types of conscious relation to culture: the relative, the ascetic, and the symbolic. Of these the first abandons a religious basis for culture, comprehending it as a system of relative values; the second emphasizes the moral and the religious basis of cultural creation and conceals in itself a renunciation of all culture-value of the secondary, conditional and irrational order,—it leads, of necessity, to the attempt to subordinate to moral utilitarianism, all instinct, all play and all caprices of production, and rests upon a deep mistrust of Nature, even though it is fain to point to the advantages of a life in harmony with Nature, etc.; the third type is the only right and sound view, the standpoint of symbolism is "the heroic and tragic way to freedom of the world-soul," and the principle of creation is theurgic, with a symbolic transformation and transfigura-

tion of all culture. It is to the second of these types that Tolstoi belongs,—he is neither a symbolist, nor a relativist. In the words of the author "Leo Tolstoi is the *Memento mori* to modern culture."—Another discussion of the Russian "prophet" is to be found in Dr. A. von Wenckstein's article on "Tolstoj und Marx, ihre Stellung zu Leben und Volk" in the *Mitteilungen der Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 313-336). According to Dr. W., both Tolstoi and Marx have put their finger upon wounds of our life, but it is an open question whether they have done more healing than hurt,—"Tolstoi is a foe to the earthly existence of man, an enemy to life in this sense, for his final idea is chastity of the present or some near generations of the future to such an extent that ultimately the human race will cease to exist."

67. *Wandering Jew*. In the *Zentralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen* (vol. 28, 1911, pp. 495-509) L. Neubaur has a contribution "Zur Bibliographie der Sage vom Ewigen Juden." His previous contributions to the study of the legend of the Wandering Jew are *Sage vom Ewigen Juden* (1884), *Neue Mitteilungen über die Sage vom Ewigen Juden* (1893), etc. In the *Zeitschrift des Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. XXII, 1912, pp. 33-54), Neubaur has also an article "Zur Geschichte der Sage vom Ewigen Juden," treating of the legend in the early Christian centuries and the Middle Ages; also in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, England, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, etc. The name of the Jew in question appears as Cartaphilus, then Buttadeus or Malchus, and (in German stories particularly) Ahasverus.
68. *War*. The issue of *International Conciliation* (No. 52, pp. 14) for March, 1912,—the monthly publication of the American Association for International Conciliation (N. Y.), consists of "An Anthropologist's View of War," by Dr. Franz Boas, Professor of Anthropology in Columbia University. The author briefly discusses the development of larger units from the numerous smaller hordes at first existing, by the increasing solidarity of certain groups and "the extermination of small, isolated hordes that remained in more primitive conditions." With increasing economic complexity hostility between groups became less. The general result has been that "the group that lives normally at peace has much increased in size, and while the feeling of solidarity may have decreased, its scope has become immensely wider. At the present time, where law rules supreme among many nations," we find the greatest numbers of peoples united in political units that the world has seen." The history of mankind thus shows us "the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size that live together in peace, and that are ready to go to war only with other groups outside of their limits," and moreover, "the practical difficulties that seem to stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for naught before the inexorable laws of history." Dr. Boas expresses the opinion that "it is not any rational cause that forms opposing groups, but solely the emotional value of

an idea that holds together the members of each group and exalts their feeling of solidarity and greatness to such an extent that compromises with other groups become impossible." "Anglo-Saxonism," "Teutonism," "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Slavism," etc., are not based on any real racial or other relationship, but are merely an "expression of a strong emotion that is connected with a vague idea of supposed relationship." No modern European race can boast a homogeneous descent. There is no true feeling of kinship accompanying, *e. g.*, the interrelationship (alleged) of all blonds or of all brunettes. Even the unity of language is more an ideal than a real bond. Those forces are already strongly at work that "will ultimately abolish warfare as well as legislative conflicts between nations; that will put an end not only to the wholesale slaughter of those representing a distinct ideal, but also prevent the passage of laws that favor the members of one nation at the expense of all other members of mankind." An authoritative account of the war customs of an American aboriginal tribe will be found in Mr. Alanson Skinner's article on "War Customs of the Menomini Indians," in the *American Anthropologist* (vol. 13, N. S., 1911, pp. 299-313), wherein are given so interesting details concerning the native ideas and practices. The "war-bundle" is represented as having been received from the Thunderers. It is said that in the early period of man's existence upon earth "the Powers Above" pitied the children of men on account of their sufferings, and called a council to remedy the sad state of affairs. All the animals promised to help man. And after the council was over:

"When the animals had completed their donations, the Sun and the Morning Star gathered the presents into a bundle, sent for the Thunder-Birds, and gave it to them to transmit to the children of men. As soon as they received the package, the Thunder-Birds called an Indian up to their home in the western sky, and gave it to him, with the promise that, if he followed their directions, he would always be successful in battle. The Thunder-Birds further desired that he should present the bundle with tobacco, and pray to it from time to time. They promised him that whenever he did this they would hear his prayers" (p. 300). Besides this:

"They gave him a rare blue powder with which he was instructed to paint the faces of the injured warriors. He was assured that, if he did this, the blood would run from their wounds and they would recover. Then the Thunderers taught him the sacred songs that go with the medicines to make them efficacious, and permitted him to depart. Since that time worthy men have received the proprietary right to the war-bundle from the Thunderers."

At pages 300-303 the author gives the full story of a bundle which was formerly the property of a man named Watakona. Some of the sacred songs, etc., are recorded on pages 305-307; and a description of the scalp-dance is also given (pp. 310). The annual ceremony is still kept up among the Menomini in the form of a feast, but there is now no attendant scalp-dance. Mr. Skinner likewise gives some notes on the Menomini tactics in warfare, etc. One of the songs in use

"stupefied the enemy and caused them to sleep more soundly." This was in consonance with the idea that "just before daybreak, when sleep is soundest, and man's vitality is said to be at its lowest ebb, was the favorite time for assault." The Menomini are said never to have been in the habit of torturing captives, prisoners being always kindly treated and usually adopted. These Indians "considered capture in war the height of misfortune, and to inflict torments on one so unlucky as to be taken prisoner was thought to be offensive to the 'Overhead Beings'." Among the Menomini then were, roughly speaking "five callings, prophecy, medicine, jugglery, sorcery, and war,"—hunting, fishing and agriculture were too universal occupations, and, "although such gifted persons as prophets, doctors, jugglers and sorcerers were often able to eke out their existence through the fees which they extorted from their patients or clients, men of fame or ability great enough to gain them a living in this way alone were rare." War was thus "the one profession open to everyone," for "all others required not only skill and training, but a certain acquaintance with the supernatural which was not vouchsafed to ordinary mortals" (these miraculous gifts also played their part in warfare, but to a more limited extent). In fact, "every man could be a warrior, but, as a general thing, only those who received divine inspiration could be leaders." Training was begun in early youth. Battles as we understand them nowadays, or how they have long existed between civilized peoples were unknown. As Mr. Skinner says:

"The actual combats were never battles fought in the open between large bodies of soldiers; flying raids by small parties, ambuscades, and, particularly, night attacks, were the rule."

69. *Wedding-gifts.* In his article, "I doni nuziali," in the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 228-254), Dr. R. Corso gives a critico-comparative study of wedding-gifts, a custom concerning which there is still much difference of opinion among folklorists and sociologists. Wedding-gifts are not representative of the *pretia puellarum*; nor are they symbols of marriage itself, being, as it were, the *alter ego* of the person offering them. The view of Crawley. (*Mystic Rose*, 1902) to the latter effect is rejected by the author. According to Dr. Corso, the nuptial contract represents the modern history of marriage, while the ceremonies represent its prehistory.

70. *Word of the dead to the living.* In his article, "Der Spruch der Toten an die Lebenden," in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 53-63, 89-91), W. F. Storek treats of the famous saying:

"What we are, that you shall be,
What you are, that once were we,"

which is met with in all the languages of civilized Europe,—also in Arabic poetry in form similar to that met with in Medieval legends.

He gives in all 147 versions, dating from the third century down—from Arabic, Latin, various periods of French, German and English, Italian, Dutch, Low German, Spanish, Russian, Belgian, Portuguese, Bosnian, etc. The shortest form in which this saying occurs is the *Hodie mihi, eras tibi* of a Carthusian inscription at Dijon,—it is also found in many other places. About the longest is a Latin inscription at Nordhausen, beginning

“Sta Viator, audi, dum te alloquor,
Et disce, sed a mortuo.”

Here belongs also the epitaph (A. D. 1376) of the Black Prince:

“Tiel come tu es ie au tiel fu:
Tu seras tiel come je su.”

The earliest citation seems to be from the third century A. D., and the saying still occurs in our own day. It is not confined to an alleged sepulchral utterance of the dead, but turns up in folk and other poetry, finds place over the entrances to cemeteries and charnel houses, occurs inscribed on works of art with allegorical representations of the transitory, etc. And it is also the origin perhaps of the legend of “The Three Living and the Three Dead,”—incorrectly, too, it has been looked upon as the source of the “dance of death.”



